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Editorial Foreword

Silviu Miloiu

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The current issue of Revista Română pentru Studii Baltice și Nordice / The Romanian Journal of Baltic and Nordic Studies (RRSBN) continues the publication of selected papers presented at the second international conference for Baltic and Nordic Studies in Romania entitled Black Sea and Baltic Sea Regions: Confluences, influences and crossovers in the modern and contemporary ages, an event which was organized under the aegis of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies with the support of the embassies of Finland, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden in Romania, of the Consulate of Latvia, of Valahia University of Târgoviște, of the City Hall of Târgoviște, of the The Princely Court National Museum Complex of Târgoviște and of Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House and of the respected companies Niro Investment Group and Arvi Agro SRL.

One of the most inspiring papers presented at the conference authored by Stefan Ewert from Greifswald University in Germany approaches comparatively the development of regional integration and identity by the means of regional higher education in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions. The author finds out that the two regions resemble each other only in terms of challenges they are facing, but when it comes to regional identity, regional co-operation and political institutionalization the Baltic Sea Region is well ahead its South-Eastern European counterpart. Instead of conclusions, the author chooses to suggest the steps to be taken by future comparative researches in the field of regional academic cooperation within the two regions, such a comparison allowing evaluating “the empirical background for an appropriate EU-strategy in the Black Sea Region.”

The Finnish respected historian Vesa Vares of University of Turku continues his analyses on the perception of „otherness“ in the European political culture, approaching the way Finland regarded Eastern Europe’s political systems and national characteristics during the interwar period. While Finland was regarded in Western Europe or in Scandinavia as part of the periphery and consequently her elite strove to prove how committed
the country was to Western values, her perceptions of Eastern Europe grew negative during the interwar period and she often accused the peoples of this area of the same sins others were attributing to herself.

The Greek historian Dimitris Michalopoulos of Historical Institute for Studies on Eleutherios Venizelos and his Era undertakes an analysis of the Romanian-Polish relations and of their regional implications. The author approaches the rationality behind the concluding of the Romanian-Polish alliance and underlines the importance of this coalition for East Central Europe in the complex geopolitical and ideological circumstances of the interwar period. Despite the rock-hard foundation on which these relations were established and the common security threats the two nations were facing, the bonds between them started to dwindle in mid-1930s as a result of the changing balance of power in Europe and of the raising influence of totalitarian great powers.

Dalia Bukelevičiūtė of Vilnius University brings a fresh air from the Lithuanian and Czech archives on the issue of the Little Entente and of Romania’s foreign policy and the way they were interpreted in Kaunas. According to the author, Lithuania showed some interest in the developments in Central and South-Eastern Europe only by mid-1930s, but even that was short-lived and shallow.

A recent Ph.D. of the University of Iaşi and an associate researcher at the University of Oslo, Vasilica Sîrbu discusses in her paper the failure of Romanian personalities to be proposed or accepted as candidates for winning the Nobel Peace Prize as well as their advocacy on behalf of various personalities to be awarded this highly respected recognition.

Ana-Maria Despa, in her debut article, reconstitutes the history of diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway during the interwar period and the international and domestic environments which affected their development. The conclusion of the author is that “the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway in the interwar period can be considered peripheral, but by no means can they be regarded as irrelevant both in the context of their foreign policy and in relation to the system of international relations”.

We hope that the diversity of topics, methods and approaches from this issue of the journal will engender a good reception from our public and that they will be a catalyst for further researches aimed at deepening our knowledge and understanding of the past and current encounters between the Black Sea and Baltic Sea rim peoples.

To achieve such goals, a great support was provided by the Niro Investment Group, a company that generously sponsored this publication and to which we extend our full gratitude.
REGIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION CO-OPERATION: A RESEARCH PROPOSAL TO COMPARE THE BALTIC SEA AND THE BLACK SEA REGIONS

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Acknowledgments
This paper has been presented at the Second International Conference on Nordic and Baltic Studies: Black Sea and Baltic Sea Regions: Confluences, influences and crosscurrents in the modern and contemporary ages hosted by the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies, Târgoviste, May 20-22, 2011.
I would like to thank the organizers of the Second International Conference on Nordic and Baltic Studies for their kind invitation, the discussants of our panel for their helpful comments as well as the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their constructive suggestions.

Abstract:
While the Baltic Sea Region is considered to be a pioneer region in the development of regional integration and identity, the Black Sea Region is regarded to be a laggard in terms of regionalization and region building. My paper summarizes the role of regional higher education co-operation in the Baltic Sea regionalization process in theory and analyzes the empirical background of these assumptions. Yet, inasmuch an evaluation of the regions’ status as a pioneer is possible only in a comparative perspective, I propose to compare the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea Region regarding their higher education networks systematically. My paper asks for the transferability of arguments in favor of a strong regional higher education co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region since the 1990s to today’s situation of the Black Sea Region. It concludes with some fundamental considerations on a comparative research project.

Rezumat:
În timp ce regiunea Mării Baltice este considerată a fi o pionieră în dezvoltarea integrării și a identității regionale, regiunea Mării Negre este considerată a fi codașă în ceea ce privește regionalizarea și consolidarea regională. Lucrarea mea rezumă rolul cooperării regionale în învățământul superior în procesul de regionalizare a Mării Baltice în teorie și analizează fundalul empiric al acestor asupți. Cu toate acestea, întrucât o evaluare a statutului regiunii ca pionieră este posibilă numai dintr-o perspectivă comparativă, îmi propun să compar regiunea Mării Negre și regiunea Mării Baltice privind sistematic rețelele lor de
INVĂȚĂMÂNT SUPERIOR. Lucrarea mea își pune întrebări cu privire la transferul de argumente în favoarea unei cooperări regionale puternice în învățământul superior în regiunea Mării Baltice din anii 1990 până la situația actuală din regiunea Mării Negre. Ea se încheie cu câteva considerații fundamentale asupra unui proiect de cercetare comparativă.

**Keywords:** regionalization; region building; regional higher education co-operation; academic networks; interregional comparison

**Introduction**

After the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea Region experienced a strong increase of regional bottom-up initiatives of co-operation, yet also a growing number of political top-down projects like the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) or the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC). Social scientists emphasized the intensive co-operation of non-political institutions and the networking of the civil society as a feature and stated the Baltic Sea Regions’ status „as a pioneer in the introduction of new modes of governance” . The constructivist approach on Baltic Sea region building became the dominating approach in explaining regional co-operation.

Co-operation and networking of higher education institutions in the Baltic Sea Region is considered as a main pillar of regionalization in social sciences theory and regional politics. In the beginning of the 1990s, the CBSS, the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) along with different bi-national initiatives supported regional higher education co-operations as a soft security strategy to enhance stability and economic prosperity in the

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1 I define the Baltic Sea Region as the region consisting of the eleven member states of the CBSS. These states are Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland. For Russia, Poland and Germany, only the subnational administrative bodies bordering the Baltic Sea are considered. For a discussion of this definition of the Baltic Sea Region, cf. Stefan Ewert, Region Building im Ostseeraum? Zur Rolle der Hochschulen im Prozess der Regionalisierung im Nordosten der Europäischen Union (unpublished dissertation at Greifswald University, 2010), 4-5.


Co-operation was mainly a transfer of knowledge from the established democracies in the north and the west of the Baltic Sea to the transition countries of the region. Academic co-operation projects to support the transition of higher education institutions in the Baltic States, but also the north-western oblasts in Russia and the northern voivodeships in Poland were argued to have a multiplier effect. The training of the new elites for the economic, political and law systems was the key of a peaceful and economically successful development of the region. After 2000, regional academic networking between east and west became more balanced. Goals like the promotion of the Baltic Sea as a “knowledge-based region” in global competition and the scientific contribution to the enhancement of the ecologic stability of the Baltic Sea were the reasons behind the regional higher education co-operation. The regional political organizations supported these goals, while scholars were actively included in the region building initiatives.

In my research on higher education co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region, I measured the degree of regional academic networking. As a result, the existence of a regional higher education space as stated in the region building literature can be identified in parts. There is some evidence for a strong co-operation, but the regional focus of a higher education institution depends on the main subjects and the membership in academic networks. But is the strength of co-operation in the field of higher education a distinguishing mark of the Baltic Sea Region? Is the region a “pioneer” in bottom-up-networking? To answer these questions, an interregional comparison is needed.

My paper is a first step of such a comparison, analyzing the pre-conditions for a strong higher education co-operation in the Baltic and the Black Sea. A systematic analysis of academic networking in both regions has three goals:

The interregional comparison could – for the field of higher education – test the thesis of a “pioneer status” of the Baltic Sea Region.

(2) The comparison could help to understand the regional development/regionalization around the Black and the Baltic Sea.

(3) From a political consulting perspective, the analysis could help to evaluate the conditions of success of regional political initiatives.

In the second chapter of my paper, I will summarize the arguments for a strong academic co-operation on regional level and the creation of a higher education space in the Baltic Sea Region. I will distinguish an internal, academic benefit of such a regional networking and external benefits (positive externalities). Chapter 3 tests the empirical background of the assumptions discussed in chapter 2 in order to evaluate the region building rhetoric and the political initiatives for the Baltic Sea Region. This analysis is done by an index-based comparison of the higher education institutions’ process of internationalization and the importance of the region within this process.

Following my research on Baltic Sea regionalization and the results of my intra-regional comparison in the field of higher education policy, I propose to extend the research to an inter-regional comparison between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea Region. This research would be a promising project to enhance our knowledge on regionalization and regionalism in the future and to understand the peculiarities of both regions. As a kind of preliminary study, chapter 4 asks for the transferability of arguments in favor of a strong academic co-operation in the Black Sea Region. Chapter 5 concludes my paper with some fundamental considerations on the comparative research project.

**Reasons for Regional Academic Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region**

In the early 1990s, the number of projects of academic co-operation increased strongly. While the western assistance in the reforming process of the transition countries in general and their higher education systems in particular was the main argument for regional co-operation projects in the beginning, the reasons for a strong academic co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region were extended later. This is true for the arguments discussed in the scientific literature as well as for the reasons given by the regional political organizations.

*Scientific discussions of benefits of regional higher education co-operation*
A matrix differentiating the assumed benefit (for the higher education institution vs. externality) and the level of the effects (concrete policy field vs. subjective level) shows the different rationales for regional academic networking. Table 1 outlines these arguments.

**Table 1: Benefits of strong higher education networking as discussed in the discourse on Baltic Sea regionalization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects on</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>For Higher Education Institutions (internal benefit)</th>
<th>External benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concrete policy</td>
<td>Internationalization</td>
<td>Transformation of Higher Education Institutions in the south-eastern Baltic Sea Region</td>
<td>Security and stability in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Positioning of Higher Education institutions in the global competition</td>
<td>Environmental protection/protection of the Baltic Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective level</td>
<td>Creation of a common identity/“Branding”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic synergistic effects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source: own illustration**

The internal or academic benefit argument refers to the assumption that a strong regional academic co-operation of a higher education institution increases the academic quality of that institution (field top left of table 1). Firstly it is said that the Baltic Sea Region offers a consistent framework for internationalization of higher education institutions. There is some evidence that cultural and spatial proximity of co-operating universities in general has a positive impact on the success of international collaboration.\(^8\) Transferred onto the Baltic Sea Region, networking on the regional level could help to enhance the internationalization (as one indicator for the success of the higher education institution) and to

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implement the aims of the Bologna process of convergence and harmonization in European higher education.9

At the beginning of the 1990s, the main argument for a strong regional networking referred to the special situation of the higher education systems in the transition states and especially in the new independent Baltic States. To reform and modernize the higher education sectors in the transition countries, the region was a suitable frame for a knowledge transfer from (north-) west to (south-) east.10 Higher education co-operation should help to modernize curricula, teaching methods and materials, to enhance the quality of teaching and to avoid a brain drain in the tertiary education sector of the new democracies.

A third argument of a benefit for the academic institution to cooperate on regional level is presented prominently by the former rector of Tartu University and minister for education in Estonia, Jaak Aaviksoo: He proposes to establish a global brand name for the Baltic Sea universities in the global educational competition.11 The universities in the region are – like the higher education systems in general – comparatively small. To be perceived in the global competition for staff and students, they should come together under one regional label. A pre-condition for this is a coordinated higher education policy in the Baltic Sea region, making strong regional networks work.

But the arguments in favor of a strong regional academic co-operation are not restricted to an assumed benefit for the higher education sector. Higher education networks in the Baltic Sea Region are supposed to create external, non-academic benefits, too (field top right in table 1). The first one refers to the transition process of the new independent Baltic States during the 1990s. Higher education co-operation was seen as a soft security to enhance security and stability in the region12. Teaching the new elites in economy, politics and law system with modern curricula, methods and materials does not only help to modernize universities, but also – as a multiplier effect – to strengthen and democratize the civil society.13 After a

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12 For a definition of “soft security” as covering all aspects of non-military security problems and an overview of soft security issues in the Baltic Sea Region see Hubel and Gänzle.
successful transformation process of the Baltic States and Poland and their accession to EU and NATO, regional co-operation within the framework of the EU-strategy for the Baltic Sea Region or the CBSS is considered as a strategy to intensify the relations between the EU and Russia and to test new forms of co-operation with Russia to improve the regional stability.\textsuperscript{14} Again, co-operation and networks in the higher education sector are regarded to be a pillar of this strategy.\textsuperscript{15}

Another soft security risk in the region is the specific ecological sensitivity of the Baltic Sea. To protect the marine environment, the “Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area” was adopted as the first region-wide convention during the Cold War in 1974. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was implemented as an institutional frame.\textsuperscript{16} Co-operations of universities and other higher education institutions were considered as an appropriate way to improve the marine environment: Joint research projects should help to enhance the knowledge on the ecological situation, and teaching collaborations should disseminate the knowledge in the whole Baltic Sea Region.

The argument of a positive influence of regional higher education networks on the position of the participating institutions in the global academic competition could be extended to the regional economies in general. Higher education co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region could help to bundle knowledge resources and bring about synergetic effects to the region.\textsuperscript{17} The common regional label of the higher education space or a “knowledge based Baltic Sea Region” could help to make the economies more visible in the global competition.

The arguments of an internal or external benefit discussed hitherto are clearly functional in scope: Regional co-operation should have a positive influence on concrete policies like environmental protection, regional stability, economic competition or internationalization. But the constructivist region building approach as the dominant approach

\textsuperscript{15} Ewert 2010, 246; 261-264.
\textsuperscript{17} Hans-Jürgen Heimsoeth, „Die deutsche Ostseeratspräsidenschaft“, in Politische Systeme und Beziehungen im Ostseeraum, eds. Detlef Jahn, Nikolaus Werz (München: Olzog, 2002), 282–293.
explaining the development in the Baltic Sea Region in the social sciences emphasizes an impact of regional co-operations on the subjective level, too. Higher education networking is assumed to have an effect on the creation of a regional identity. First of all, universities are described as places of the regional discourse, creating and disseminating regional symbols.\textsuperscript{18} Secondly, the existing academic co-operations are a kind of “engine” of regionalization, and regional networking initiatives show the regional awareness on the academic level.\textsuperscript{19} A Baltic Sea Region identity arises on the one hand between the higher education institutions (field bottom left in table 1). On the other hand, university networking helps to establish a regional sense of community and thus have a positive effect on the treatment of regional policy (field bottom right in table 1).

\textbf{Regional academic co-operation on the agenda of the regional political organizations and the EU-strategy for the Baltic Sea Region}

The analysis of the agenda of the regional political organizations in the Baltic Sea Region exposes the political influence of the arguments discussed in this chapter. Some initiatives like the \textit{Nordic Advisory Committee on Higher Education} (HØGUT) of the NCM aim to implement academic benefits for the higher education institutions in the region. But primarily, the regional political organizations emphasize the positive external effects of regional higher education networking. Already the founding declaration of the CBSS from 1992 stresses education as one main field of co-operation for the “construction of democratic societies”.\textsuperscript{20} And part of the core policy of the NCM in the 1990s was to enhance stability and security in the Baltic Sea Region by supporting the education of the new elites in the transitioning states of the region.\textsuperscript{21}

After 2000, the focus of the regional political organizations was on the promotion of the Baltic Sea Region in the globalized regional competition. Again, co-operation in the higher education sector plays a key role in this policy. Especially the development and discussions of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Kazimierz Musiał, “Education, research and the Baltic Sea Region Building”, in Musiał, 42.
\item \textsuperscript{20} CBSS, \textit{CBSS 1st Ministerial Session – Copenhagen Declaration}. Available at: \url{http://www.cbss.org/component/option,com_attachments/id,151/task,download/}, (accessed January 06, 2011).
\item \textsuperscript{21} Kazimierz Musiał, “Education, research and the Baltic Sea Region Building”, in Musiał, 55-56.
\end{itemize}
concept of a “Knowledge based Baltic Sea Region” in the CBSS and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) with the universities as main forums exemplify this idea of an external benefit of regional higher education co-operations. Here, the connections between the academic region building discourse and the agenda of the regional political organizations are outstanding.

The Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, adopted in October 2009 by the European Union, focuses on priority areas to bundle project-based European contributions to specific regional challenges like water protection and maritime safety. Again, educational and especially higher education co-operation is a core issue. On the one hand, there is a direct reference to this idea by integrating two university cooperation projects into the priority area 12 of the strategy (“To maintain and reinforce attractiveness of the Baltic Sea Region”). On the other hand, Schymik and Krumrey emphasize in their analysis of the consultation process the external benefit argument stated by the stakeholders in the formulation of the strategy. They conclude that ideas of education and research networking “touch upon all priority areas, be it educational programs to foster environmental awareness, research in maritime safety and security, or measures designed to promote region branding.” Again, regional co-operation of higher education institutions is described as an appropriate way to answer regional challenges beyond the academic institution.

The discussion of positive externalities of higher regional higher education co-operations and the corresponding initiatives by the political institutions make the analysis of the higher education networks focused in the region a question for political science: Is the empirical background of the initiatives strong enough to make them work and how influential are

23 Cf. the different articles in Henningsen.
the political institutions in terms of steering the internationalization of higher education institutions? To answer the questions, I made a proposal how to measure the regional embeddedness of academic institutions, analyzed the higher education institutions the Baltic Sea Region and discussed the role of the regional political organizations in this process.26 The following chapter 3 outlines my research results.

**Analyzing the Empirical Background: Higher Education Co-Operations in the Baltic Sea Region**

To understand the perception of the arguments for a strong regional higher education co-operation as presented in chapter 2, four flagship projects will exemplify the project-based implementation of the internal and (mainly) external benefits discussed above. Yet, to evaluate the empirical background of a Baltic Sea higher education space in a comprehensive way, a systematic analysis on the level of the higher education institution will follow these case studies.

**Four examples**

The region builders` assumption of the higher education sector as an engine of regionalization in the Baltic Sea Region is reasonable in so far as there are different co-operation projects that aim at the implementation of positive externalities. Four projects may illustrate this matter of fact:

1. Already in 1991, the Baltic University Programme (BUP) was founded as a university network to improve the quality of teaching in the areas of environmental protection/ sustainability and democratization. Initialized by the Uppsala University in Sweden, the project is a suitable example of a regional grassroots movement. Today, 225 higher education institutions from the Baltic Sea littoral states are members of the BUP and around 9,000 students take part in the courses developed collectively within the network.27 The content of the courses and programmes – sustainability and water protection as well as democracy and peaceful development – are clearly aimed at improving the ecological situation of the Baltic Sea and the democratic consolidation in the transition states.

2. As an example of a top-down initiative started by a regional political organization, the EuroFaculty project as one main field of activity of the CBSS in the 1990s is worth mentioning. From 1993 to 2005, the EuroFaculty Baltics project helped to (re-) establish and transform programs

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26 Ewert 2010.
in political sciences, economies and law at the University of Latvia (in Riga), University of Tartu and Vilnius University. Financial aid and staff exchange should help to modernize curricula and teaching methods, libraries and IT-networks. The project aimed to educate “local civil servants with distinct sets of knowledge, skills and experiences” to operate in the new democratic institutions. The overall goal was to “play a key role in the continued strengthening of the institutional and administrative capacity” in the Baltic States to enhance security and stability in the region.

(3) In the beginning of the 1990s, the NCM extended its activities to the Baltic States. The activities in the field of education and the support of student and teacher exchange in the region were a strategy “to contribute to the overall stability and security in the northern part of Europe”. Again, the enhancement of security and stability as the main regional challenge in the 1990s is the core incentive for higher education co-operation. Yet, the establishment of the NORDPLUS higher education program with a complete integration of the Baltic States in 2008 demonstrates the political initiative to generate internal benefits for the participating universities, too. Aims of the program are e.g. the development of joint study programs and the co-operation in quality assurance.

(4) Yet, also bilateral initiatives focus on the development of the region. In 1994, the Stockholm School of Economics established a branch in the capital of Latvia, Riga. The Swedish government and the parliament, as well as the George Soros foundation sponsored the project, while the Latvian government helped to acquire the school building. The Stockholm School of Economics in Riga aimed at broadcasting economic knowledge in the Baltic States to foster the economic and peaceful development of the

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28 In the 2000s, several EuroFaculty projects by the CBSS were implemented in Kaliningrad and Pskov to support the reform of study programs in law and economics. For a discussion of the problems in implementing the EuroFaculty Baltics, cf. Ewert 2010, 39-42.
Baltic Region. A fear was that the alumni will leave the region after finishing their studies, but surveys showed that the graduates remained in the Baltic States and worked in different economic sectors.

The Index of Regional Higher Education Networking

The four projects outlined exemplify the creation of positive externalities by regional higher education co-operation. Yet, to measure the strength of regional cooperation on the level of the higher education institution systematically, I use my index of Baltic Sea regional networking. The index consists of different dimensions of the internationalization of universities and higher education institutions. Four main processes of internationalization are the pillars of the index: In the field of teaching, academic mobility and the internationalization of curricula are the dimensions taken into account. For measuring academic research co-operations, the index comprehends the cross-border research projects with participating institutions from different countries and the joint publication of research results.

To operationalize these four dimensions, quantifiable indicators were built. For measuring academic mobility, ERASMUS exchange statistics served as the database. The ERASMUS program is the dominating exchange program in Europe. In contrast to the free mover mobility, bi- or multilateral contracts between higher education institutions are the precondition of exchange. The indicator for student mobility ( ) and for teachers’ mobility ( ) displays the relation between outgoing students/teachers staying in the region and the total number of outgoings from this higher education institution.

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36 Due to the fact that the Baltic States and Poland take part in the ERASMUS-exchange since the end of the 1990s, Russia is the only country of the Baltic Sea Region that is not participating in the program. For the interpretation of the index results, this limitation has to take into account.
37 Teachers’ mobility concerns the internationalization of teaching and research. Hence, the indicator refers to both dimensions.
The spatial concentration in the Baltic Sea Region within the context of the internationalization of curricula is analyzed for *joint degree/double degree* study programs and for the foreign language courses at the higher education institutions. In *double degree/joint degree* study programs, the locations of formal project partners show the regional program networking is the mean of all *joint/double degree* programs ratio of program partners from the Baltic Sea Region to the total number of project partners.

Apart from the co-operation in *double* and *joint* study programs, the foreign language courses offered at the higher education institutions show their regional integration. Even if English is the *lingua franca* in academic co-operation in general and in the Baltic Sea Region in particular, the teaching of regional languages is seen as one of the keys to regional knowledge and regional consciousness. The more regional languages are taught at the universities, the higher is one of the precondition factors for regionalization. In the Baltic Sea Region as defined above, there are eleven national languages, so every higher education institution in the region can offer ten regional foreign languages at most. The indicator shows the ratio between the *de facto* numbers of offered regional languages courses/studies and this maximum.

To analyze regional networking in research co-operation, the partners’ location in international research projects financed by the EU and

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Footnote 1: The languages are: Russian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, German, Danish, Norwegian, Icelandic, Swedish and Finnish.
the publication of research results in international co-authorship are considered.

For European universities, the different research programs established and financed by the EU are one main source for international research projects.\textsuperscript{39} To research the regional networks in these projects, I have analyzed the location of project partners and compiled an indicator .

consists of the number of projects conducted with partners only from Baltic Sea Region ( ), with partners from inside and outside the region, but the coordinator coming from inside ( ) and the number of projects with partners inside and outside the region, but the coordinator stemming from outside the Baltic Sea States ( ), divided by the whole number of projects of the university financed by the EU ( ).

Similarly, the regional co-operation in joint publications is weighted and related to the publications in international co-authorship on the whole . is the number of publications of scientists from one university written with international colleagues only from Baltic Sea Region universities, is the number of articles written with scientists from inside and outside the region.

Information on research projects financed by the EU are published on the portal CORDIS (Community Research and Development Information Service; \url{http://cordis.europa.eu}). For the research of international co-authorship, Thomson Scientific’s Science Citation Index and Social Science Citation Index are the database (\url{http://isiknowledge.com/wos}). Both websites are reliable databases to investigate regional research networking by analyzing the location of research partner’s home university.

The indicators for the different dimensions of internationalization have a range of values from 0 (minimum) to 1 (maximum). They are summarized to the Index of Regional Networking (IRN):

The index measures the relevance of the Baltic Sea Region in the process of internationalization for the particular higher education institution. The maximum value 1 indicates an exclusive concentration on the region, while the minimum value 0 shows that there is no regional co-operation.40

**Results for the Baltic Sea Region**

The index is my instrument of a systematic intraregional comparison of higher education institutions from one region. It helps to

(1) Evaluate the strength of regional co-operation not only on the basis of flagship projects, but on the basis of all higher education institutions in the region

(2) To test possible factors that influence the importance of the region in the process of the academic institutions’ internationalization by using quantitative social sciences methods.

(3) To give – from a political consulting perspective – advices to political initiatives of regionalization about the conditions for the higher education institutions to create the positive externalities discussed in chapter 1.

A further purpose of the index could be to provide the method for an interregional comparison as outlined in the following chapters. But first, the main results of my research on the Baltic Sea Region are depicted.

I compared all 70 higher education institutions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the German federal state Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with more than 1,000 students enrolled concerning their international contacts in the Baltic Sea Region in the year 2007.41 The interpretation of the values measuring the degree of regional focus in the process of internationalization reveals that there is no Baltic Sea Region higher education

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40 The value 0 may imply that there are no international contacts of the higher school at all. However, it can also mean that there is some international co-operation, but all with institutions from outside the Baltic Sea Region. For the research question, the conclusion is the same: There are no regional academic networks which can generate an internal or external benefit described in table 1. Values near 1 may also indicate an exclusive regional network if not all ten regional foreign languages are taught at the higher education institution.

41 In 2007, there were 34 higher education institutions in Lithuania, 15 in Latvia, 16 in Estonia and five in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with more than 1000 students enrolled. Data for the particular institutions comprehend their co-operation in the different dimensions in 2007.
space in general. The analysis shows considerable differences in regional networking between the institutions. While there are some academic institutions with more or less no international contacts in the Baltic Sea Region, other higher education institutions are strongly regional embedded. The Estonian University of Life Sciences in Tartu exhibits the highest score of regional integration (IRN = 0.60), followed by the Latvian University of Agriculture (Jelgava) (IRN = 0.54). In Lithuania, the University of Klaipėda (IRN = 0.45) and in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the University of Greifswald (IRN = 0.48) are the higher education institutions that have the strongest regional focus. The regional higher education sector and its intraregional contacts offer an empirical basis for the region building approach and the political initiatives to foster regionalization, yet the strength of regional embedding depends on certain factors on institutional level.

I tested these factors using correlation analyses. While there are no significant correlations between the size or the strength of internationalization in general and the regional embeddedness, the membership of the higher education institutions in regional higher education networks and the academic focus of the institution correlate with the values. With the significant correlation of the membership in networks and the level of regional integration in research and teaching, one feature of the Baltic Sea Region described in the theory of region building can be verified for the higher education sector. The approach emphasizes the importance of bottom up initiatives and networks for regionalization. The impact of networks on regional development is

42 The arithmetic mean of index for the 70 higher education institutions examined is IRN = 0.254, the standard deviation is 0.15. For a more detailed description and analysis of the regional embedding of the 70 higher education institutions, cf. Ewert 2010.

43 I analyzed the correlations between the membership in one or both region-wide higher education networks listed by Suominen et al. (2001) and the values. The networks are the Baltic University Programme (cf. BUP, About BUP. Available at: http://www.balticuniv.uu.se/index.php/about-us, accessed September 03, 2010) with more than 220 higher education institutions involved and the Baltic Sea Region University Network, founded in 2000 as an umbrella group of regional academic networks (BSRUN, General Information. Available at: http://bsrun.utu.fi/information/, accessed September 03, 2010). The Parsons r correlation scores are = .409 (BUP) and are = .557 (BSRUN). Both correlations are significant at the 0.01-Level.

argued to be a characteristic of the region.\textsuperscript{45} If a higher education institution is a member of a higher education network in the Baltic Sea Region, then this institution is systematically stronger integrated into the region in terms of teaching and research.\textsuperscript{46}

Next to the membership in regional higher education networks, the focus on the Baltic Sea Region depends on the focus of a higher education institution with regard to its content. My analysis shows a significant positive correlation of the IRN values for agricultural and traditional universities, while the higher education institutions with a focus on economic and social sciences are considerably less regionally embedded\textsuperscript{47}. This result is an empirical evidence for the assumption of a different academic incentive to co-operate mainly on the regional level. While e.g. agricultural universities have strong academic incentives to co-operate on regional level due to the comparable landscape situation and similar forms of farming\textsuperscript{48}, higher education institutions with other academic focus have smaller academic incentives. As a consequence for regional policies, there is a need for an external intensive (project funding etc.) given to the higher education institutions in order to create a regional higher education area not only in certain academic fields.

To sum up: The analysis shows that there are projects on the academic level to implement the benefits of a regional co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region as presented in chapter 2. A comprehensive measurement of the role of the region in higher education internationalization on institutional level depicts that there is an empirical basis for region building

\textsuperscript{46} Ewert 2010, 228-229.
\textsuperscript{47} I correlated the values with dummy variables, mapping the focus of the academy with regard to its content. The allocation of higher education institutions to different groups is mainly based on the names of the academic institutions and the study programs offered. Except for the last category (“traditional universities”), institutions were allocated to the group which matched the majority of the programs best. The eight groups were technical, agricultural, medical pedagogical and social/economic sciences higher education institutions, art academies, police academies and traditional universities. There are correlations significant at the 0.01-level for the traditional universities (\textit{Pearsons} \( r = .383 \)), the agricultural academic institutions (\( r = .342 \)) and the higher education institutions with focus on social and economic sciences (\( r = -.449 \)). For the other groups, no significant correlations could be found.
\textsuperscript{48} Aldis Karklinsh, “Regional Agricultural Cooperation: Experiences and Future Potential”, \textit{Ambio} 26, no. 7 (1997): 466–468.
and regionalization in the higher education sector, even if a Baltic Sea region higher education space does not exist in general. But to test the pioneer character of the Baltic Sea Region in terms of regionalization, an interregional comparison is needed. Hence, the following chapters 4 and 5 propose to compare the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea Region concerning the extent of regional higher education co-operation.

Arguments in Favor of an Academic Co-operation in the Black Sea Region

Analyzing the reasons for a regional co-operation in the Black Sea Region shows that a bundle of arguments given for a strong regional networking in the Baltic Sea Region in the 1990s could be transferred to Black Sea Regions` challenges and development. Yet, the role of higher education institutions in the process of regionalization is discussed only elusively. The arguments of an internal, academic effect and positive externalities of regional higher education co-operation could as a matter of principle be applied in favor of a strong Black Sea regionalization. Yet, the de facto discourse seems to be much smaller than in the Baltic Sea Region. Three issues of regional policy may point out the transferability, yet also the elusive character of a public or academic debate:

(1) Though there are different levels and trajectories of democratic development in the Black Sea Region, democratic consolidation and the enhancement of political stability is a main challenge in all littoral states and hence for the Black Sea region as a whole, too.\(^\text{49}\) Obviously, the proper education of the civil servants in the region could serve as a key to consolidation of democracies, effectiveness, stability and a reduction of corruption. The multiplier effect of co-operations to reform and modernize the higher education systems in the transitional states for state stability and the development of a civil society could appear in the Black Sea Region as it appeared in the Baltic Sea Region (and especially in the Baltic States) in the 1990s.\(^\text{50}\) Yet, unlike the Baltic Sea Regions` situation in the beginning of the 1990s, political as well as bottom-up initiatives are rather scarce.

(2) One core question of regional stability in the Baltic Sea as well as in the Black Sea Region is the integration of Russia into the regional co-operation. As in the Baltic Sea Region, Russia`s history as the former


hegemonic power in the region and its position today in regional co-operation is the key to the region’s security and the solution of conflicts concerning energy transport networks through the region.\footnote{The regions position as an “energy corridor” is a considerable similarity between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea Region. For the EU as destination of these corridors, it makes both regions to pivotal bordering regions. Yet, while the Northern Dimension formulates a coherent EU-strategy on its north-eastern border, a Black Sea Dimension is still much less elaborated. Despite this influence of the EU as an external actor, the question is how much potential arises of the regions’ status as “energy corridors” for the development of a regional identity. The discussion in the Baltic Sea Region on the Northstream gas pipeline from Russia via the Baltic Sea to Germany shows that there is more conflict than co-operation on such projects. Cf. Grotzky and Isic, 5; Iris Kempe and Kurt Klotzle, The Balkans and the Black Sea Region: Problems, Potentials, and Policy Options (Munich: CAP Policy Analysis No. 2, 2006) 16-18.} In the Baltic Sea Region, the regional integration of Russia was a core question for the academic discourse as well as for the policy of the regional political organizations – even more with the accession of Poland and the Baltic States to the EU in 2004 (cf. chapter 2). A shared knowledge – region-wide spread on conferences, via academic exchange and other co-operation projects with Russia – is considered to be one soft security strategy of the EU member states to embed Russia into the Baltic Sea Region. Even if this strategy is far from being coherent in the Baltic Sea Region, it is even more elusive in the Black Sea Region.

(3) Another similarity of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea Region is the ecosystem’s fragility of the eponymous sea as a main regional challenge. Problems like the heavy tanker traffic, the toxic threats or the eutrophication by point- and diffuse sources (mainly agriculture) are only some threats for the Baltic and the Black Sea.\footnote{For the Baltic Sea Region, cf. Yrjö Haila, “Unity versus Disunity of Environmental Governance in the Baltic Sea Region”, in Joas, Jahn and Kern, 193-198. For the Black Sea Region, cf. Mustafa Aydin, Europe’s Next Shore: The Black Sea Region after EU-Enlargement (Paris: ISS Occasional Paper No. 53, 2004) 24-28.} Like in the case of the Baltic Sea, the regional co-operation to work on the improvement of the marine environment is – compared to other policies – strongly institutionalized. Organizations like the Commission for the Protection of the Black Sea (based on the Bucharest Convention) or the Black Sea Environmental Programme are regional institutions to improve the ecological situation of the Black Sea.\footnote{Fabrizio Tassinari, A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation: Guidelines for an EU Initiative (Brussels: CEPS Policy Brief No. 105, 2006) 6-7.} Concerning the sustainable development of the Black Sea Region, bottom-up initiatives of higher education co-operation are to identify. Particularly the Black Sea Universities Network (BSUN) with its aim “to identify and enhance intellectual resources needed for sustainable
development”\textsuperscript{54} expresses the idea to create a positive externality for the region by academic networking.\textsuperscript{55}

Of course, further research is needed to describe the role of higher education networking in the discourse on Black Sea Regions development systematically. It is the first step to a comprehensive comparison of both regions as proposed in this article. Possible positive external effects and its public and academic discourse should to be analyzed for the policies mentioned above, yet also for the economic development, transportation networks or regional problems like human trafficking etc. But my point is the following: There is a good base for arguing that patterns of reasoning for a strong Black Sea regional co-operation are – with some exceptions – similar to the situation in the Baltic Sea Region. If this is true, higher education institutions and their regional co-operation could play a similar strategic role like the academic co-operation in the project of Baltic Sea region building. Next to that, we see a kind of political institutionalization of regionalization – for example the European Neighbourhood policy on the Black Sea Region and – as a kind of umbrella for different initiatives of regional co-operation – the organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).\textsuperscript{56} These institutions could serve as an engine for higher education co-operations, being a forum of region builders and giving incentives to the academic institutions to co-operate regionally.

Yet among scholars, BSEC co-operation is considered to have a rather “poor performance”\textsuperscript{57}. While the regional challenges in the Baltic Sea Region (especially in the 1990s) and the Black Sea region feature a considerable amount of similarities, the level of regional identification, regional co-operation and political institutionalization in the Black Sea Region is much less developed than in the Baltic Sea Region.\textsuperscript{58} It results in the situation that there is no coherent internal or external strategy on Black Sea regionalization discussing regional higher education co-operation and networking to foster regional development. From a political science point of view, it leads to the question if these different points of departure lead to a different level of regional higher education co-operation. Hence, I


\textsuperscript{56} Aydin 2005, 62-66.

\textsuperscript{57} Tassinari 2006, 2; Cf. Grotzky and Isic, 7.

\textsuperscript{58} Kempe and Klotzle, 5.
propose to compare this empirical background of regionalization projects in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea Region in a systematic way.

**Conclusion: Comparing Academic Co-operation in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea Region**

Such a systematic comparison consists of three steps. First of all, the rationales behind the demand for a strong academic co-operation on regional level are to be compared concerning their role in the political and academic discourse and their regional adaption. The question is: Why should a higher education institution co-operate on regional level? A comparison of the arguments given in the Baltic and the Black Sea regional discourse serves as a foundation of the empirical analysis in both regions.

In a second step, the analysis of the implementation in different political and/or academic projects would help to understand the adaption of the arguments in practice. For instance, a case comparison of the *Baltic University Programme* and the *Black Sea Universities Network* could depict the prospects and challenges of academic co-operation generating a positive externality on sustainability in the Region. Furthermore, the model character of the BUP to establish the BSUN could be elaborated.

Yet, to test the empirical basis for a *region building* project in the tertiary education sector systematically, all higher education institutions should be included into the comparison of regions. An aggregation of values for different kinds of higher education institution and the comparison between the Black and the Baltic Sea Region could then depict the background factors of regional integration.

As stated in the introduction of my paper, such a threefold comparison could generate three research results. Firstly, it could test the hypothesis of the Baltic Sea Region as a forerunner or pioneer in regionalization and the governance of regional policies on non-state-level. Secondly, the analysis would help to evaluate the prospects and challenges for the region and regionalization in the light of the situation in the other region. And last but not least, such a research project has a political consulting dimension. For instance, the comparison of the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea concerning the level of higher education co-operation within the regions could help to formulate a coherent EU-strategy for the Black Sea Region. In general, two approaches of a European policy towards Euro-regionalisms can be identified: An outside-in-strategy with the EU as an initiator of regionalization and the inside-out-model with a strong co-operation on state and civil society level already running.\(^59\) While in the

\(^{59}\) Tassinari, 2006.
second case, the EU has to position itself within these strong regional networks (like it has to do in the case of the Baltic Sea Region), the main challenge in the first case is to find partners in the region. The systematic analysis of higher education co-operation in the Black Sea region and its comparison to the Baltic Sea Region could help to evaluate the empirical background for an appropriate EU-strategy in the Black Sea Region.

References:

A. Books and Articles


Regional higher education co-operation: a research proposal to compare the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea regions


B. Web postings


“NEVER SATISFACTORY, ACCORDING TO THE FINNISH STANDARDS”. FROM OPTIMISM AND INTEREST TO DISAPPOINTMENT AND DISILLUSION: FINNISH VIEWS ON THE NATIONS IN EASTERN CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

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Abstract:
The questions of national prejudices, xenophobia and enemy images have been lately popular issues. The creation of the “Other” has been evident in racial issues, like in the ideologies of imperialism or anti-Semitism. However, it is important to see the same mentality inside the European political culture itself, because the images often did and still do divide the nations into different categories. This mentality gained even more impetus after the collapse of the empires in 1918 and yet again in the discussion about “Old Europe” and “New Europe”. My purpose is to study how Finland saw Eastern Europe and its political systems and national peculiarities between the World Wars. Finland formed an interesting hinge between Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. On the one hand it wanted to emphasize how Western its mental heritage was; on the other, it had to fight off assumptions that it was still “half-Russian” and behaving in a “Balkan” manner. In the early 1920s there were also ideas of similar interests in European politics and similarities of the social structure. In the longer run, the Finns saw Eastern Europe as an area which was not ready for democracy, because it lacked the elements of national cohesion and basic people’s education. Argumentation resembles the German one, but was not necessarily decided by it – rather by own experience or Scandinavian and sometimes Hungarian information. For the Finns, Hungary formed some sort of exception of the prejudiced view because it was considered to be a kindred nation, but the experts could see little similarities even between Finland and Hungary.
Rezumat:
Chestiunea prejudecăților naționale, a xenofobiei și a imaginii inamicului au reprezentat aspecte populare în ultima vreme. Crearea „Celuilalt” a fost evidentă în problemele rasiale, ca și în ideologiile imperialismului sau antisemitismului. Cu toate acestea este important să observăm aceeași mentalitate și în interiorul culturii politice europene în sine, deoarece imaginele de multe ori au împărțit și încă mai împăr națiunile în diferite categorii. Această mentalitate a căștigat un impuls și mai mare după prăbușirea imperiilor în anul 1918 și încă o dată în discuția despre „Vechea Europă” și „Noua Europă”. Scopul meu este de a aborda modul în care Finlarda a percepct Europa de Est, sistemele sale politice și particularitățile sale naționale în perioada interbelică. Finlanda a constituit o „balama” interesantă între Scandinavia și Europa de Est. Pe de o parte, a vrut să sublinieze cât de occidental era patrimoniul său mental, pe de altă parte, a trebuit să lupte împotriva asumptiilor că ea era încă „jumătate-rusească” și că se comporta într-o manieră "balcanică". La începutul anilor 1920 au existat, de asemenea, concepții cu privire la interese similare în politica europeană și la asemănări ale structurii sociale. Pe termen mai lung, finlandezii au văzut Europa de Est ca o zonă care nu era pregătită pentru democrație, pentru că îi lipseau elementele de coeziune națională și educația de bază a oamenilor. Argumentarea se aseamănă cu cea germană, dar nu a fost neapărat decisă de aceasta – mai degrabă a fost preluată prin experiența proprie sau prin informațiile provenite din mediile scandinave și, uneori, din cele de limba maghiară. Pentru finlandezii, Ungaria a format un fel de excepție în ceea ce privește aceste prejudecăți deoarece era considerată a fi o națiune înrudită, dar experții au putea observa puține asemănări chiar și între Finlândia și Ungaria.

Keywords: nation-building; identity; nationalism; Finnish foreign relations; Eastern European image abroad; the “Other”

The issue
The terms “exoticism” and the “Other” are nowadays usual among researchers while talking about the differences between Europe and other continents (mainly Third World countries). In cases where the differences between the observer and the subject are very evident these terms are, of course, very clearly useful. This is also what the most authoritative and well-known scholars on the issue of the “Other”, like Edward Said, Stuart Hall, Benedict Anderson, Hugh Honour etc. refer to – not to mention the less academic commentators. In most cases, the research of “Us” and the “Other” deals with nationalistic or even xenophobic phenomena. And the  

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fact that the outward differences of the “Other” are as obvious as possible, like the clothing of the Orthodox Jew, the peculiarity of a skin of another colour or the strange prayers of a Moslem, certainly help to create the image of the “Other”, and the stereotype carries more easily mental and political weight.

But in those cases the terms become also problematic; one is almost tempted to say that when the differences between the observer and the subject are very obvious, the shades between these two very different entities easily disappear altogether, and the two extremes inevitably become “Us” and the “Other”, “Normal” and “Exotic”.

It might be even argued that the terms are in fact more useful in milder contexts than when comparing two extremes. In this paper I concentrate on a subject where the differences were clear, but not equally imminent nor carried such a historical burden: the Finnish, or, seen more widely, Scandinavian, views on Eastern Central Europe. By this, I mean the area between the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean, and between the German, Russian and Turkish areas. Russia as such is not included, although its – or Germany’s for that matter – influence can not totally be neglected. The period in scrutiny is the time between the World Wars – the time when this area had gained independence of the Old, collapsed Empires, but also the time when the domestic policy meant for almost the entire area the failure of parliamentary democracy and the introducing of a strong-man Government.

It might be asked, whether this question is at all worth research, since it does not carry great drama. Finland and Eastern Central Europe were neither enemies nor allies. Eastern Central Europe was never vital to Finnish identity or Finnish nationalism. Events in Eastern Central Europe did not cause changes in Finnish society, domestic or foreign policy, as the policies of Russia, Scandinavia, Germany and even to some extent England or the Baltic states did. Eastern Central Europe was too far to have common interests with Finland and far enough not to cause any trouble, let alone dangers, to Finland. It was not only geographically remote, but also mentally far. Whereas most people in Finland had some idea or knowledge, some even experience of what Sweden, Germany, Russia and England were, Eastern Central Europe was something that was strange to them. There was little that would have connected even an educated Finn to, say, Bulgaria, or that would have compelled him or her to have any opinion on Serbs and Croats. It was like Neville Chamberlain defined Czechoslovakia in 1938: a far-off country, about which we know nothing.
However, this is precisely one reason why the question of the Eastern European image is interesting: it was a good instrument to form stereotypes, and these stereotypes could have both “good” and “bad” features. The area did not consist of fairy tale countries, but nevertheless of countries which could be very easily represented either as a good reference group in the New Europe or as something that was “un-Finnish” or otherwise strange – the “Other”. Eastern Central Europe was a fertile and safe ground for stereotypes to entertain, especially in a time, when the Finns were exceptionally free to make their own choices in seeking their own identity, their own role models and the warning examples. Thus the view on Eastern Central Europe, which seemed to be developing into an entity of its own, was relevant, even though this area did not concretely influence Finnish policy and choices.

I must point out that this is not a study on Eastern Central Europe as such or on the domestic or foreign policy of the Eastern Central European countries, but on the reactions and mentalities of the Finns. Thus I do not claim that the Finnish stereotypes on the area which stretched from Poland to Greece were reasonable or truthful. They were mainly myths and generalizations. But they were true to those people who expressed these views, and since there were very few experts on the issue in Finland, the few ones who could claim any sort of expertise had almost a monopoly on the general opinion – or, to be more precise, to that part of the general opinion which had any interest in Eastern Central Europe. I only explain the Finnish mentality by the myths which it expressed; I do not make statements on Eastern Central Europe itself.

Of course, the Finns had also another stereotype of a culturally inferior, definitely “Eastern” nationality in the 1920s and 1930s. This was the image of a Russian. The Russian was simultaneously stupid, childish, drunken, dirty, cowardly, devilish and dangerous – and always lacking any self-control or the sense of sacrificing himself for a higher cause. However, the Finnish Russophobia cannot be compared to the views on Eastern

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Central Europe as such, since in the case of Russia, the outward feeling of superiority actually covered the feelings of fear and danger (or, to some, also the wishes for expansion at Russia’s expense). No such feelings could be attached to the stereotypes on Eastern Central Europe, which was far and harmless, and could not offer much help either.

I maintain that the Finnish reaction towards the Eastern Central European features, policies and national habits can be compared to identity-building, with some exaggeration almost to a sort of ”neo-nationalism”, and to the sense of ”Otherness”. Also criticism against Eastern Central Europe or emotional “Balkans”-labelling between the World Wars can be seen as methods of creating and defending one’s identity against an alien, the ”Other”. It is the same mechanisms that apply even in a case where the outward differences are not so striking. It is possible to create one’s identity – or, to put it more unscrupulously, to convince oneself of being better than the other – also by more conventional and less extreme means, but basically using the same kind of psychology. It was a way to prove that Finland had a different cultural and political background than Eastern Central Europe and was a more developed and “civilized” country than those in the East (although, in fact, Finland was itself geographically more Eastern than they were – this seldom comes to mind as Finland is usually seen to be a part of the “North”, so that the actual geographical West-East-dimension is forgotten).

The Finnish mentality, consciously or subconsciously, needed this kind of stereotype of a less developed, strange and exotic area – otherwise there would have been only a sense of inferiority towards the more developed Scandinavia, Germany and Western Europe. Moreover, there was a need to fight against the stereotypes which one knew to be entertained about Finland itself – especially the notions that the Finns were themselves “Mongols” or ”Russian”.

But I will now look more deeply into the stereotypes which the Finns entertained about others.

**A possible reference group?**

The real differences between Finland and Eastern Central Europe were actually not as big as we might now think. Most definitely, they were not as big as between, say, Sweden and Romania or Germany and

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Yugoslavia. Finland was a new state, independent only since December 1917, and its society was equally agrarian and rural as in most Eastern Central European countries. It was far less urbanized and industrialized than Scandinavian countries; even as late as the end of 1930s, about two thirds of the population earned their living in agriculture and lived in the countryside.

There is also good reason to question how it was even possible for the Finns to have feelings of superiority towards Eastern Central Europe. The prestige of the Finns was most probably not very high in Eastern Central Europe. Most of the population had probably not ever heard of Finland, and if they had heard the name, they considered it Russian or just as one of the new Baltic states in the far North. Even the Hungarians, who had at least some interest in Finland because it was considered to belong to the same Fenno-Ugrian kin, talked semi-contemptuously of the “fish-smelling cousins in the north” in the late 19th century. After the First World War, seeking friends after the Trianon trauma, they were more eager to cultivate relationships with these cousins.

And why would anyone have heard of Finland anyway? Whereas almost any Eastern Central European nation had some period of glory to remember and to be nostalgic for – Poland and Hungary had been mighty Empires, the Balkan nations had fought courageously against the Turks etc. –, the Finns had been a bunch of provinces of Sweden for 650 years and then an autonomous state in the Russian Empire for 108 years. Not much to boast about or to have nostalgia for past greatness – or to raise envy in others.

Thus it is not strange that some Finns thought in the terms of trying to become one of the Eastern Central European nations as quite a reasonable goal, not as degeneration. For a short period after the First World War some Finns dreamed of an alliance of new, rising and dynamic nations which reached from the Black to the Baltic Sea, and these circles were not totally out of influence.⁴

For example, some representatives of the powerful Agrarian Union, practically always in the Government and the biggest non-Socialist party in Finland in the 1920’s and 1930’s, thought that the political position of Finland and Eastern Central Europe was the same, the main enemy was the same (Russia), the social structure was the same, the idea of rising nationalism was the same, so Eastern Central Europe could be quite a natural reference group for Finland – provided it stayed radical and

democratic. When the reactionary landlords – often speaking foreign languages – would be thrown away in the vast area between the Black Sea and the White Sea, Finland, the Baltic states and Eastern Europe would all become progressive, democratic peasant nations.

The spiritual leader of the Agrarian Union, Santeri Alkio, even visualized in 1919 how the area from the Black Sea – including also the Ukraine and Belarus – to not only the Baltic Sea, but all the way to the White Sea, would become a nucleus for a “New Europe”. The “Old” Europe, the Western one, had exhausted itself in the war and was degenerated by cosmopolitan, individualist, urban and secular vices and by its former sinister imperialism. The new dynamic nations in the East were free of all these shortcomings. As Alkio put it: “Europe must be reborn in order to survive.” The “new Europe” could also defend itself against Russia – be this Bolshevik or Czarist – because it would have more population, more industry and would be more educated and nationally awakened than the eternally backward Russia.5

Also the Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti, who belonged to the liberal-minded National Progressive Party and held office in the early 1920s and late 1930s, had same kind of ideas. He wanted to create a security alliance, which would include Finland, the Baltic States, Poland and possibly some members of the Little Entente, at least Czechoslovakia. Even in 1934, when he was not a Foreign Minister but held the position of the Finnish representative in the League of Nations, he considered Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania as vibrant and dynamic nations, which had fervour and courage and which would be future European super powers.6

There were also all the time at least some Finns who thought that Finland and Poland had the same interests against Russia, no matter what the differences between the countries were. It is also interesting to note, that the Finnish Social Democrats, whose sympathies had been in the Polish-Russian War of 1920 rather on the Russian than on the Polish side, by and large accepted and even defended the Józef Piłsudski coup in 1926 against Finnish Liberals and Agrarians, who were very critical against it. The leading newspaper of the Social Democrats did not support anti-Parliamentarism and authoritarianism as such, but it interpreted that had

5 Ilkka, 16.12.1919.
Piłsudski not taken the power, the Fascist circles would have done it, since the reactionary forces had already been on the move, and right-wing Fascist rule would have been far more harmful to Polish society than Piłsudski’s. According to the newspaper, it had rather been a revolution than a coup, and the Polish democracy supported Piłsudski, who was politically rather a liberal non-socialist than anything else. “The socialist labour has been ready to take Piłsudski’s rather than the Fascists’ side.”

Some Finns stretched these dreams to Romania, and the Finnish envoy had very encouraging discussions with the Romanian politicians in the early 1920s.

The Romanians were not totally uninterested in the possibility to raise political capital in Finland because of this constellation. The Finnish envoy Väinö Tanner reported in October 1920, that the Romanian Prime Minister Averescu had suggested a joint conference of all border states from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, and Tanner wrote to Helsinki that the idea was worth considering, since Finland was for the time-being isolated from Scandinavia. Of course this would have to be done with all due caution, since the position of these countries was not stable nor out of danger. “We both considered that domestic peace and eagerness to work hard were dominant in Finland and Romania and that both countries were going towards a glorious future in economy.”

Meeting with King Ferdinand was even more encouraging. The King was staunchly anti-Bolshevist, glorified the Finnish struggle against Bolshevism and advised to make no compromises. He considered Bolshevism a “sort of religious madness” which represented “the worst and cruellest features of the Slavs”. The only trouble for the King was to understand why the Finns had had so close relationships with Germany in 1918. Tanner was apologetic: there had been no choice, since Sweden had not helped.

The Romanian King and Government did not make any concrete offers, and as the King expressed in the second meeting in February 1921, it was best to get to know each other first and leave the paragraphs to a later date. In his report to Helsinki Tanner made no qualms that he did not

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8 Professor of geology and geography – not the Social Democratic Minister Väinö Tanner.
9 Tanner to UM (Finnish Foreign Ministry) 12.8.1920, 21.10.1920. UM 5C 14, Bukarest; Tanner to UM 22.2.1921. UM 5C 14, Bukarest. – The text is very dim.
10 Tanner to UM 5.8.1920. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
11 Tanner to UM 12.8.1920. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
12 Tanner to UM 22.2.1921. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
trust much the Romanian ministers or society, since these were not Western, but the King was different – him you could trust.\textsuperscript{13} Tanner’s own goal – or as he expressed it, “working hypothesis” – was an alliance of Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Greece, and “naturally Finland shall be there too”.\textsuperscript{14} Actually he had offers of cooperation from even a farther country – from his Persian colleague, of whom he had quite a high opinion, even better than of most Romanians.\textsuperscript{15}

Later on even Tanner was not very optimistic about the proposed alliance with Romania; he was frustrated by what he considered to be Romanian dishonesty, bribery and sheer crimes – even the Legation of Finland fell victim to a robbery. Besides, after some time he concluded that Romania could not become interested in a country which lay so far from it.\textsuperscript{16}

Some of the positive stereotypes were not always directly connected to politics. Also some pragmatic features, like the democracy of Czechoslovakia\textsuperscript{17} or the military achievements of the Serbs, might be appreciated. Sakari Pälsi, an author who wrote several travel books about Eastern Europe, commented in Belgrade to his wife, that the military uniform had showed that the man was actually the crown of God’s creation, and the Serbian officer in his uniform was the most beautiful jewel of this crown. The wife admitted the Serbian part of the comment.\textsuperscript{18}

Another reporter wrote in the 1930s, that Bulgaria was the most democratic country in the world – since it had abolished party politics and the economic and social differences between the classes were so small.\textsuperscript{19} And even though most Finns would not have recognized Polish politicians by name, many of them had noticed that Janusz Kusocinski was the only non-Finn who had won the Olympic Gold Medal in track-and-field long distance running between 1924 and 1936.

However, the problem of the “pro-Eastern” circles was that they had hardly any following that would have carried real political weight. The bulk of Alkio’s party, the Agrarian Union, was totally uninterested in any foreign matters, and when Eastern Central Europe gradually turned to right-wing authoritarian governments, there was little for the Agrarians to

\textsuperscript{13} Tanner to UM 22.2.1921. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
\textsuperscript{14} Tanner to UM 17.8.1920. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
\textsuperscript{15} Tanner to UM 6.9.1920. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
\textsuperscript{16} Tanner to UM 9.9.1920, 23.10.1920. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
\textsuperscript{17} See for example Idman to the UM 8.11.1928. UM 5C 13 Varsova.
identify oneself with – those governments were seen as the return of the feudal landlords. Also the Progressives were more interested in getting security guarantees from England and France. When Holsti introduced a military alliance treaty which he had signed with Poland, Latvia and Estonia in 1922, he was dismissed by the Finnish parliament, which also refused to ratify the treaty. The majority thought that this kind of alliance would have meant more trouble than security. And if you would have gone still more south, the common interests – and the advantages for Finland – would have become still weaker.

Most countries of the area were already on the “wrong” side: Czechoslovakia had a military agreement with the Soviet Union, Poland and Romania would make Finland a tool of France’s anti-German policy. The Finns did not want to ally themselves with Germany either, be it democratic or National Socialist, but since they had no quarrel with it, they had no wish to make it an enemy either – one great power was more than enough for this. All in all, the Russian / Soviet challenge could not be answered by cooperation with Eastern Central Europe.

The Scandinavian, Lutheran background

For the vast majority of the educated Finnish class any kind of identification with Eastern Central Europe proved to be impossible.\(^{20}\) The intellectuals were mainly Conservatives, who had previously studied in Germany and were grateful for the German intervention in the Finnish Civil War in 1918. It was not that they would have been entirely on the mercy of German prejudices of backward Eastern Europe. They were no doubt influenced by it; German was the foreign language which they mastered, and German scientific literature was the one foreign literature which they knew. But previously they had also been critical of German minority policy which had been directed against the Czechs and the Poles. It was mainly the Scandinavian, Lutheran background and the Finnish nationalism which emphasized the national cohesion and the importance of the education of the common people and education as criteria for governing the society, which made the Finnish intellectuals see Eastern

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\(^{20}\) I have previously discussed the theme in shorter articles: Vesa Vares, „Rajankäyntä sivistyksen nimissä. Suomalaiset ja Väli-Eurooppa maailmansotien välillä,” Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 2 (2003): 248-262. Most parts of the analysis in these chapters are conclusions of wide source material, so I will refer to specific sources only when they deal with the specific examples mentioned in the text.
Central Europe as the “Other”. It was precisely on such matters that Eastern Central Europe was seen lacking.\textsuperscript{21}

The Finns did not feel that history would have made Eastern Central Europe in any way superior to Finland. Quite the contrary. True, there had been no Finnish Empire, but there had been 650 years as part of Scandinavia (belonging to Sweden), then 100 years of autonomy in the Russian Empire. For the Finnish intellectuals, this meant that Finland had always been a part of the West and was now a ripe, Scandinavian nation and state; the only trouble was to make others realize this as well. Independent Finland might be something new, but the state institutions had in fact been founded already in the beginning of the 19th century, and the Finns had ruled their own country as an autonomous state quite freely (with the exception of years 1899–1917). This Scandinavian cultural influence, the German connections and the existence of the state institutions long before independence made the Finns think that they belonged to the nations which were “ready” and that there was a sense of national cohesion and civilization in Finland – they had been educated and trained for independence, whereas Eastern Central Europe mostly did not have this sort of background.

True, nations in Eastern Central Europe might have a glorious past, at least some of them. But where had the Polish nation been for the last 150 years? Hadn’t Hungary been conquered by Turks and Austrians? Had the Balkan countries yet really recovered from the Turkish rule? Were not literacy and hunger for education in general far more widespread in Finland than in Eastern Central Europe? All in all, Eastern Central Europe was seen as an area which had lived so long under Russian and Turkish influence that it had gone backwards and degenerated for hundreds of years and had now much more catching up to do than Finland in the rule of law and Western civilization.

True, there had been a bloody Civil War in Finland in 1918, which did not give a good picture of Finnish inner cohesion either. But this could conveniently be explained to be the fault of Russian agitation and infiltration and to some domestic traitors. It was not seen as a permanent feature in the Finnish society.

It is illuminating that it was precisely the most pro-Scandinavian circles which had the lowest opinions of Eastern Central Europe. The Social Democrats admired the rising Swedish welfare state and considered Eastern Central Europe as politically reactionary, socially unstable and backwardly agrarian. The Finnish Conservatives appreciated the “Old Scandinavia” as the bastion of the West, as the source of Finnish political and judicial culture and the way of life of the middle estate. Eastern Central Europe was too unstable and too uncivilized to fit this pattern. And the Jews had far too important a role among the meagrely educated classes in Eastern Europe, so the national awakening had not even had a real chance.22

The “democratic”, free peasant

The general Finnish view was that even the same kind of agrarian social structure did not make Eastern Central Europe equal or even comparable to the Finnish case, because the Eastern European peasant had a long history of serfdom and was still practically at the mercy of his landlord. Because the peasants were uneducated and the landlords egoistic and reactionary – and the independence did not seem to change much of this –, the area had remained backward. It might have had a glorious past, but it had missed out the development of the 18th and 19th centuries and failed to create national cohesion and true, Protestant work ethics (in the Weberian sense of the word).

The Finnish intellectuals thought that their own position and mentality differed radically from that of Eastern Central Europe. They thought that they represented a new, rising class which had created its position by merits, not by birth. Thus they were not subject to the same egoism and degeneration as the upper classes in Eastern Central Europe (or in Russia and Southern Europe).

Also the Finnish peasant was something else: he might be difficult and it was regrettable that he so often voted for the Agrarian Union (which was often considered, though patriotic, even less educated and more greedy than the Socialists), but he was and had always been an

22 On the other hand, Finns were usually not openly anti-Semitic themselves since the number of the Jews was so small in Finland. They often pointed out to the anti-Semitic policies and laws of Eastern Europe as uncivilized conduct, not acceptable for a Western way of thinking nor considering the principle of equality in front of the law. Even the Jew should have the same citizen’s rights as the others, no matter what you thought of him. Open, hostile anti-Semitism was not proper conduct of a gentleman. The Finnish attitude resembles the mentality, which a Jewish sarcastic expression describes: “They say that an anti-Semite is someone who hates the Jews more than is absolutely necessary.”
independent peasant. It was always pointed out that the Finnish peasant had never been a serf, and he had enjoyed the right to send representatives to the Parliament already for hundreds of years. And in 1918 he had risen to arms when there had been a Red coup in the South of Finland. The peasant had to be romanticized because of this, since the peasant had created the nucleus of the victorious White Army in the Civil War. In the national myth, he was seen as the defender of Christian and Western values, who never submitted to tyranny – in the way the “Eastern” peasants did.  

The Finnish observers – mainly diplomats or writers of travel-books – often pointed out in the 1920s and 1930s how helpless and poorly educated the Eastern Central European peasant was. This was not necessarily his own fault: the peasant lacked any ability to progress, because the time of serfdom was still so near, and the society was still essentially feudal. Therefore it was easy to manipulate the peasants in the elections which were thought to be dishonestly conducted anyway. Due to the lack of the same kind of tradition of education and representation which was typical for Scandinavia, the Eastern Central European electorate was uncivilized and unindependent and thus easy to manipulate, and the

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23 The Civil War is an extremely traumatic issue in the Finnish history. The reasons of the war were largely domestic – the struggle for power (after the collapse of the Russian Empire in spring 1917) between the parliamentary almost evenly represented non-Socialists and Socialists, social want, disagreements on independence policy etc. – but here it is more relevant to present only the general outlines and the foreign political aspect. The war started simultaneously as a Red coup in Helsinki and in South Finland and as an uprising against the Russian garrisons in Ostrobothnia (Western Finland) at the end of January 1918. The most densely populated and industrialized part of Southern Finland was occupied by the Reds and the rest of Finland by their non-Socialist opponents, the so-called Whites. The Reds got military assistance from Soviet Russia and the Whites from Imperial Germany; the latter also intervened later in the war and conquered Helsinki in April 1918. The war resulted in a White victory in May 1918. Historians have usually estimated that the Whites would have been victorious even without the Germans because their military discipline and training was considerably better, but the war would have lasted longer. It can be said that more important than sending one German military division to Finland was the fact that Soviet Russia had to conclude in March 1918 such a peace treaty (Brest-Litovsk) with Germany which practically prevented it from further assisting the Reds. It is also usually estimated that had the Reds won, Finland would have sooner or later been annexed to the Soviet Union. However, the reputation of the war is also sinister because of the extensive White Terror after the war (which outnumbered heavily the Red Terror that had taken place before it). It is also important to note that the most right-wing elements were marginalized from the power in 1919 and practically all right-wing elements after 1944 – whereas the party defeated in the Civil War, the Social Democratic Party, was soon rehabilitated, returned to the Parliament already in 1919 and has been an almost constant government party in Finland since 1937.
elected MPs had no respect towards the law like their Scandinavian counterparts did.

This had led to a state of things where no government ever lost an election and was replaced only by coups and revolutions (as indeed happened; no Eastern European Government lost an election between the wars). And the Eastern Europeans were mostly Slavs – which meant that they came uncomfortably close to the hated Russians.

So, in the opinion of the Finns, the Eastern European nations simply lacked the necessary education, and therefore they lacked the essential national cohesion. Upper and lower classes were hopelessly apart and hostile to each other, and the middle class, which was making Finland truly Western, nationally awakened and educated, was in Eastern Central Europe scarce, not educated enough, and – as already noted – often even “non-national”: German or Jewish.

Because of this lack of national cohesion the Eastern European countries could not be counted as really dependable and worthy allies against the Russian and Bolshevik menace either. The uneducated lower class was considered easy prey for either Communism or Fascism.

Some of the countries in the area seemed to be hopeless cases right from the start, because they were in some ways artificial: they were not nation states, which, according to the Finnish mentality, was the only natural form for a state. This artificiality applied especially to Austria, which ought to have been a part of Germany, and to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, because these were conglomerates of several nationalities. And that was regarded neither healthy nor sound.

**Stereotype nation by nation – the ultimate “Other”**

If one reads the reports from the Finnish legations in the Eastern Central European capitals or the travel books on the area, one sees constantly that every envoy and author seems to have thought that it was just his host country where politics was the most passionate national sport and where things did not run smoothly and by the book, but everything had to be ensured with connections and often also with bribes. No matter whether the report came from Poland or Greece, Romania or Hungary, Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, these kinds of prejudices can be found, and the explanation was almost without exception the national character, which seemed so strange for a Nordic mind. One did not hesitate to state this difference and set the Nordic way of life as a model for proper conduct – and to be flattered, when for example a Romanian minister praised the incorruptibility and honest nature of the Finnish civil servants to the
Finnish envoy and complained how badly things were in Romania with all the corruption.24

As a nation which has always feared that no one notices it, the Finns are always grateful for any kind of flattering.

Some Finnish expressions on Eastern Central Europe are quite revealing where the stereotypes and prejudices are concerned. Especially in diplomatic reports the statements could be very straightforward and even hostile, because they were not public. There were expressions like “mixed races” and “nonexistent national spirit, due to the primitiveness”; “below every standard”, “uncivilized ministers”, “Russian”, “a country of bribery”, “the barbarian village”, “skinning the population”, “dishonesty”, “rule of thieves”, “the state of domestic policy is never satisfactory, according to Finnish standards”, “lack of culture”, etc. Also Czechoslovakia, which should have scored sympathy points as the only other newly-independent country that had remained democratic, was, according to the Finnish envoy in Prague, “a democratic dictatorship”.25 The state of culture in Eastern Central Europe was no better; for example the revues in Belgrade were replaced by “hundred-kilo belly dancers”.26 One of the envoys traced the national mentalities to pre-modern times – according to him, the Greeks, for example, and Venizelos as a person, behaved like a character in an ancient Greek play.27

Of course the harshest expressions were not a rule, but exceptional outbursts of frustration. And if you compare them to the expressions about the Russians, often openly hostile and some even racist, they were of course milder. They did not include the menace of Bolshevism either, which the Finns were beginning to see as almost a special Russian racial feature. But especially as such outbursts these expressions reveal the paternalist spirit in relation to the Eastern Central European – which was considered more “Eastern” than “Central” – the “Other”.

In the case of Romania, there had been some renewed hopes about the Maniu regime at the turn of the 1930’s. According to the reports, it was an improvement, closer to democracy than its predecessor, opposed to bribery and in general a sign that the country would become more “European”. However, disappointment followed quickly also in Maniu’s case, and anyhow, seen by the Finnish mentality, the Romanian electorate

24 Artti to the UM 12.4.1929. UM 5C 28.
26 Mauri Honkajuuri to J.K. Paasikivi 2.4.1921. Paasikivi Archives, VA Y 4398, KA (=Finnish National Archives).
27 Artti to the UM 28.3.1935. UM 5C 23.
seemed to be easily manipulated. The Finnish envoy explained in his report that the peasants hardly even knew to whom they were cheering, and they considered political rallies as trips of amusement to Bucharest. But, the envoy added, this was easy to understand since it was only 70 years ago since serfdom had been abolished, and the government had never made any effort to educate the peasants politically.\(^{28}\)

The mentality of the people was, according to the envoy, totally different from the Finnish one: much more realistic and selfish, and law and order were not appreciated as such, but as means to provide material and political advantages to oneself and one’s party.\(^{29}\) The most serious problem was that there was no one in Romania, whom the Romanians would trust. On the contrary, they were ready to believe unfavourable things about everybody.\(^{30}\) And the Romanian Parliament was “the nicest and most obedient Parliament in the world”, since its MPs always almost totally belonged to the ruling Government Party.\(^{31}\) “Romania is a country, where you always wait for the Messiah to come.”\(^{32}\) And as another Finnish diplomat pointed out: love affairs disturbed Romanian politics, since they and politics were often so intertwined to each other.\(^{33}\) The Finnish envoy considered one of the Romanian agrarian politicians outright ”peculiar”, since this politician always wore a national costume – which included a short skirt.\(^{34}\)

A Finn who always considered that his own people represented the sensible, practical and matter-of-fact, no-nonsense type, could hardly have given a more devastating verdict than to point out to bribery, lavishness, pompousness and ineffective naivety, and to deficiencies in morality and in “serious” thinking. Even the Iron Guard was seen mostly as a reaction to all this corruptness.\(^{35}\)

By and large, in the 1930’s the minister in Bucharest seems to have been the most frustrated Finnish representative abroad – he even wrote to Helsinki that “negotiations with Romania belong to the punishments which one gets for his sins”.\(^{36}\) According to him, dishonesty was rather a system

\(^{28}\) Idman to UM 21.11.1929. UM 5C 13, Varsova.
\(^{29}\) Idman to UM 14.6.1930. UM 5C 13, Varsova.
\(^{30}\) Idman to UM 16.10.1930. UM 5C 13, Varsova.
\(^{31}\) Idman to UM 20.5. ja 14.6.1930. UM 5C 13, Varsova.
\(^{32}\) Idman to UM 22.4.1931. UM 5C 13, Varsova.
\(^{33}\) Artti to UM 20.1.1933. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
\(^{34}\) Idman to UM 1.6.1937. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
\(^{35}\) Idman to UM 15.1.1938, 28.2.1938, 18.5.1938. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
\(^{36}\) Idman to UM 21.6.1935. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
than an exception. However, he admitted that there many extremely civilized personalities among the Romanian ruling classes.

If you sum up the national stereotypes of the Finns (meaning those few Finns who had opinions and knowledge about the area), the Romanian was corrupt and dishonest. The Bulgarians were backward but showed some signs of appreciation for education and had a good opinion of the Finns. The Serbs and Croats were too hot-headed, but had military virtues, and there might be some similarities between Serbian nationalism against Turkey and the Habsburgs and the rise of Finnish nationalism in the 19th century, and also between Finnish independence in 1917 and Croatian fight for independence. However, they represented the stereotype of the strange “Balkans”, were Members of Parliament shot each other and the Moslem population meant that a piece of Arabia had penetrated Europe.

Of the more “northern” cases, the Czech was efficient, but he oppressed unjustifiably the German minority. The Poles were brave and heroic, but almost too brave and heroic for their own good, paid no attention to every-day improvements like the Scandinavians did, and were very quarrelsome also amongst themselves. Since the Poles also were anti-German, they had more shortcomings than their evident Russophobia could compensate. They would be a dangerous nation to ally oneself with.

Mainly, the picture was critical and the Eastern European was always seen as less advanced than the Finn.

**The Hungarian exception?**

There was one slight exception to this rule: Hungary. The spirit of the day was that there was a bond of kinship between the Finns and the Hungarians and that they came from the same ethnic background. Even though most pro-Hungarian Finns knew that this was not scientifically true, whereas ethnicity was concerned, there were still enough similarities in the grammar and the “Fenno-Ugrian” idea to make Hungary special. Hungary was also the only country in Europe outside Finland and Estonia where you could find academic people who might master the Finnish language.

It was also usually accepted by the Finns that hard as the Hungarian rule might have been against the minority nations in the Habsburg Empire during the late 19th century, this had essentially benefited these minority nations as well, since Hungary was more advanced than

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37 Idman to UM 2.12.1935. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
38 Idman to UM 20.11.1934. UM 5C 14, Bukarest.
them. And in any case, the Peace Treaty of Trianon – as the Peace Treaty of Versailles – was considered in Finland totally unreasonable.

The Hungarian fierce patriotism and love for their country was also appreciated, especially as the Finns themselves were usually too shy to show any public emotions, and there seemed to be something “romantic” and “chivalrous” left in the Hungarian culture and way of life which you could not find anywhere else in Europe. Some comments also reveal that the silent and sullen Finns envied the way the Hungarians could feel and express their emotions and make a party of their life. There was some positive exoticism in Hungary.  

The exoticism was not, however, a one-way street. A Finnish politician, Edwin Linkomies, describes in his memoirs, how Regent Horthy had talked to him about a plan to settle tens of thousands of Finnish men to Hungary so that they would marry Hungarian women and cultivate the land. They would thus bring up a generation which would reform the Hungarian blood by introducing Finnish guts, stamina and persistence to it. After some time the men would be free to return to Finland if they wanted to, but the Hungarian wives and the children would stay in Hungary. It is difficult to confirm if such a plan ever actually existed, but nevertheless the story represents very illuminatingly national stereotypes.

But even bearing all this in mind, even Hungary could not be as familiar as Sweden or even Norway and Denmark, or Germany. The Hungarian mentality was too fierce and open, the ways of behaviour too bombastic for the Finnish standards, the cultural background was totally different, the work ethics not on a Lutheran standard (“the Hungarian mind is not suitable for scientific work”, wrote a Finnish Professor, himself a very pro-Hungarian personality and later the Finnish envoy in Budapest, in a letter already in the 19th century). The Finnish diplomats also considered Hungary’s domestic policy undemocratic and criticized the indifference of the Hungarian Government when social policy and the lot of the lower class was concerned. The failure to issue a land reform in Hungary was considered strange, and the Hungarian way to manipulate

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41 The person in question made also other similar pejorative remarks in his correspondence. See for example E.N. Setälä to Almberg-Jalava 15.2.1889. Sign. 212, Finnish Literary Society; Setälä to Lauri Palonen 16.2.1889 and 12.3.1889. Setälä archives, VA Y 5508, KA.
elections surprised even the conservatives. The Finns also found the anti-Semitic laws peculiar – and the rise of the Arrow Cross Movement worrying.\textsuperscript{42}

The main difference was that also the Hungarian was a “person of a moment”, not of endurance, which trait the Finns have always appreciated more than fierce emotions. The Hungarians were, as one Finnish author put it, “God’s big, joyful children, who have a good opinion of themselves – often justifiably”.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Conclusion}

As Stuart Hall has stated, the national culture is, more than anything else, a discourse. Also Benedict Anderson refers to the nation as an “imaginary community”.

Essentially the case of the Finns and Eastern Europe was the same as for the Europeans in relation to the new continents: there was idolization, fantasies of lust and contempt and inability to recognize and accept differences, the only measurement being one’s own categories. All these elements can be found in milder form in the Finnish thinking on Eastern Central Europe; the latter was not the “Enemy”, but very definitely the “Other”, which was inferior. Thus the opinions on Eastern Central Europe were a part of the Finnish identity – and state-building process. They showed a reference group which Finland did not find suitable and which according to the Finns could be considered “less developed” than Finland.

But it should also be remembered, that the Finns were not often very successful in their efforts to represent themselves as more “Western” than Eastern Central Europe was. Actually all the time during the 1920s and 1930s, there had often been a very similar stereotype about Finland in the West that they Finns themselves entertained about Eastern Central Europe.

In the various Western analyses the Finns seemed to be a people which did not quite live up to the Scandinavian and Western standards, but were strangely “Eastern” and “Baltic”. They could be accepted as equals only after they had matured in their political life. Their mentality, however, seemed peculiar for example, for Swedish, British or German observers. This mentality was sometimes fierce, sometimes passive and melancholy, sometimes hardworking, sometimes helpless. According to these analyses, the Finns seemed to concentrate on politics with a passion that was strange

\textsuperscript{42} See Vares, Isten vidám..., 63-88.
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to the matter-of-fact and efficient Scandinavians or other peoples that had been more accustomed to a democratic and liberal society. Only after the Second World War – and as the Finnish society began to resemble the Swedish society more and more – did the Finns become more acceptable and it became self-evident that they were not to be compared with Eastern Central Europe, but to Scandinavia.

Maybe this paper can be concluded by the report which the Swedish envoy wrote to his Foreign Ministry in May 1921 from Helsinki. It was about the circumstances in Finland and concentrated especially on the person of the Finnish Prime Minister:

“--- he is naive, childish, pleased with himself, open-mouthed, a busybody and shallow in his analysis. A person told me that he has read everything and assimilated nothing, and I agree with that analysis. Furthermore, it appears that he thinks that the dunghill from the top of which he greets the rising sun every morning is the greatest and finest in the world.”

It is very likely, that the viewpoint of Eastern Central European diplomats about Finland was very much the same as that of the Scandinavians and Western Europeans.

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UN SINGUR POPOR CU DOUĂ DRAPELE": THE ROMANIAN-POLISH RELATIONS DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

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Abstract:
This article, chiefly based on the archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tells the story of Romanian-Polish relations between the years 1919 and 1939. Driven by the fear of Soviet Russia, the two countries backed each other and tried to build up a cordon sanitaire which would protect Europe against ‘contamination’ from the East. During the 1920s things went more or less well – though Poland obstinately refused to participate in the Petite Entente system. In the 1930s, nonetheless, the change of the constellation of Powers in Europe, due to the rise of Germany and the inward-looking nature of Stalin’s U.S.S.R., had as a result the two countries interpreting their interests differently and gradually choosing to ally themselves with opposite camps. The outcome of that change led to Poland being conquered by the Germans and Romania fighting alongside the Axis Powers.

Rezumat:
Acest articol, care se bazează în principal pe Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al Greciei, narează povestea relațiilor româno-poloneze între anii 1919 și 1939. Mânate de faimoa de Rusia Sovietică, cele două state s-au susținut unul pe celălalt și au încercat să constituie un cordon sanitar care ar fi protejat Europa împotriva „contaminării” dinspre Răsărit. În anii 1920 lucrurile au stat mai mult sau mai puțin bine, deși Polonia a refuzat cu încâpățânare să participe la sistemul Micii Înțelegeri. În anii 1920, însă, schimbarea survenită în constelația de putere din Europa prin ridicarea Germaniei și natura introspectivă a politicilor U.R.S.S.-ului lui Stalin a avut ca rezultat interpretarea diferită de către cele două state a intereselor lor și inițierea de demersuri treptate de alianță cu tabere opuse.
There are three landmarks as far as Romanian-Polish relations are concerned in the interwar years: a) The statement by Marshal Józef Piłsudski in September 1922, at Sinaia: *alianța inimilor este reprezentată, de la Marea Baltică la Marea Neagră, de un singur popor cu două drapele.* b) The transfer of Victor Cădere, Romanian minister at Warsaw, to Rio de Janeiro, in the autumn of 1935, because of his disagreement with Nicolae Titulescu. c) The visit to Warsaw of Grigore Gafencu, Romanian Foreign Minister, in March, 1939, and his meeting with Józef Beck, his Polish counterpart – swan song of Romanian-Polish fraternity in the years before WW II. The relevant stages were the following.

**I. The Common Fear**

The prolegomenon was written in 1919, when the Romanian government, upon the “desperate call” of Polish Prime Minister, Ignacy Panderewski, dispatched large quantities of cereals to Poland – as humanitarian help. It may have been Nicolae Iorga who was the father of Romanian-Polish cordial friendship – a friendship which developed as early as during the last stages of WW I. It was, nonetheless, Take Ionescu who took the credit for the rapprochement between the two countries. In fact, upon conclusion of the convention of the defensive alliance between Romania and Poland at Bucharest, on the 3rd of March, 1921, Ionescu, then Foreign Minister, clarified to Prince Eustachy Sapieha, his Polish equivalent, the following: “It is the common duty of our countries to defend side by side their right to live by means of the closest solidarity, 

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3 Ibid., 31.
4 Dispatch No.55 of 10.10.1925 of Petros Metaxas, Greek chargé d’affaires at Warsaw, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, AYE, 1925, A/5/VIII
nay! union with the neighbours by the side of whom we have fought ...”. (Les deux pays ont le devoir de défendre côté à côté leur droit à la vie par la solidarité la plus étroite, par l’union avec leurs voisins aux côtés desquels nous avons combattu...) As a result, a secret «Military Convention» was signed that same day by the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Romanian and Polish Army, generals Constantin Cristescu and Tadeusz Rozwadowski 7.

Ionescu’s statement today would be regarded as a commonplace; but was not in the early 1920s. According to a publicist of that time, the Polish People had suffered a “monstruous quartering” (écartelemment monstrueux), “Prussian vexation”, and Russian tyranny (le despotisme russe); whilst the Romanians, on the other hand, had experienced “the age-old dispersal of their race” (dispersion séculaire de la race), the abduction (rapt) of Bukovina and Bessarabia, and oppression by the Magyars. As a result Romanian-Polish amity was given, by the ‘parallel sufferings’, a “stamp of permanence” more effective than the one relying on treaties 8.

This assessment is irrefutable. Thanks to Piłsudski’s genius volte-face in 1917, his ‘providential’ captivity by the Germans and, of course, Ionescu’s obstinacy 9, both Poland and Romania were found in the victors’ camp at the end of the Great War. But happy coincidences were not enough for the hearts’ rapprochement heralded by the Marshal at Sinaia.

It is a truism, too, that the Soviet régime jeopardized mainly the two brother-countries, Romania and Poland. Though Romania was not able to assist Poland in the critical days of the year 1920 10, both countries had a common foe in the 1920s and 1930s, namely Communist Russia. On the 16th of September, 1922, the last day of Marshal Piłsudski’s official visit to Romania, a new Military Convention was signed in Sinaia by C. Cristescu and T. Rozwadowski. Article 1 of the 1922 Convention stipulated that, if one of the two Parties were a victim of aggression and, as a result, the casus fœderis was constituted, the other Party, i.e. the one that had not suffered aggression, must enter at once the war alongside its ally 11. In June, 1923, it was the turn of King Ferdinand and Queen Consort Maria to pay a

7 MAE/DAD, România-Polonia, I, doc. 15, 22-24; Anghel, 134.
10 Dispatch No. 8945 of 7/20.07.1920 of Iōannēs Pappas, Greek chargé d’affaires at Bucharest, to the Foreign Ministry AYE, 1920, 20.3; Anghel, 86.
11 Anghel, 142-144; Calafeteanu, 245.
visit to Poland\(^\text{12}\); and on the 27\(^{th}\) of June, the Sovereign and Piłsudski were in Mokotów at an impressive military review: Polish and Romanian armies were a shield against Bolshevism, modern political product of Asia\(^\text{13}\). “Poland and Romania are to be found on the Eastern borders of European civilization”, was trumpeted in the well-known liberal\(^\text{14}\) paper *L’indépendance roumaine* in October 1929, i.e. in the happy days of August Zaleski’s visit at Bucharest\(^\text{15}\). The “Bolshevist threat”, nonetheless, was not the only reason of that rapprochement and relevant alliance. Poland almost desperately needed an outlet on the Mediterranean. For Danzig being a city under a peculiar international régime, the seaport of Gdynia\(^\text{16}\) was not enough. It is certain, moreover, that Romania and Romanians were very much to Piłsudski’s taste; and this personal factor should not be underestimated. In September 1928, for instance, the Marshal, having suffered from ill-health, was treated at Lucjan Skupiewski’s nursing home\(^\text{17}\) near Târgoviște\(^\text{18}\). He was recovering and was delighted to do so in the friendly atmosphere of the home and homeland of Dr. Skupiewski. After having recovered from illness, he paid a visit at Bucharest, on the 30\(^{th}\) of September, 1928\(^\text{19}\). But it was clear his visit had no political flavour. Constantin Argetoianu, then Foreign Minister of Romania, notwithstanding seized the opportunity to proclaim once more the very basis of the Polish-Romanian cordial alliance. “The two countries are nowadays the champions and guarantors of Peace and Civilization in Eastern Europe”, he declared at the official lunch Marshal Piłsudski was offered\(^\text{20}\).

It is noteworthy that the above statement was only the core of the Romanian multi-directional foreign policy. For the Bucharest Government was aiming at that time at concluding a “Central Europe Locarno Treaty” –

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\(^{12}\) Anghel, 193-196.

\(^{13}\) România-Polonia, vol. I, 29-30 (note 1).

\(^{14}\) Dispatch No. 2309 of 15.12.1933 Konstantinos Kollas, Greek minister at Bucharest, to Démétrios Maximos, Foreign Minister of Greece, AYE, 1933, A/7.

\(^{15}\) Pologne et Roumanie se trouvent aux confins orientaux de la civilisation européenne (« La visite de M. Zaleski », *L’indépendance roumaine*, 26.10.1929.)

\(^{16}\) “The new Polish port of Gdynia… From a fishing village of a thousand souls in 1921, Gdynia expanded to a city of 120,000 people in 1939”. (Jerzy Łukowski and Hubert Zawadzki. *A Concise History of Poland* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 239.

\(^{17}\) România-Polonia, I, doc. 54: dispatch No. 2007 of 26.06.1928 of Carol Davila, Romanian minister at Warsaw, to Vintilă Brătianu, Romanian Prime Minister, 108-109.

\(^{18}\) Kollas’ dispatch No. 1283 of 04.09.1928 to Alexandros Karapanos, Foreign Minister of Greece, AYE 1928, 50.2

\(^{19}\) He left on the 4\(^{th}\) of October. (*L’indépendance roumaine*, 04.10.1928.)

\(^{20}\) Kollas’ dispatch No.1438 of 03.10.1928 to Karapanos, AYE 1928, 50.2.
that is with Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary\textsuperscript{21}. Poland, on the other hand, did not approve such a policy; she was prone to bilateral treaties\textsuperscript{22}. For the Polish, either populace or rulers, their military strength was a point of vital importance – literally a question of their nation’s life or death\textsuperscript{23}. It is why they agreed to have (within the context of \textit{Sanacja}) that famous “colonels’ régime” consolidated even before Marshal Piłsudski passed away\textsuperscript{24}. Since, therefore, they were situated among two potentially terrible enemies, namely Germany and Soviet Russia, considered Romania to be their only trustworthy ally\textsuperscript{25}.

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They were right. First of all, because the Romanian Army’s prestige was enormous in Central Europe. For if the Polish beat the Red Army in 1920 (thanks not only to the strategic astuteness of Piłsudski but to the French assistance, as well\textsuperscript{26}), Romanians’ numerically weak army succeeded in routing the Hungarians and entering Budapest\textsuperscript{27}. As a result, Romanian soldiers were so proud as to fire at British boats on the Danube\textsuperscript{28}. For Great Britain had a spite against Romania, since the time of Hungary’s military administration by the Allies (August-November, 1918)\textsuperscript{29}.

It is noteworthy that Poland and Romania were seeking in the late 1910s and early 1920 their national integration\textsuperscript{30}. For Romanians wished to
have Hungarian rule removed from Transylvania and Russian from Bessarabia, whilst the Polish, beyond the ideological differences with “Red Moscow”, encouraged an authoritarian régime to be established in Ukraine as well as the separatist currents in that country. What is more, “Jagiellonian Idea”, i.e. Piłsudski’s federalist dream, fuelled the feud between Poland and Lithuania. Whatever the facts of the matter, Romania and Poland were, so to speak, natural allies. On the 26th of March, 1926, the Romanian-Polish Treaty of Guarantee was signed in Bucharest, in fact a second alliance treaty after the one of 1921 had expired; and in November, 1927, lieutenant-general Kazimierz Sosnkowski paid a visit to Bucharest and considered with his Romanian colleagues a plan of military co-action. The crux was a presumed aggression against Yugoslavia by Italy. Romania should assist her neighbour and Poland would then assist Romania. The latter’s military leadership, nonetheless, regarded Sosnkowski’s minutely detailed plan too complicated, and, therefore, not very serious. For they dreaded that, in such a case, Soviet Russia would attack Bessarabia. So the limits of Romanian-Polish military co-operation were unveiled.

In point of fact, the Romanian-Soviet feud over the eastern part of Moldavia was continuous during the 1920s and the 1930s. Romania wished Bessarabia’s annexation by her to be recognized not only de facto but de jure, too, by the Soviet Government. Still Moscow regarded a plebiscite to be

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31 Metaxas’ dispatch No. 745 of 30.11.1925 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1925/A/5(viii). Poland had recognized the independence of Ukraine and concludes an alliance with the Semion Petliura Government, which was fighting against the Red Army. (Lukowski and Zawadzki, 225.) With regard to the Polish aspirations concerning Ukraine, see mainly Anghel, 72-74.

32 Metaxas’ dispatch No. 745 of 30.11.1925 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1925, A/5 (vii.). The 1919 proposals of Lithuania to Poland, moreover, are very interesting: Le gouvernement de Lituanie a proposé au gouvernement polonais d’organiser une défense commune contre les Bolchévistes aux conditions suivantes: La Pologne s’engage à reconnaître la Lituanie comme État libre et indépendant dans les frontières revendiquées par la Lituanie à la conférence de la Paix, c’est-à-dire les gouvernements de Kœno, Vilna, Grodno, Shvalki [Suwałki], une partie de Courlande et une partie de la Prusse orientale, avec Vilna comme capitale. (Letter No. 863 of 06.05.1919 of the Lithuanian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference to the Greek minister at Paris, AYE, 1919, 5/VI [23]u ministre de Grèce, No. 863, Paris, May 6th, 1919.) See also the statement of August Zaleski to the Polish Diet on the 15th of January 1929. (Le Messager Polonais, January 16th, 1929.)

33 By Ion Gh. Duca, Foreign Minister of Romania, and Józef Wielowiejski, Polish minister at Bucharest. (Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, No. 16, 28.02. 1927.)

34 Its term was fixed at five years. (I. Calafeteanu [ed.], Istoria politicii externe românești în date , 240-241.)

35 Kollas’ dispatch No. 1944 of 08.12.1927 to Alexandros Zaïmēs, interim Foreign Minister of Greece, AYE 1927, 17.1.
held previously in Bessarabia as a *conditio sine qua non* of any formal recognition by the Soviets of Bessarabia’s international status\(^{36}\). But Bessarabia presented a predicament not only in the matter of Romanian-Russian relations but of those between Bucharest and Warsaw as well. For the Romanian Government had expropriated there property from people on whom Polish citizenship was bestowed after the end of WW I. As a result, these people, not satisfied with the indemnity they were allotted, asked for equal treatment with French and British citizens – the only ones hitherto to have been well reimbursed by the Romanian Government. It is why Poland was seeking to be accorded the status of most favoured nation in that case; and she consented to conclude the 1926 Treaty only after having been asserted by the Romanian Government that this demand would be soon satisfied\(^{37}\). The latter complied finally to pay Polish subjects 36,000 lei per hectare\(^{38}\). The problem, nonetheless, was not resolved until Zaleski’s visit to Bucharest in October 1929. After he returned to Poland, the Romanian-Polish agreement on the Polish citizens to-be-indemnified-for-their-property-in-Bessarabia was concluded in Warsaw\(^{39}\). Obviously, it was due mainly to Zaleski’s efforts; the Polish ex-landowners, nevertheless, had a grudge against him, because they considered him to have been “too easy to deal” with the Romanians\(^{40}\). But they were not right; for if the Romanian Government would consent to having Polish citizens receiving more generous indemnities for their lost property, nationals of other countries, Hungarians for instance, would ask to be treated on equal footing as the Polish\(^{41}\). Similar problems mushroomed throughout Europe after WW I, and only British and French citizens had “preferential treatment”, because their countries were then the strongest in Europe\(^{42}\).

In any case, the 1926 Treaty was somewhat different from that of 1921. The latter was aiming latentely exclusively at Soviet Russia\(^{43}\) and was

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\(^{36}\) Dispatch No. 2512 of 23.08.1933 of Spyridon Polychroniadés, Greek minister at Moscow, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1933/A/3/20.

\(^{37}\) Dispatch No.72 of 29.11.1926 of Andreas Delmouzos, Greek minister at Warsaw, to Pericles Argyropoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, AYE 1927, 17.1.

\(^{38}\) Ibid. Also: Kollas’ dispatch No. 1548 of 13.11.1926 to Argyropoulos, AYE, 1927.1.

\(^{39}\) Kollas’ dispatch No. 79 of 11.01.1930 to Andreas Michalakopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, AYE 1930, A/3/18.

\(^{40}\) Kollas’ dispatch No. 17 of 05.11.1930 to Michalakopoulos, AYE 1930, A/3/18.

\(^{41}\) Kollas’ dispatch No. 79 of 11.01.1930 to Andreas Michalakopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, AYE 1930, A/3/18.

\(^{42}\) As far as Greece and Albania are concerned, see D. Michalopoulos. *Scheseis Helladas kai Alvanias, 1923-1928* (=Greek-Albanian Relations, 1923-1928) (Salonica: Paratērētēs, 1986), 69.

\(^{43}\) Art. 1. (*România-Polonia*, I, doc. 18, 19; also doc. 37: I. Gh. Duca, Foreign Minister of Romania, to Constantin I. Diamandy, Romanian minister at Paris, No. 7229, February 4th, 1926, 72.)
conceived in the spirit of the League of Nations. In other words, it was a bilateral act within a concrete context. The former, nevertheless, was more or less formulated according to the “Locarno spirit”. For it regarded the whole of the borderlines of either country\textsuperscript{44}: it was a \textit{contra omnes} bilateral act.

Of course, the situation in Europe had changed by that time. As early as 1925, Stalin stated that “Capitalism had [doubtlessly] survived”\textsuperscript{45}; Trotsky, who was then given the post of the chairman of the Concessions Committee, announced that the core of his policy would be “to attract foreign capitals”\textsuperscript{46}; and last but not least Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, had declared that the Soviets would not wage war on Poland and Romania. For Bessarabia and eastern parts of Poland would split respectively from the rule of Romania and Poland “by themselves”, he explained\textsuperscript{47}.

The Soviet leaders were right; for the rampant famine in the USSR had a terrible impact even on the Red Army\textsuperscript{48}; as a result, Soviet Russia was not in a position to threaten anybody. In early 1928 the situation was more or less the same. The Soviets trumpeted now the cordial relations they had with Germany – in both political and economic fields\textsuperscript{49}. They were, nonetheless, “nervous about Poland”, because they regarded her as a “very dangerous” enemy. Moscow would never tolerate Poland being a Great Power; and should Soviet Russia make war in Europe, she would battle against Poland first of all\textsuperscript{50}.

But the likelihood of such a war was still far away. In December, 1928, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov delivered a speech in the Central Executive Committee of URRS, and explained that Communist Russia had friendly relations with Germany (and relatively friendly with USA); Poland

\textsuperscript{44} Art. 1. (Ibid., doc. 39, 74.)
\textsuperscript{45} Dispatch No. 1932 of 27.03.1925 of Nicholas Mauroudès, Greek chargé d’affaires at Moscow, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1925, A/5/VII(3).
\textsuperscript{46} Mauroudès’ dispatch No.1864 of 10.06.1925 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1925, A/5/VII(3).
\textsuperscript{47} Mauroudès’ dispatch of 05.05.1925 (no number given) to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1925, A/5/VII (3),
\textsuperscript{48} Dispatch No. 224 of 03.03.1925 of Raoul-Vivika Rosetès, Greek chargé d’affaires at Sofia, to Andreas Michalakopoulos, interim Foreign Minister of Greece, AYE 1925, A/5/VII (3).
\textsuperscript{49} AYE, 1928, 65.3, “Report on the Foreign Policy of USSR” (in French); attached to Mauroudès dispatch No. 289 of 21.01.1928 to Michalakopoulos.
\textsuperscript{50} La Russie soviétique surveille avec un énervement mal déguisé les progrès de sa voisine, la Pologne. Pologne pour Russie est un adversaire très dangereux… L’URSS ne peut admettre que la Pologne devienne une grande puissance…Si les Soviets font jamais la guerre, ils la feront à la Pologne qui est pour eux une barrière entre leur pays et l’Occident et un concurrent dans les pays baltiques. (Ibid.)
and Romania, on the other hand, feigned they would be victims of Russian aggression, but simultaneously turned down Moscow’s conciliatory overtures, Litvinov stated.  

Unlike Stalin, Trotsky and Chicherin, Litvinov proved not to be right; for the *beaux gestes* to which he alluded had good reception in the end. On the 9th of February, 1929, the multilateral protocol concerning “the renunciation of war as means of national policy”, based on the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, was concluded in Moscow; and among the signatories were Soviet Union, Poland and Romania. Peace was assured - for the moment; and Zaleski’s visit to Budapest in 1929, before his visit to Bucharest, was in harmony with the spirit of the time. For he declared in the Hungarian capital that he had the intention of interceding between Romania and Hungary, his aim being to conciliate the two countries. Zaleski’s initiative was received with cool indifference (actually with anger) in Bucharest, for it was regarded as “platonic”, that is a naïve one. But it was a period of universal naïvety, due mainly to the famous Kellogg-Briand Pact.

**II. Common interests**

Development of bilateral relations in the field of trade was a constant concern in Bucharest and Warsaw. In early August 1929, Virgil Madgearu, Romanian Minister of Industry and Trade, paid a visit to Poland. The path to his stay in Warsaw was paved by Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, the tireless Polish statesman. Romania had already taken great steps towards the unfolding of her commerce with Poland. For she had changed the customs rates, and created important facilities in the ports of Brăila, Galați, Constanța, and Giurgiu. Romanians’ worry was that the bilateral trade balance showed a deficit to the detriment of their country. The importation of grapes from Bessarabia into Poland, for instance, was problematic. The Polish, on the other hand, asserted that this question would be settled soon.  

51 *Izvestia*, No. 287 (3521), December 11th, 1928. (The Greek translation in AYE, 1928, 65.2.)  
52 Calafeteanu, 258.  
53 Kollas’ dispatch No.952 of 24.05.1929 to Michalakopoulos, AYE 1929, A/3/28.  
54 *La Nation Roumaine*, August 7th, 1929. (This newspaper was considered to be the semi-official organ of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)  
55 Dispatch No. 638 of 14.08.1929 of George Lagoudakēs, Greek minister at Warsaw, to Michalakopoulos, AYE 1930, A/3/18.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.
Of course, the problem was not only Bessarabian grapes. The main trouble was that both Poland and Romania were agricultural countries. 80% of the Romanian population were peasants with a plot of land of their own – and practically without debts. On the other hand, 70% of Poland’s population were “farmers”. But the fertility of Polish peasantry in connection with the fact that large scale land expropriation had not taken place yet in Poland, created serious problems in the economy of the country. However, a provisional Trade Convention was concluded between the two countries in late 1929; but problems did not finish. For both countries, being agricultural, produced nearly the same goods.

As far as the Polish outlet to the Mediterranean was concerned, it is noteworthy that implied not only Romania but Bulgaria, Greece and other Balkan countries as well. On the 6th of February, 1930, Jovan Jovanović, Yugoslavia’s former Foreign Minister, published in the newspaper Trgovinski Glasnik an article on the Polish plan of a railroad linking the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean seashore. The intention was to build a rail line from Poland to either Salonica or Istanbul. The Bulgarians agreed in principle; but the point was whether the trains would cross the Danube by means of ferry-boats or a bridge. The Bucharest Government was in favour of the second option, namely a Giurgiu-Ruse bridge, whilst the Bulgarians preferred ferry-boats. The decision, nonetheless, was made up by Romanian and Polish experts during a conference in Warsaw already in August, 1929. The line would be a double-track one, and the terminus would be at Gdynia. The expenses of building such a line would be covered by the Polish Government, Zaleski stated during his visit to Bucharest in October 1929.

The problem was the Greek side. For it was dubious whether the Greek Government would accept Salonica to be linked to Gdynia via “Slavic countries” such as Bulgaria. It was only a couple of years before the

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59 Dispatch No. 911 of 15.11.1934 of Alexēs Kyrou, Greek minister at Warsaw, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1934, A/13/II.
61 Kyrou’s dispatch No. 911 of 15.11.1934 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1934, A/13/II.
63 Dispatch of 24.08.1929 (no number given) of G. Lagoudakēs, Greek minister at Warsaw, to Michalakopoulos, AYE 1930, A/3/18.
64 Ibid.
65 Lagoudakēs’ dispatch No. 638 of 14.08.1929 to Michalakopoulos, AYE 1930, A/3/18.
Un singur popor cu două drapele: The Romanian-Polish relations during the interwar period

Polish-Romanian agreement on the railroad from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean that a coup had overthrown General Theodóros Pankalos’ régime, because he had agreed with the Yugoslav Government to establish a free zone in the port of Salonica. Of course, the LOT Polish Airlines was to establish in the early 1930s air communication between Warsaw and Salonica via Bucharest and Sofia; but rail linkage was different. The Yugoslavs on the other hand were hopeful that financial interests would prevail over the military ones in the mind of Greece’s rulers: were Gdynia linked by train to Salonica, the latter would become an international trade centre once more. The Italians, moreover, were vigilant. For they had their own plans, such as to link Valona (Vlorë), Albania, to Istanbul via Salonica, or alternatively the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea via Yugoslavia. Romanian ports, on the other hand, namely Galaţi, Constanţa, and Brăila were already linked to Gdynia and Danzig; but the Black Sea was a rough and closed one. So the Mediterranean outlet was an absolute necessity and not only for trade reasons but for military ones, too. For Poland needed a “transit line” from Salonica to the North – a vital necessity in case of war. But on the eve of WW II this ambitious plan, namely the Gdynia-Salonica railroad communication, had not materialized yet. Nor was another one, concerning a channel-to-be-built between the Pruth and Vistula rivers.

III. The Crisis

On the 9th of June, 1934, Nicolae Titulescu, Foreign Minister in the Gheorghe Tătărescu Government, and M. M. Litvinov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of USSR, each stated that “normal diplomatic relations” should be established between Romania and Soviet Union. As a result, Titulescu, a couple of weeks later, made a pathetic speech to the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs of his country: “Forget the

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69 Trgovinski Glasnik, February 6th, 1930.
70 Ibid.
71 « La visite de M. Zaleski », L’indépendance roumaine, October 26th, 1929.
72 România-Polonia, I, doc. 87: Dispatch No. 9507 of 17.02.1937 of Alexandru D. Zamfirescu, Romanian minister at Warsaw, to Victor Antonescu, Foreign Minister of Romania, 182.
74 Ibid.
75 L’Indépendance Roumaine, June 12th, 1934; cf. Calafeteanu, 282.
past. The future knocks at the door [of us]…”, he explained⁷⁶. The next step was foreseeable: diplomatic relations between Romania and Soviet Russia were restored. On the 3rd of December, 1934, Mikhail Ostrovsky, Soviet minister at Bucharest, delivered his credentials. Titulescu, then abroad, came back to the Romanian capital in order only to assist with the ceremony⁷⁷.

It was the end of an epoch. Bilateral relations between Bucharest and Warsaw were disturbed⁷⁸. A couple of months before the Moscow-Bucharest relations were restored, Józef Beck, Polish Foreign Minister, explained in the League of Nations, Geneva, that his country would no longer accept the Minorities Treaties being applied, unless all nations matched their policies to the stipulations of those Treaties⁷⁹. It was a hint to Europe’s Great Powers, namely Britain and France, which used the Minorities Treaties as a tool for intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. This statement caused a sensation in Romania. The Gheorghe Tătărescu Government endorsed the essence but not the virulence of Beck’s statement. The Polish minister at Bucharest grasped the opportunity to defend “his” Foreign Minister and affirmed that “it was the duty of every true Romanian patriot to approve Beck’s declaration, unless his behaviour was brought into line with Foreign Powers’ orders”⁸⁰.

It was too much. Adevărul made a furious onslaught on the Polish diplomat⁸¹. An indirect consequence was that magyarophilia mounted up in Poland, and the palpable evidence was the official visit that Guyla Gömbös, Hungarian Prime Minister, paid to the Polish capital on the 20th of October, 1934⁸². A Romanian delegation, on the other hand, signed in Moscow a convention for the rail connexion of their country with USSR⁸³. The Romanian-Polish entente was nearly broken – and saved in extremis thanks to Poland’s peculiar position: she considered herself to be

⁸⁰ Ibid.
⁸¹ Issue of the 21st of September, 1934.
⁸² Politiés’ dispatch No. 806 of 20.10.1934 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1934, A/13/II(i).
⁸³ Calafeteanu, 286; Polychroniadès’ dispatch No. 249 of 20.02.1935 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1934, A/7/4.
simultaneously threatened by Germany and Russia. As a result, Romania was the only beacon in her despair.84

Things, nevertheless, grew complicated once more, because of Piłsudski’s death on the 12th of May, 1935; for it was now Romanian’s turn to be put in an awkward position. What would now be the policy of Poland?85 But Titulescu was adamant: in summer, 1935, Friedrich Weber, Völkischer Beobachter’s correspondent in Bucharest, was expelled from Romania. For (among others) he had bitterly criticized Titulescu’s pro-Soviet policy.86 But, if Germany’s National-Socialist Government finally swallowed the insult, the Polish side was infuriated when Titulescu jointly with Edvard Beneš, his Czechoslovakian counterpart, acted against Polish interests in the League of Nations.88 Titulescu proved once more that he was prompt to react: Victor Cădere, Romanian minister at Warsaw and one of the enthusiastic supporters of Romanian-Polish “cordial alliance”, was moved from Poland to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; for he was not a fervent advocate of Titulescu’s pro-Soviet policy.89 A virulent press campaign against the Romanian Foreign Minister ensued in Poland, and it was declared semi-officially in Warsaw that, unless N. Titulescu was removed from office, Polish-Romanian relations would be jeopardized.91

In truth, Titulescu’s policy was not such an “insane” one. The Soviet Union was humiliated after the Japanese Empire had established the Manchukuo buffer state in northern-eastern China. As a result, the USSR tried to ‘normalize’ her relations with European countries: Romania and Poland were among them.92 But whilst Romania, under Tătărescu, made overtures to Moscow, Poland hesitated. In early 1933, Adolf Hitler declared that Pomerania should be given back to Germany.93 Albeit that in January 1934, a Polish-German accord was concluded, Poland kept on being more afraid of Germany than she was of Soviet Russia.94

85 Adevărul, May 15th, 1935.
86 Dispatch No. 2745 of 29.08.1935 of Alexandros Rhizos-Rhankavēs, Greek minister at Berlin, to the Foreign Ministry. AYE 1934, A/7/4.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid. (See also România-Polonia, I, 145 [note 1].)
90 Panas’ dispatch No. 1426 of 10.10.1935 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1934, A/7/4.
91 Ibid.
92 Politēs’ dispatch No. 722 of 11.08.1933 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1933, A/13/I.
93 Lagoudakēs’ dispatch of 03.03.1933 (no number given) to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1933, A/13/I.
94 Kyrou’s dispatch No. 848 of 02.11.1934 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE, 1933, A/13/I.
Strangely enough, the impact of the moral defeat Soviet Russia suffered thanks to Manchuria’s affair was the involvement of Turkey in regard to Polish-Russian relations. Had Japan declared war on the USSR, the Soviet rulers dreaded being the victims of simultaneous Polish aggression. They asked, therefore, the Ankara Government to intervene in their favour\textsuperscript{95}. Economically speaking, Turkey was then in an awful situation\textsuperscript{96}; nonetheless, Ferid Bey, “the most intelligent Turkish diplomat”, was transferred from London to Warsaw during the spring of 1932 in order that a Polish-Russian armed conflict be averted\textsuperscript{97}. But nothing happened.

IV. The outcome

In October, 1938, J. Beck paid a visit to Galați. He had talks there with King Carol II and Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, Foreign Minister of Romania. He tried to ensure a friendly attitude of Romania with regard to the Polish-Hungarian dispute over Sub-Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia)\textsuperscript{98}. On March 4-6, Grigore Gafencu was the guest of his Polish counterpart in Warsaw. He was regarded as a fervent adherent of the Romanian-Polish “cordial amity” – and actually he was. During his stay in the Polish capital he discussed with J. Beck the overall situation in Europe. Both countries had an “independent foreign policy”, without “ideological restrictions” or interventions by the Great Powers\textsuperscript{99}. A key matter was the 1938 cession of Czechoslovakia’s part of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine to Hungary – thanks to the First Vienna Award of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of November, 1938. Poland did not agree; for she had different views concerning Ruthenia. Should the issue be re-examined, Romania would conform to the line of Poland, Gafencu explained to his host\textsuperscript{100}. As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, both countries desired an ambiance of bon voisinage\textsuperscript{101}. Matters of the Poland-Greece rail connection (via Romania) and Baltic-Black Sea shipping (by means of canals between Vistula, Dniester, Pruth, and Danube rivers) were

\textsuperscript{95} Lagoudakēs’ dispatch No. 450 of 15.06.1932 to the Foreign Ministry, 1933 A/13/II.

\textsuperscript{96} The mortality rate was very high (27.5\%\%), because of the hardships that the population bore. (Dispatch No. 597 of 15.05.1928 of Konstantinos Sakellaropoulos, Greek consul general at Istanbul, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE, 1928, 65.2.)

\textsuperscript{97} Dispatch of 23.05.1932 (no number given) of Dēmētrios Kaklamanos, Greek minister at London, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1933, A/13/II.

\textsuperscript{98} Calafeteanu, 307; Rhizos-Rhankavēs’ dispatch No. 937/III of 13.05.1939 the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3,4).

\textsuperscript{99} Kollas’ dispatch No. 841 of 10.03.1939 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3, 4).

\textsuperscript{100} Dispatch No. 412/A of 07.03.1939 of Cimon Kollas, Greek minister at Warsaw, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3,4).

\textsuperscript{101} Rhizos-Rhankavēs’ dispatch No. 937/III of 13.05.1939 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3,4).
taken up once more. But money was needed. Would the British Government furnish the two countries with the necessary funds? It was a hope - but nothing more\(^\text{102}\). The point was however that the “Cold Years” of Romanian-Polish relations were over\(^\text{103}\). *Rezultatul vizitei mele oficiale la Varșovia este foarte mulțumitor*, Gafencu stated on the 9\(^{th}\) of March\(^\text{104}\).

But the well of peaceful solutions was already running dry as well. During that fateful month of March, 1939, the President of Poland, Ignacy Mościcki, delivered a radio speech on the occasion of Saint Joseph’s Day. He was quite clear: Poland was not in need of any protection from the Great Powers; for she had confidence in her own Army\(^\text{105}\). A couple of weeks later, E. Kwiatkowski, then vice-president of the Polish Government, explained at Toruń that, without the Corridor, Poland could not survive\(^\text{106}\). What is more, in the summer of that year the idea that Danzig could never be German was the leading one of Polish public opinion\(^\text{107}\).

Despite her rulers’ statements, albeit self-confident, Poland was seeking discretely the assistance of the two major Western Powers. Ironically enough, it was J. Beck, once regarded as pro-German\(^\text{108}\), who inaugurated such a policy\(^\text{109}\); and, whatever the facts of the matter, he decided, after British pressure on him, to embark on a Polish-Russian rapprochement\(^\text{110}\). On the 10\(^{th}\) of May, 1939, the Soviet legation in Warsaw was re-opened. (It had been practically non-existent during the last two years.)\(^\text{111}\)

What followed is well-known. The German-Polish conflict ended in Poland’s disaster since the Police military leadership had, among other things, remained convinced of the usefulness of Cavalry and horses in the

\(^{102}\) C. Kollas’ dispatch No. 412/A of 07.03.1939 to the Foreign Ministry; K. Kollas’ dispatch No. 841 of 10.03.1939 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3,4).

\(^{103}\) C. Kollas’ dispatch No. 412/A of 07.03.1939 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3,4).


\(^{105}\) L’écho de Varsovie, 22.03. 1939.

\(^{106}\) The French translation of his speech in AYE, 1939, A/13/II (3,4).

\(^{107}\) C. Kollas’ dispatch No. 1129/B of 01.07.1939 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (2).

\(^{108}\) By contrast to A. Zaleski, a Francophile (Lagoudakēs’ dispatch No.410 of 01.05.1933 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1933, A/13/II.)

\(^{109}\) C. Kollas’ dispatch No. 325/A of 22.02.1939 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3-4).


\(^{111}\) Dispatch No. 2050 of 11.05.1939 of Spyridon Marketēs, Greek minister at Moscow, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3-4).
age of armoured warfare\textsuperscript{112}. As a result, instead of the Jagiellonian Poland it was the Piast one that was restored in the mid-1940s. The Polish Army was strong – but not as strong as Edward Rydz-Śmigly used to believe\textsuperscript{113}. The latter’s persisting in not allowing the Soviet Army to enter Poland\textsuperscript{114}, had a fatal impact on his country. What is more, the Marshal had offensive plans but did not defensive ones\textsuperscript{115}; and since the German forces outnumbered the Polish Army, the game was over for Poland.

But Rydz-Śmigły’s heroic death absolved his faults and failures.

* * *

It is a commonplace that during her martyrdom Poland was living in the hearts of her intelligentsia, political leaders, and military rulers. Piłsudski had been the main character in the drama of Poland’s rebirth; and Rydz-Śmigly the one in her 1939 tragedy. Both of them have been worthy of their country. Piłsudski, nonetheless, was clear-sighted enough to grasp what was going on with Soviet Russia. “Britain tries to find mercenaries against the Soviets”, he told A. Zaleski and Alexandru Iacovaky, Romanian minister at Warsaw, in February, 1927. Both Romania and Poland, consequently, should avoid war with Russia at any cost, unless Russia attacked either one of them\textsuperscript{116}.

What is more, Piłsudski regarded as “unavoidable” a war of his country with Germany. Yet he feared Russia more than he did Germany. He tried, therefore, to gain time by means of the 1934 German-Polish pact\textsuperscript{117}.

He was right. In 1927, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, explained \textit{urbi et orbi} the importance that Russian oil had for Britain\textsuperscript{118}. In fact, Piłsudski prophesied the main cause of WW II; for Hitler planned his own variety of \textit{Drang nach Osten} only after the failure of the 1923 putsch in Munich. It was

\textsuperscript{112} Because of the precedent of the 1919-1920 Polish-Russian war. Cf. Anghel, 148.


\textsuperscript{114} Marketès’ dispatch No. 2050 of 11.05.1939 to the Foreign Ministry, AYE 1939, A/13/II (3-4).

\textsuperscript{115} Dispatch No.664 of 16.09.1939 of K. Oikonomou, Greek military attaché at Belgrade, to the Foreign Ministry, AYE, 1939, A/13/II (2).

\textsuperscript{116} România-Polonia, I, doc. 46: Dispatch No. 655 of 11.02.1927 of Alexandru T. Iacovaky, Romanian minister at Warsaw, to Ioan M. Miteiineou, Foreign Minister of Romania, 89.


\textsuperscript{118} Joseph V. Stalin “Why England lost the oil monopoly” (translated into Greek), published (among others) in the Greek newspaper \textit{Heleutheron Vēma} (= The Free Tribune [Athens]), 15.09.1927.
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in Landsberg that Rudolph Hess put the National-Socialist leader in contact with Karl Haushofer\textsuperscript{119}. As a result, the Lebensraum notion was produced and war preparations against Russia were fuelled as early as 1936\textsuperscript{120}.

Unfortunately, Poland was in the very center between Germany and Russia.

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Un singur popor cu două drapele: The Romanian-Polish relations during the interwar period

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The Little Entente and Romania from the Perspective of Lithuanian Diplomacy in the 1930s

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This paper has been presented at the Second International Conference on Nordic and Baltic Studies in Romania: Black Sea and Baltic Sea Regions: Confluences, influences and crosscurrents in the modern and contemporary ages hosted by the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies, Târgoviste, May 20-22, 2011 and is prepared as part of postdoctoral fellowship research funded by European Union Structural Funds project entitled "Postdoctoral Fellowship Implementation in Lithuania".

Abstract:
The first diplomatic contacts between Lithuanian and Romanian representatives started in the aftermath of World War I when Lithuania was looking for the protection of her inhabitants who were still refugees in Russia. As Russia became entrenched with Bolshevism and Civil War, the Lithuanian citizens were evacuated through Romanian territory from South Ukraine and Crimea. Lithuania and Czechoslovakia established diplomatic relations in December 1919 and eventually an attempt was made to set up ties also with Romania. As a member of the Little Entente and an ally of Poland, Romania attracted the attention of the Lithuanian government. Romania recognized Lithuania de jure on August 21, 1924 and Dovas Zaunius was appointed as the first Lithuanian envoy to Bucharest. Nevertheless, during the next decade no political or diplomatic contacts between Lithuania and Romania were recorded. With the growing influence of Germany, the Soviet Union and the Little Entente on the international arena, Edvardas Turauskas was appointed on August 27, 1935 as envoy to Romania residing in Prague and later in the year Romania accredited Constantin Vallimarescu for the position of envoy to Lithuania residing in Riga. The dialogue between the two parties remained, however, occasional. When on July 21, 1940 Lithuania was occupied by Soviet Union, Turauskas visited the Romanian Legation in Bern and presented a note of protest in this respect. Romania did not acknowledge Lithuanian occupation and annexation.
Rezumat:

Keywords: Romania; Lithuania; Prague; diplomatic relations; 1930s; Little Entente; Baltic Entente

The growing intensity of political relations in Europe in the 1930s brought up the idea of collective security. The small and medium countries faced the inevitable necessity to seek for ways out of the international tension created by Germany, Poland, the USSR, Italy and the Great Powers. The Little Entente, which came into being as a bloc of countries as far back as 1920, was able to provide at least some measure of security to Romania. The situation of Lithuania was quite the opposite – it was not a party to any political alliances and it had serious political territorial disputes with the neighbouring Poland, as well as problems with Germany as regards the German minority. The small countries began to realise that they could only maintain political stability and play an active and influential role in foreign policy (in particular, in the League of Nations) in cooperation with other countries.

At the dawn of the 1930s, foreign policy did not promise any remarkable turning-points. The foreign policy of Lithuania went through a peculiar period at that time, which also manifesting in the lack of attention towards the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans. Several attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Romania and Yugoslavia resulted in a failure. Prague was not considered an important political centre, therefore, only a charge d’affaires of Lithuania, Jurgis Brėdikis, resided in the city. In
spite of that, the Foreign Ministry of Lithuania saw Prague as the most important diplomatic post in the area. The Lithuanian diplomat was required to provide information on the Little Entente and to monitor the policies of Romania and Yugoslavia. In spring 1932, following the conference of the Little Entente in Belgrade, Jurgis Brėdikis noted that “the countries of the Little Entente do not miss the opportunity to express their political and military significance on the key European issues and to highlight their obvious political independence.”¹ In 1932, the newly appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Lithuania to Czechoslovakia Jonas Aukštuolis was able to report more detailed information to Kaunas on the events in the Little Entente.

The year 1933 witnessed a growing interest of Lithuania in the Little Entente following the signing by Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia of the Pact of Organisation in February. The document strengthened the trilateral cooperation and the alliance’s role in the European foreign policy. The three countries also undertook not to sign unilateral treaties with third countries without the preliminary consent of all Little Entente members. Italy, Germany, the USSR, and Poland were considered the key third countries at that time. Lithuania was most interested in the relations between the members of the Little Entente and the aforementioned powers. Following the signing of the Pact on Organisation, Jonas Aukštuolis drew the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania to the fact that the relations between the Little Entente and Poland became particularly important and the position of the Little Entente in respect of Poland could play a role in the future relations between Poland and Germany.²

The position of Hungary in Europe was not of significant importance to the policy of Lithuania; hence, attention was not paid to the relations between the Little Entente and Hungary. Lithuania followed the events and recorded the facts communicated by its diplomats, but it failed to express any reaction, being content to remain a passive observer. It was far more interested in the circumstances of consolidation of the Little Entente and the attempts of the regional alliance to remain outside the sphere of interest of the Great Powers. The Pact of Organisation also covered the circumstances of economic cooperation; however, Jonas Aukštuolis was rather sceptical about Czechoslovakia’s interest in developing the economic relations with Romania and Yugoslavia by

asserting that due to their similar economic structure, Yugoslavia and Romania were more likely to cooperate between themselves than with Czechoslovakia. According to him, the strength of the Little Entente could be seen in contemporary political rather than economic ties. Economic ties were a matter of future and were dependent on policy, and not solely on the political development within the Little Entente.”

In the meantime, strange though it may seem, situations were recorded when foreign diplomats gathered in Kaunas to discuss international relations developments according to information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania. The envoys of Czechoslovakia and Italy M. Niederle and G. Amarodi discussed in Kaunas the potential Polish corridor to be created at the expense of Lithuania and the Lithuanian-Polish relations. G. Amarodi shared documents received from Budapest (from the Legation of Italy) and the minister of foreign affairs of Romania was informed that in order to have the USSR-Polish agreement signed, a secret treaty on the division of the spheres of influence in the Baltic countries was discussed, which would place Lithuania into the sphere of influence of Poland, while Latvia and Estonia were to be attributed to the USSR.

The international cooperation essentially changed in 1934 after the creation of the Baltic Entente and the signing of the Balkan Pact, i.e. the cooperation acquired a completely different form. The Balkan Pact between Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey was concluded in February, whereas Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia founded the Baltic Entente in September. The main connection between these alliances was their desire to preserve the stability and peace in the region, but their members lacked confidence in one another and the capacity of negotiating with countries that were not members to their respective alliance. According to the minister of foreign affairs of Lithuania Stasys Lozoraitis, the Baltic Entente acceded to other regional treaties, i.e. the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact, and sought the same goals.

The Lithuanian politicians’ interest in the Little Entente mainly focused on Czechoslovakia, which was considered the most influential member of the Little Entente. Romania and Yugoslavia received far less

4 Czechoslovakia’s charge d’Affaires in Lithuania M. Niederle report of 01.03.1933 from Kaunas to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic (hereafter, AMZV), Pz-Kaunas. č.j.35/duv.
attention. One of the Lithuanian diplomats once noted that they should not be interested in the issues that were not related to Lithuania. Lithuania was little interested in the relations between the members within the Little Entente; it was far more interested in the political power of the Little Entente and its regional and European foreign policy.

Thus, Romania, as a member of the Little Entente, was mainly of interest to the Lithuanian politicians for its relations with Poland and the USSR. Edvardas Turauskas discussed the two issues in the first meeting with the minister of foreign affairs Nicolae Titulescu in Bucharest. Titulescu professed to possess a document at his disposal whereby Russia recognised Bessarabia’s belonging to Romania and emphasized that his country encountered no problems with the USSR. Turauskas was however reluctant to believe in Titulescu’s assertions. The Lithuanian envoy was also interested in the reasons of the dwindling relations between Romania and Poland. Titulescu asserted that Poland was too keen on influencing Romanian foreign policy, which he found unacceptable. He acknowledged that the Poles were not satisfied with his personality either. On the other hand, as a member of the Little Entente, Romania perfectly understood its political weight. Titulescu professed to Turauskas his belief that: “you are in favour of the Little Entente and the policy of Romania in general”.

Starting with 1935 Turauskas was the envoy to all three members of the Little Entente, but he used to receive most information on the conferences of the Little Entente and their resolutions from Czechoslovakian politicians, as he maintained his residence in Prague. In 1936 he was very active in trying to find out the circumstances of the non-aggression draft treaty drawn up between Romania and the USSR and approached various politicians in this regard. In April, Kamil Krofta, the minister of foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia, reassured him that such a treaty was to be concluded before long. The issue was again addressed in November, when the King of Romanians paid a visit to Prague. Krofta reassured Turauskas that Romania was on the side of Czechoslovakia regarding the development of relations with the USSR because “Romania will also be able to take advantage of such good relations and it will not face any threats from the side of the USSR.” Turauskas was prone to evaluate the opinions of the Romanian envoy Theodor Emandi and learned

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7 Ibid., L.320-323.
that Krofta looked very optimistic during the king’s visit (especially as regards the relations with the USSR). In May 1937 Victor Cadere, the envoy of Romania in Prague, tried to explain to the Lithuanian diplomat the reasons why the treaty with the USSR was not concluded: Titulescu was willing to enter into the treaty with the USSR and would have concluded it, if not for Litvinov’s persistence to leave the question of Bessarabia open. That also triggered the changes in the Balkans. Cadere explained that the Romanian society did not support the negotiations with the USSR led by Titulescu. If such a treaty was concluded, Yugoslavia would recognise the USSR de jure, and the Little Entente would enter into the reciprocal treaty with the guarantee from France. In the meantime, foreign minister Victor Antonescu was not willing to disclose the circumstances of the treaty to Turauskas, limiting himself to the remark that the relations between Romania and the USSR were good.

The changes in Romania’s foreign policy in respect of Poland in 1936-1937 were not only of interest to Lithuanian politicians but also to the USSR diplomats residing in Kaunas. In 1936 the relations between Poland and the members of the Little Entente Czechoslovakia and Romania were actively monitored by the envoy of the USSR in Kaunas Michail Karski, who evaluated the visit of Antonescu by expressing his suspicions as to whether France did stand behind this cooperation. He also expressed his reasonable doubts that the excessive involvement of Poland in international policy could diminish the role of the French-USSR treaty. The new USSR envoy to Lithuania B.N. Podolski was haunted by similar moods and did not conceal that Moscow paid considerable attention to Antonescu’s visit in Warsaw. Podolski confessed to J. Skalicki that the visit of Antonescu to Warsaw was a change in the foreign policy of Romania which ran against the development of Romanian-USSR relations, as well as against the interests of the Little Entente. The Soviet diplomat was surprised to see the increased weight of Poland in Romania; he went on to assert that changes, which could divide the Little Entente, were underway. However, the Czechoslovakian diplomat did not believe that the visit should be

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evaluated by anything but dark shades; Prague was notified of Antonescu’s visit and no serious outcomes were expected out of it.\footnote{J. Skalický report of 05.02.1937 from Kaunas to Foreign Ministry of Czechoslovakia, AMZV.Pz-Kaunas. C.j.43-duv.}

The evolution of the Polish-Romanian relations was also discussed during Turauskas’ visit to Bucharest in May 1937. Antonescu was reluctant to go into details, he only confirmed that “we agree on all the issues as far as both countries are concerned.” In the assessment of the changes in Romania's foreign policy, he said that there were no essential changes and that they only revived their union with Poland, which was deteriorating due to personal disagreements between Titulescu and Beck. The Lithuanian diplomat was interested whether the alliance with Poland was only concerned with certain borders or the overall borders of both countries were envisaged. Antonescu replied that the alliance was not targeting against any country and guaranteed the recognition of borders of the two countries. Nevertheless, Turauskas noted in his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania that Antonescu was right in *de jure* terms, whereas in practice the alliance was concerned with the eastern borders exclusively.\footnote{E. Turauskas report of 18.05.1937 from Prague to Foreign Ministry of Lithuania, LCVA.F.648.Ap.1.B.16.L.63-64.}

According to the Czech historian Z. Sladek, we could no longer speak about the unity of the Little Entente by 1936, whereas the signing of the Austrian-German treaty on 11 June marked the end point in the collective security policy, and the countries of Central Europe fell under Germany's sphere of influence.\footnote{Sládek Zd. Mála dohoda. Praha, 2000.s.195, 197.} It should be noted that the Lithuanian diplomats were gradually getting signals of the dwindling unity within the Little Entente. The Czechoslovakian politicians did never openly express that to Turauskas, and the actual situation was concealed under a veil of optimism. In 1937 Turauskas pursued an active diplomacy in Prague in order to find out what were the interests of the Little Entente in signing the non-aggression treaty with Hungary. In February 1937, Krofta did not any longer conceal that the idea would remain unfulfilled because the Romanians hesitated and Yugoslavia demonstrated its opposition. Therefore, the Czechs could not force them to enter into such an agreement.\footnote{E. Turauskas report of 02.02.1937 from Prague to Foreign Ministry of Lithuania, LCVA.F.648.Ap.1.B.16.L.7-8.}

In summer, not even the President of Czechoslovakia Edvard Beneš concealed from Turauskas that essential differences between the position of Czechoslovakia and the ones of Romania and Yugoslavia were
apparent in the Little Entente.\textsuperscript{17} Of course, Yugoslavia and its attempted withdrawal from the Little Entente and that time became the focus of attention.

The treaty signed between Yugoslavia and Italy in March essentially changed the substance of the Little Entente. Therefore, in June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania was struck by the news of Italy’s endeavour to disband the Little Entente, and the treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia meant that one of the members of the Little Entente was already “pull out” of it.\textsuperscript{18} Even though the Little Entente was formed against Hungary, the conclusion on the ineffectiveness of the Little Entente included a remark that “the Little Entente is already ineffective even against Hungary”. According to the Lithuanian diplomat, Italy may seek to sign the agreement with Romania, case in which the Little Entente would remain “just a memory”, but at the same time he expressed his doubts as to its probability because Romania highly depended on the influence of France and Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{19}

Lithuanian diplomats were also interested in the negotiations between the Little Entente and Hungary over the situation of Hungarian minorities in the countries of the Little Entente. Romania expressed a rather categorical position on this issue and therefore the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania was informed that Romania had changed its positions and refused to make a statement on the Hungarian national minority, reminding that the Little Entente was created against revisionism and it would be to abandon its major goal if reconciliation with Hungary was achieved (even though other members of the Little Entente supported such a statement).\textsuperscript{20} Czechoslovakia was dissatisfied with Romania’s behaviour; its minister of foreign affairs even complained to Lithuania’s minister of foreign affairs Stasys Lozoraitis in Geneva in October that Antonescu hesitated to take any step on the issue of Hungarian national minorities.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1938 the issue of the German national minority and German interests with regard to Czechoslovakia gave the final blow to the Little Entente. However, in 1937 the minister of foreign affairs of Czechoslovakia explained to the Lithuanian diplomat that Romanians were well aware that

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} E. Turauskas report of 03.06.1937 from Prague to Foreign Ministry of Lithuania, LCVA.F.648.Ap.1.B.16.L.78-81.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., L.90-91.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid., L.107.
\end{itemize}}
if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, Romania’s destiny would be similar or even worse because the Russians would also invade Romania. Therefore, according to the Czechoslovakian chief of diplomacy, Romania, although only partially, did support Czechoslovakia\textsuperscript{22} in spring 1938. Nevertheless, right before the Sinaia conference, he already acknowledged that the Little Entente was faring through a crisis and the conference was not expected to bring any positive outcomes. Czechoslovakia did not expect any support from Yugoslavia, “but Romania currently expresses more concern and understanding of Czechoslovakia's situation. Romania acquires a deeper understanding of the importance of its relations with the USSR.” \textsuperscript{23}

The news with regard to the Little Entente reaching Lithuania from Prague testified that on the verge of war the countries of the Little Entente were most likely to act not as a united body, as they had already failed to react to arising threats as a solid political bloc for a number of times before. The Lithuanian politicians, immersed in solving their political issues with Poland and Germany, as well as the integrity of the Baltic Entente, remained only passive observers of the break-down of the Little Entente. They realised the importance of the treaties ensuring peace in Europe, therefore, they paid considerable attention to the relations between Romania and the USSR; the territorial conflicting interests were not of the least importance. The case of Lithuania shows that the actions of the USSR diplomacy extended to small countries as well. It should be noted that Poland was still considered the enemy of Lithuania in the 1930s; hence, the concern of the Lithuanian politicians about the improved relations between Romania and Poland in 1936-1937 was not gratuitous.

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The Nobel Peace Prize from a Romanian Perspective – The Interwar Period

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Abstract:
The Nobel Prizes are widely regarded as the ultimate achievement by researchers, writers and politicians. Due to its uniqueness and the values it stands for, the Nobel Peace Prize seems increasingly important in the modern world. To this point, no Romanian citizen was awarded this prize, but how many of them were nominated and how close were those nominated to winning this prize? Based on the archives of the Nobel Institute, this paper presents the Romanian nominees during the interwar period, their image and their activity as it appears in the nomination letters. The documents show that the name of some Romanians appears in the letters of nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, their works and ideas being of a real interest. Those who nominated them tried to influence the decisions of the Nobel Committee in favor of their candidate. The results were not positive, but Romanians, the nominees as the nominators, were among those keeping pace with the events, the politics and the peace movements in Europe during a troubled time.

Keywords: Nobel Peace Prize; Romanians; nominations; Nobel Committee
This article approaches the interwar nomination of Romanians to the Nobel Prizes, with emphasis on the Nobel Peace Prize. The Nobel Prize has received growing attention in Romania especially against the background of the awarding of Nobel Prize for Literature in late 2009 to German-Romanian writer Herta Müller. As little research has been done on the Romanians nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, my work is proving a start in the field. The few works approaching this subject refer especially to the Nobel Prize for Science, among the winners of which was George Emil Palade in 1974. The Prizes for Literature were subject to heated discussion in an attempt to explain why Romanian authors have been ignored although the Romanian literature is one of exceptional quality. The main sources of information for this paper are the archives of the Nobel Institute.

The fact that Romanians were not selected by the Nobel committee in Oslo or Stockholm is not due, as has been argued elsewhere, to the scarcity of contacts between Romania and the Nordic countries or to the lack of interest of these committees, but rather to the fact that these contacts

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1 According to the Statutes of the Nobel Foundation, a nomination is considered valid if it is submitted by members of national assemblies and governments of states, members of international courts, University rectors, professors of social sciences, history, philosophy, law and theology, directors of peace research institutes and foreign policy institutes, persons who have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, board members of organisations that have been awarded the Nobel Prize, active and former members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, former advisers to the Norwegian Nobel Committee. The Nobel Committee makes its selection on the basis of nominations received or postmarked not later than February 1st of the year in question. Nomination which do not meet the deadline are normally included in the following year’s assessment. Members of the Nobel Committee are entitled to submit their own nominations as late as the first meeting of the Committee after the expiry of the deadline. The Committee does not itself announce the names of the nominees. In so far as certain names crop up in the advance speculations as to who will receive the year’s Prize, this is either sheer guesswork or information put out by the person or persons behind the nomination. Information in the Nobel Committee’s nominations data base is not made public until after fifty years. http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/nomination_committee/who-can-nominate/

2 Laurenţiu Ulici, Nobel contra Nobel (Bucureşti: Editura Cartea Românească, 1988).


4 Nominations are considered by the Nobel Committee at a meeting where a short list of candidates for further review is created. This short list is then considered by permanent advisers to the Nobel Institute, which consists of the Institute’s Director and the Research Director and a small number of Norwegian academics with expertise in subject areas relating to the prize. Advisers usually have some months to complete reports, which are then considered by the Committee to select the laureate. The Committee seeks to achieve a unanimous decision, but this is not always possible. The Nobel Committee typically comes to a conclusion in mid-September, but occasionally the final decision has not been made until the last meeting before the official announcement at the beginning of October. http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/nomination_committee/selection-process/
were not sustained. Romanians have not paid enough attention to the functioning mechanisms of these institutions and were not able to profit from the interest the Nobel Committee members have expressed for some of their personalities. Another possible explanation is the increased interest for winners, rather than for nominees, and the limited level of cooperation between Romania and Scandinavia. The language barrier played also a role.

The existing documentation offers a good picture about how Romanians were perceived in Oslo and the Norwegians in Bucharest, which areas of collaboration between the two countries prevailed and how and through whom this collaboration was achieved.

The interwar period, for example, was considerably richer in nominations of Romanians as compared to the previous period. Several attempts were made to draw attention to the Nobel committees\(^5\) upon Romanian scientists, writers or politicians due to the uniqueness and importance of their work and research, but very few have ever come to the attention of these committees or ended on the short list. This may be regarded as partially Romanians’ fault. The Romanian government and personalities have either failed to understand or showed limited interest in the functioning mechanisms of the Nobel Prize. A concentration of forces is usually required, followed by internal and international recognition. A large number of letters sent from all over the world to support and draw attention to the person recommended to the Nobel Committee helps\(^6\) in most cases, even though there are also a few examples of the opposite\(^7\). This means that a person nominated to receive the Nobel Prize should be recognized for his/her work for peace both domestically and internationally. A single letter sent once a year, or every year for a period of several years is not sufficient to win the prize. This was the case for most Romanians nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize\(^8\).

The first recorded Romanian nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize dates back from 1912\(^9\). The famous historian and professor Nicole Iorga\(^{10}\)

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\(^5\) *Redegjørelser for Nobels Fredspris* (Oslo: Grøndahl & Søns Boktrykkeri, 1939) and http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/nomination/database.html

\(^6\) See, for example, the recommendations sent for Karl von Ossietzky (1889-1938) who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1935. There are two bulky files in the archives of the Nobel Institute including over ninety letters of recommendation for the German dissident.

\(^7\) *http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/nomination/database.html.* Fridtjof Nansen for example needed not more than a few letters to win the Prize.

\(^8\) *Redegjørelser for Nobels Fredspris*...

proposed for the awarding of the Prize the Königlich-Sächsisches Institut für Kultur-und Universalgeschichte an der Universität Leipzig and his founder Karl Lamprecht. Iorga begins the nomination letter with a brief introducing of himself where he writes:


The remaining of the letter emphasizes Lambrecht’s qualities as a historian and the importance of the Institute he created: Personne n’a une part plus large dans la rénovation des études historiques pendant les vingt dernières années que M. Lamprecht. Lamprecht and his theories have changed la manière d’étudier les événements historiques. In Iorga’s opinion, the Institute has set les bases nouvelles de l’histoire universelle et découvrent par patience comparaison les liaisons secrètes des civilisations nationales. His letter of recommendation is not unique in recommending the Institute from Leipzig. German and Austrian professors also tried to convince the Nobel

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10 Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940) was a Romanian historian, politician, literary critic, memoirist, poet and playwright. Co-founder (in 1910) of the Democratic Nationalist Party, he served as a member of Parliament, President of the Deputies' Assembly and Senate, cabinet minister and briefly (1931–32) as Prime Minister. A child prodigy, polymath and polyglot, Iorga produced an unusually large body of scholarly works, consecrating his international reputation as a medievalist, Byzantinist, Latinist, Slavist, art historian and philosopher of history. Holding teaching positions at the University of Bucharest, the University of Paris and several other academic institutions, Iorga was founder of the International Congress of Byzantine Studies and the Institute of South-East European Studies.

11 Königlich-Sächsisches Institut für Kultur-und Universalgeschichte an der Universität Leipzig or The Institute for Cultural and Universal History at the University of Leipzig was created in 1909 by Karl Lamprecht whose work was devoted to comparative world and cultural history. Iorga studied for his PhD at the University of Leipzig and Lamprecht was one of the members in his doctoral committee.

12 Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 1-46, PFL 26/1912.

13 Ibid.

14 Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 1-46, PFL 26/1912.

15 HTTP://WWW.NOBELPRIZE.ORG/NOBEL_PRIZES/PEACE/NOMINATION/NOMINATION.PHP?STRING=1912&ACTION=SIMPLESEARCH&SUBMIT.X=18&SUBMIT.Y=11
Committee of the values promoted by Lamprecht and his new theories in the study of history.

However, for Romanians, the most outstanding example of a personality who was not rewarded with the prestigious prize is that of Nicolae Titulescu. Titulescu remarkably represented Romania on the international arena during the interwar period, being twice elected President of the General Assembly of the League of Nations. His outstanding work for peace and the admiration he enjoyed from some of the Nobel Committee members may have entitled him to be considered for the awarding of Nobel Peace Prize. He began his diplomatic career in 1920 as the representative of Romania at the Peace Conference and as one of the main mediators after the war. In the third decade of the 20th century, he became a first class personality of the international diplomatic community as a servant of his nation as Minister of Finance and Foreign Minister, twice appointed ambassador to Britain and permanent member of the Arbitration Court in The Hague. For more than twenty years, Titulescu, endowed with a strong analytical sense, was present on both political and diplomatic fronts, proving a competence which cannot be denied. The realistic manner in which he addressed key issues on the international arena such as disarmament, peace treaties, positive economic cooperation between states led, as I mentioned above, to his election as president of the General Assembly of the League of Nations in 1930 and 1931, which was unique in the history of this organization\(^1\). Holding this prestigious position twice only confirmed the exceptional qualities of a politician involved in obtaining peace through international cooperation.

His activity brought a big contribution into enhancing the prestige of Romania on the European political scene. The Romanian diplomat was one of the most talented representatives of small powers, a man of peace who first spoke of *spiritualizing* the boundaries, developing a definition for what the European Union stands for today. This was a new interpretation based on the idea of finding those elements uniting people, namely culture and spirituality, instead of keeping to the physical barrier of borders. Titulescu’s conception represented a cornerstone in the development of peace and international relations during the inter-war period. In one of his lectures, he emphasized that *peace should not simply mean the absence of war, but the attitude of trust, mutual understanding and the hope that the future will be better. Peace should not be only proclaimed, it should be cherished and maintained*\(^1\). In accordance with his ideas, international relations should be

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\(^1\) Walter M. Bacon Jr., *Nicolae Titulescu și politică externă a României, 1933-1934* (Iași: Editura Institutului European, Romania, 1999), 11.

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guided by the laws of peace.\(^{18}\) Constantly defending the ideas of peace, Titulescu promoted the policy of good neighborliness, the ability to understand other states’ point of view, the general cooperation through regional and international cooperation. Therefore, he labored to create regional alliances such as the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, to strengthen central and eastern European states in order to counterbalance the great powers. He stressed several times that there should be a general European security system, not one divided into the Western security and Eastern security, as proposed by Great Britain\(^ {19}\). Titulescu was among the few Romanian politicians who understood and expressed the relationship between national and universal in politics and developed a unified and balanced political vision accordingly.

Although an entire mythology surrounds Titulescu and his alleged recommendations for the Nobel Peace Prize, he was in fact never nominated; no recommendation or nomination letter was sent for him to the Nobel Committee in Oslo. Yet, as I noted above, being a widely appreciated and recognized figure throughout Europe and beyond, he would have not lacked supporters if such a campaign would have been initiated. He was one of best candidates for obtaining the Nobel Peace Prize in 1930 or 1931 or in the subsequent years. Some of the Nobel Committee members, such as Johan Ludwig Mowinckel\(^ {20}\) and Halvdan Koht\(^ {21}\) were great admirers of Titulescu’s work during his presidency of the General Assembly of the League of Nations. Mowinckel showed his appreciation for Titulescu in 1933 during a discussion with the Romanian envoy in Oslo, Barbu Constantinescu. Mr. Titulescu, Mowinckel argued, was undoubtedly one of the best and the most capable presidents of the League of Nations. There is a great honor for your country to have a Foreign Minister of such a scale\(^ {22}\). We can only imagine Mowinckel’s reaction, or that of other members of the Nobel Committee, if letters of recommendation would have arrived at the Nobel

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\(^{18}\) Ibid., 345.
\(^ {19}\) Bacon Jr., 13.
\(^ {20}\) Johan Ludwig Mowinckel (1870-1943), famous Norwegian politician, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister between 1924 and 1926, 1928 and 1931 and between 1933 and 1935. He was also a member of the Nobel Committee between 1925 and 1937.
\(^ {21}\) Halvdan Koht (1873 – 1965) was a Norwegian historian, biographer, and Foreign Minister (for Labour Party) between 1935 and 1940. He was a consultant for the Norwegian Nobel Institute from 1904 to 1913, examining proposed candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize, and served on the Norwegian Nobel Committee from 1918 to 1942.
Institute on his name. The instability on the Romanian political scene following the death of King Ferdinand worsened the internal situation and diminished the chances that real values would be recognized and promoted. Instead of appreciation for his work, Titulescu became a *persona non grata* during the dictatorship of Carol II who asked him to leave the country and removed him from all public positions\(^\text{23}\). While in exile in Switzerland, Titulescu continued to promote his ideas of peace through a series of articles and conferences, drawing attention especially to the dangers of fascism.

As regards the Nobel Peace Prize, Titulescu wrote a letter of nomination, dated January 28, 1935\(^\text{24}\), recommending the former Prime Minister of Brazil, Afrânio de Mello Franco\(^\text{25}\). The two politicians had much in common and became friends during their League of Nations’ mandates\(^\text{26}\). In his letter of nomination sent to the Nobel Committee, Titulescu is highlighting the merits of Mello Franco in mediating the conflict between Colombia and Peru, which broke out in 1932 when the Peruvians had occupied the port Leticia. The jurisdiction over the port was assigned in 1922 to Colombia, but the Peruvians challenged their authority\(^\text{27}\). Mello Franco intervened as a mediator and war was avoided after the signing of an agreement on May 24, 1934. Consequently, in 1935 43 letters of recommendation\(^\text{28}\) were sent to Oslo expressing support for Mello Franco as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize, including the one sent by Titulescu. Titulescu presents, in a convincing manner, Mello Franco’s qualities as a lawyer and politician, *his courage to implement the ideas of peace and international cooperation, his conception that theory and action can always be merged into politics for preventing the outbreak of war*\(^\text{29}\). Unfortunately, Mello Franco was not able to win the Peace Prize that year, the whole attention being directed toward the German dissident Karl von Ossietzky who dared to oppose Hitler.


\(^{24}\) Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, Prisforslag/Nominations (PFL), 18-41/1935.

\(^{25}\) Afrânio de Mello Franco (1870-1943), Brazilian politician and diplomat, Foreign Minister and Brazil’s representative to the League of Nations from 1929.

\(^{26}\) During his activity as Romania’s Foreign Minister, Titulescu has shown great interest for Latin and South America. He will open, for example, new diplomatic representations in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Mexico City, Caracas.


\(^{28}\) Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 1935 and www.nobel.se/nominations.

\(^{29}\) Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, Prisforslag/Nominations (PFL), 18-41/1935.
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The first letter of recommendation sent to the Nobel Committee for a Romanian by another Romanian does not appear in the Institute’s archives before 1926. The letter bears the signature of Romanian Senator Dissescu and recommends Vespasian V. Pella, professor and member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Professor Dissescu dispatched together with his letter of recommendation dated January 1, 1926, two copies of Pella’s main work, La Criminalité Collective des Etats et le Droit Pénal de l’Avenir. In a new letter dated March 16, 1926, Dissescu attached two more volumes of this book along with five booklets comprising the results of an international investigation on the novelty of the ideas Pella was promoting. He expressed his regrets of not being able to annex several documents received from leading figures in the United States, Spain, France, etc. who considered Pella’s work outstanding, since they would have arrived after the deadline. In his turn, Vespasian Pella has also sent a letter from Paris to the Nobel Committee’s Chairman, expressing his gratitude for Dissescu’s proposal and offering to send more information on his theory.

30 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 1-17 /1926 and 9/1926.
31 Constantin G. Dissescu (1854 – 1932) was a Romanian lawyer, politician and diplomat, Professor of Law at the University of Iași (1883) and Bucharest (1884), he also served as Minister of Justice, Education and Religious Affairs. He was one of the Romanian delegates to the League of Nations, a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, President of the Romanian Inter-Parliamentary-Group.
32 Vespasian Pella (1897-1960) was a Romanian lawyer, professor and diplomat, member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, member of the International Association of Penal Law, Professor of International Law at the Academy in The Hague, member of the Romanian Academy, Romanian delegate at the League of Nations. His ideas gave rise to the creation of international institutions such as the International Court of Justice and the Prevention of Genocide Convention of the United Nations.
33 Inter-Parliamentary Union is an institution founded in 1889 by Frederic Passy, winner of the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901, and William Randal Cremer. It was the first international forum open to negotiations aimed at arbitration and peaceful resolution of conflicts. The organization played an important role in establishment of the first Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The permanent headquarters of the Inter-Parliamentary Union are in Geneva.
34 The paper Dissescu referred to was published in 1925 and proved to be a complete novelty for the international law system.
35 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 1-17/ 1926 and 9/1926.
37 The Nobel Committee was composed between 1925 and 1930 by Fredrik Stang (Chairman), Cornelius Bernhard Hanssen, Hans Jakob Horst, Johan Ludwig Mowinckel and Halvdan Koht.
38 According to the „unwritten laws” of the Nobel Committee, it is a mistake to contact the Committee after being nominated. Therefore, Pella’s action was not welcomed and probably determined his exclusion from the shortlist.
Professor Dissescu’s letter of proposal outlined Pella’s tireless work to spread the ideas of peace through his book of great value and absolutely original, which qualifies his author for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Dissescu continues with great fervor in over 45 pages to make a brief presentation of Pella’s innovative ideas, highlighting his merits point by point: participation in international conferences, speeches, articles in newspapers and magazines, reports to scientific societies etc. He regarded as noteworthy the interest of different personalities of the time for the new ideas and theories expressed by Pella. Instead of making a simple summary of Pella’s work, he tried to present it through the eyes of these personalities who would thus give Pella a kind of mediated recommendation. Dissescu considered La Criminalité Collective des Etats et le Droit Pénal de l’Avenir the most important work of Professor Pella arguing that introducing this book to the Nobel Committee will give the author the chance to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize but this did not prevent him to review some other of his writings.

He insists on the novelty of the theories promoted by Pella: instead of an empirical study of war, he introduced for the first time in international law, the idea of collective criminality of states in case they allow war to happen.

Dissescu tried to accomplish alone something others have achieved through combined efforts of institutions and personalities, namely to convince the Nobel Committee of the value of Vespasian V. Pella as a peace personality. He lacked in the available resources, finances or contacts like other nominators, but he brought to the attention of the Committee in his long letter references and recommendations from personalities such as Louis Barthou, Donnedieu de Vabres, Enrico Ferri, Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst, to name just a few of those who were familiar with

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40 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 1-17/ 1926 and 9/1926.
41 Ibid.
42 Louis Barthou (1862-1934) French politician, Prime Minister in 1913, Chairman of the Reparation Committee after the war, Minister of Justice during the Poincaré government and Foreign Minister in 1934. Aware of the German danger, Barthou confirmed French support to Poland and encouraged local alliances such as Little Entente initiated by Romania.
43 Henri Donnedieu de Vabres (1880-1952) was a French lawyer known for his work in the Nuremberg trials after the World War II. Together with Raphael Lemkin and Vespasian V. Pella, he contributed to the Convention for the Prevention of Genocide documents of the United Nations. Lemkin was the first to use the term genocide (from Greek word Genos - family, tribe, race and Latin Cide - to kill) in his 1944 work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.
44 Enrico Ferri (1856-1929) was an Italian jurist and criminologist, supporter of the socialist ideas, author of different books on social criminology. Professor at the University of Rome and initiator of the Italian School of Criminology.
45 Cecil James Barrington Hurst (1870-1963) was an English politician and lawyer, member of the House of Commons, Foreign Office legal adviser. He worked from 1929 to 1945 as a
Pella’s ideas, considering them interesting and exciting. Thus, a number of 22 personalities from the political, diplomatic or legal fields pronounced themselves, indirectly, in favor of Pella's candidacy. The nomination would have received considerable weight were the aforementioned personalities send their recommendations to the Nobel Committee and not to a anonymous senator in Bucharest. Unfortunately, we can only speculate on this. No further nomination of Vespasian V. Pella can be found in the Oslo archives in the subsequent years and Dissescu’s enormous effort remained thus inconclusive.

Vespasian V. Pella\textsuperscript{46} is considered today one of the founders of international law. He was a founding member of the International Association of Law established in 1924 in Paris, one of the initiators of a Permanent Criminal Court and a representative of Romania to the League of Nations. He presented at the League of Nations in 1928 the draft of a Statute\textsuperscript{47} for creating an International Court of War Crimes inside the already existing permanent International Court of Justice.

In 1949, Vespasian V. Pella’s name appears again in the archives\textsuperscript{48}, this time among the nominators. He proposed Edgar Milhaud\textsuperscript{49}, French economist and politician, for the Nobel Peace Prize. This letter shows Pella’s continuous involvement in peace problems and his unremitting contacts with international institutions despite the political system change in Romania.

From 1931 to 1937 nominations were sent to the Nobel Committee\textsuperscript{50} on behalf of Professor Peter Tomaschek of Siret (a small town in Northern Romania) for his visionary ideas on the issues of peace\textsuperscript{51}. Peter Tomaschek was not, as one would expect, a famous name in the Romanian political or diplomatic life. His presence among the nominees of Nobel Peace Prize may come as a surprise to those familiar with the main figures of Romanian interwar period. One may wonder: why no letter of recommendation for judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague, serving from 1934 to 1936 as the President of this Court.

\textsuperscript{46} C. Turcu, “Centennial Vespasian V. Pella”, \textit{Magazin Istoric} 1 (1997).


\textsuperscript{49} Edgar Milhaud (1895 -1964) was a famous French economist, author of several theories behind what has become today's social economy. Promoter of socialist ideas and the extension of voting rights for women. He published several articles and lectures on complying with international treaties and conventions as a prerequisite to prevent war.

\textsuperscript{50} Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 1931-1937.

Titulescu is to be found and so many for some completely unknown person? The letters of recommendations for Tomaschek cover a period of six years. His circles of friends or acquaintances were probably convinced of the value of his ideas that deserved to be promoted and rewarded. At this point, a brief overview of his life and career appears necessary.

Peter Tomaschek was born on July 11, 1882 as the youngest child of a family of German descent from Bohemia who settled in the small Moldavian town of Siret in the early nineteenth century. Peter began his studies at the Theological Seminary in Lemberg (Lvov) obeying his parents’ desire to become a priest. He was more inclined towards medicine and philosophy and eventually spent several semesters studying medicine in Prague and Vienna, coming in contact with the spirit of the time and with the new ideas promoted in the Academia. He finally concluded his studies in Literature and Philosophy in Cernăuți. After graduating, he became professor in Cernăuți and Gura Humorului, and between 1912 and 1926 he taught German and Latin at the German High School in Suceava. The Austrian Yearbook acknowledged him as a professor at the Franz Joseph Gymnasium in Suceava and then in Siret. After the First World War, he will be very active in the union movement of Bukovina with Romania. In 1940, Tomaschek was elected as one of the members of the Romanian-Soviet Committee who met the Soviets in order to negotiate on the issues springing from the application of Soviet ultimatum to Romania, which implied the occupation by the Soviets of the northern part of Bukovina. He sustained and pleaded in favor of Romanian stance53.

Tomaschek’s nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize are a result of his sustained work on promoting peace54, which began as early as 1906 through the publication in Vienna of his first paper: How can peace save the world? The first letter of nomination was sent in 193155 by Pantelimon

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52 Ibid., 5-6.
53 Schipor, 14.
54 Vasile Schipor refers to a series of articles published by Tomaschek between 1906 and 1931 in German newspapers such as Czernowitz Tagblatt, Czernowitz Morgenblatt, Deutsche Tagepost. Schipor, 16-18. The 1931 letter of recommendation sent by Pantelimon Chirilă referred to the article Creation of the new nations and world peace, appeared in 1918. The letters of recommendation sent in 1933, 1934 and 1937 referred to more recent works such as Paneuropa published in 1930 and Global crisis and peace published in March 1931. Perceci noted that four copies of Crime Industry appeared in 1929 will be sent later to the Nobel Committee because of the difficulty to send everything by registered mail. In the Nobel archives in Oslo there are only the recommendation letters, but not the books mentioned above. Vasile Schipor states that they were required from the Nobel Institute in 1987 by Tomaschek’s family (settled in Sweden).55 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 32-1/1931.
Chirilă, a member of the Parliament in Bucharest. Recommendations for Tomaschek were sent again in 1933 by Senator Ştefan Percec. The subsequent letters from 1934 to 1937 will be sent on behalf of teacher Peter Tomaschek by Erast Nastasi, also a Member of Parliament. All the letters are in German, with annexes or newspaper cuttings of the time and even poetry, emphasizing the international situation and the merits of the above-mentioned Romanian teacher.

For example, in an old-fashioned style and faulty German, the first nominator, Pantelimon Chirilă emphasizes Tomaschek’s qualities as a propagator of peace as they appear in the brochure: The Emergence of the New Countries and Peace published in 1918. Devoted to the concept of world peace, Tomaschek claimed in his work that war was always a relic of barbarism in humans, a disgrace to the civilized world and should therefore disappear from people’s minds in the 20th century. He believed that peace alone could contribute to the plenary development of the human being.

In his recommendation of 1933, Ştefan Percec points out to Tomaschek’s ideas about the individual’s role in society, about war and the transfer of responsibility from politicians to ordinary men. The fact that people expect from the state and from the politicians (whom he calls merchants of death) to decide on important questions such as peace does not reflect a mature thinking. He insists on the fact that proper training could transform citizens from passive to active, getting them more involved in decision making (...) He points out that disastrous wars are merely the result of global finance, and therefore wars should be moved to a spiritual level and transformed into a noble competition. Contacts between nations should be facilitated by a common language, a common currency and a common World Parliament. A whole literature is written by Tomascheck on this subject, as

56 Pantelimon Chirilă (1878-1940) was a lawyer and senator, member of Peasants Party, born in Rădăuţi in northern Bukovina. Member of Tomaschek’s circle of friends.
57 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 47-1/1933.
58 Ştefan Percec (1873-1938) Romanian lawyer and politician, member of the Peasants Party, senator of Radauţi.
60 Erast Nastasi (1898-1933) Romanian politician and lawyer, former judge, Vice-Chairman of Rădăuţi Liberal Party. Appears in the Nobel Archives under the name Ernst Nastasi.
61 There are only references to these books and brochures by those who nominated him. They were not to be found in the Nobel Institutes Archives as Tomascheck’s family wanted to have them.
63 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 47-1/1933.
64 Besides the idea of European Union to which Tomaschek refers, there is interesting to note the three terms he uses: common language, common currency and the World Parliament, all of which begin in German with the letter W: Weltsprache, Weltwährung, Weltparlament.
Percec states, which was on the way of being translated into all languages and enlighten the masses.

New recommendations written by Erast Nastasi beginning with 1934 and continuing every year until 1937 followed. They are largely identical to his first recommendation. Yet, the letter of 1936 bears the visible influence of the international polemics around the nomination of Carl von Ossietzky. It is obvious that Nastasi informed himself from the German press and did not escape the influence of Nazi propaganda that attacked at the time Ossietzky as well as the Nobel Committee and Norway. He attached, confused, many clippings from German newspapers where the Nobel Committee members were called Marxists, Freemasons, fanatics and unreliable. He adds, though, in the end of his letter, showing enough understanding and common sense that: we do not want to believe these suppositions. Despite this remark, it seems that at least partially the propaganda had some effect, which becomes obvious in the letter sent in 1937 in which he states: until the last corner of the world, indignation broke out against Ossietzky receiving the Prize. To justify his attitude he attached again to the letter several German newspapers cuttings, articles written by

67 Carl von Ossietzky (1889-1938) was a famous German peace activist who began his career as a critical journalist of the Weimar Republic and published documents demonstrating German rearmament. His vehement criticism continued also after Hitler came to power in 1933. Therefore, he would be arrested, tortured and sent into several camps where his health started to deteriorate. The first nominations for the Peace Prize being granted to Ossietzky arrived at the Nobel Institute in 1935. The Nobel Committee included at that time members of the Norwegian Government. They had to deal with Hitler’s threat to attack Norway if the Peace Prize will be awarded to Ossietzky. The Committee tried to gain time by deciding not to award the Peace Prize in 1935. In 1936, more than eighty letters arrived at the Nobel Institute from all over the world nominating the German dissident. Under such pressure the Committee had no choice but to award the Peace Prize to Ossietzky in 1936 for 1935. Hitler did not invade Norway, but forbade German researchers to receive the Nobel Prizes or any other awards that were not granted by a German, Arian institution, the only ones able to judge German value. This prohibition was to enter into force in 1937 and ended in 1945, affecting a number of German researchers. The Norwegian Parliament in its turn decided to avoid such crises in the future and stated that no member of the Government or Parliament should be allowed to be a member of the Nobel Committee. Parliament or Government members could hold such a position, but only after their retirement from politics. The goal was for the Committee to gain independence from the Government, so that its decisions would not affect the security of the Scandinavian state. Vasilica Sirbu, “Hitler şi Premiile Nobel,” Analele Științifice ale Universității ”Al.I.Cuza”, Iași, Istorie LI (2005).
68 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 32-1/1937.
69 The fact that there are only cuttings from news papers considered by Nastasi edifying for his attitude makes it difficult to know their titles or their release date. It can be assumed, however, that they are from German newspapers published between 1936 and 1937.
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Nobel’s family in Sweden or by Knut Hamsun in Norway, most of them against Ossietzky.

In the recommendation letter\textsuperscript{70}, Nastasi persevered into highlighting the merits of Tomaschek, undertaking a presentation of his work. He repeated Percec’s ideas and his arguments of the previous years. He emphasized Tomaschek’s arguments in favor of creation of a Parliament of nations, of a common currency that would facilitate world development, of multiculturalism, of the advantages of the democratic system and the dangers of individual annihilation in a totalitarian state, offering as a negative example Bolshevik Russia. Tomaschek’s opinion that heads of state should be exposed to the new ideas about democracy, which promote the value of each man, thus avoiding the danger of transforming humans into an inert mass, blind and illiterate was also referred to. Nastasi also mentions Tomaschek’s support for the setting up of a Hebrew state based on his argument that Jews have not left their old land voluntarily, but they were forced to do so. (…) People’s attitude towards them was not always favorable, bringing them therefore in a defensive position. Continuous difficulties have turned the Hebrews into the brightest and wisest of all peoples of the world. The solution proposed by Tomaschek, and supported by Nastasi in his recommendation, was the creation of a Hebrew state where joining the ranks of other nations, they would lose their dangerous sharp intellect and the ability to dominate world finances. The creation of a Jewish state is a prominent factor for solving the problem of peace\textsuperscript{71}. This is an interesting vision if we look at the time when it was presented, but idealistic and somehow ironic taking in consideration the political developments after the creation of the Jewish state.

Nastasi’s recommendations are intended to be complex and informative about the ideas promoted by Tomaschek. His presentation is sometimes inconsistent, disorganized and difficult to understand, even though most of it insists on the candidate’s ability of providing solutions for the problems of that time. It is unlikely that the Nobel Committee members would have had the time or the patience to understand the significance of such recommendations.

However, despite the possible faults of the recommendation letters, the ideas of Peter Tomaschek as presented by those who nominated him show him as a person who wanted to find solutions to the world’s conflicts and was well connected to the realities and events of his time. The transformation of the individual from passive to active and the pressure on political power are some of the most widely acclaimed principles today.

\textsuperscript{70} Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkioskaper, 32-1/1937.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
Promoted by both governmental and non-governmental organizations, they represent the underlying code of every democracy. Tomaschek’s vision about future foreshadowed some of the contemporary institutions such as the European Union, the United Nations, the use of a common currency, respect for diversity and tolerance. Despite the “Blacksmith’s Iocan” atmosphere in connection with the discussions on the questions of peace emerging from the recommendations sent to Oslo as well as from the book written by one family offspring, Tomaschek was loved, respected and appreciated by his family and friends who decided to honor him by sending nominations to the Nobel Committee.

For the interwar period, we can find a number of other nominations made by Romanians, which demonstrate that they were keeping pace with time and events. For example, when the League of Nations was nominated for the Peace Prize in 1929, a nomination letter from Romania joined other famous names supporting the international institution established after the First World War. The author of this letter was Ermil Pangratti, Rector of the University of Bucharest, member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The recommendation is in reality an answer to an invitation sent by the Nobel Committee to come up with a proposal, as reflected in the Nobel statutes. The Union of Associations of the League of Nations was sustained in 1929 by numerous letters of recommendation following a campaign initiated by its member states.

In 1931, the famous Romanian journalist and politician Mihail Manoilescu sent a letter of nomination for Étienne Clémentel, French

72 Refers to a scene from one of the most famous novels of post World War II Romanian literature, Moromeții written by Marin Preda (1922-1980). In about thousand pages, Preda presents the slow and deep dissolution of an ordinary peasant family from the Wallachian Plain in Southern Romania. The novel traces the destiny of this social category between 1930 to 1950 showing how Moromete’s peasant dignity is kneeled by the deep changes brought about by the war and by the communism. The author relies heavily on his characters use of language, comprising their particular humor, reflection and subtle meditation on the deep questions of existence. The scene I am referring to describes the gathering of peasants every Sunday at the local blacksmith, Iocan, to discuss politics and to put the country on track.
75 Ermil Pangrati (1864 - 1931) engineer and mathematician, founder of the Romanian School of Architecture.
76 See www. nobel.se/nominations
77 Mihail Manoilescu (1891-1950) was Romanian economist, journalist and politician. Foreign Minister during the turbulent summer of 1940, he half-heartedly signed the Viena Dictate imposed by Hitler and Mussolini upon Romania. According to it, Romania was forced to cede more than 16,000 squares miles of territory to Hungary. Manoilescu’s ideas presented in his Economic Theory of International Trade have been implemented with success.
lawyer and politician who helped spreading the ideas of pacifism and international cooperation and the establishment of the International Chamber of Commerce, whose first president he became in 1920. The International Chamber of Commerce comes up with the idea of nominating Clémentel for the Nobel Peace Prize, sending the first recommendations in 1931.

In 1932 two members of the Romanian Parliament, Vasile Demetrescu-Brăila and Constantin Xeni recommended Efisio Giglio-Tos. Giglio-Tos was known as the founder of the International Federation of Students Corda Fratres in 1898, based on principles of mutual understanding for the cause of peace. He was the main promoter of closer cooperation between Italy and France and of creating an international Parliament of students and teachers who should meet on a yearly basis. Giglio-Tos’s ideas became growingly accepted, especially against the background of the limited freedom of expression in Fascist Italy. In 1938, there is another Romanian professor, Aurelian Ionașcu, who nominated

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78 Étienne Clémentel (1864-1936) was a French lawyer and politician, holding various governments positions. He was involved in the recovery and reorganization of France after 1918, negotiating the Dawes Plan.

79 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/nomination/nomination.php

80 Vasile Demetrescu-Brăila (1876-1939) was a Romanian physician and diplomat, one of the politicians who considered that Romania should enter the war as one of Entente’s allies. Minister of Arts and Religious Affairs during Take Ionescu’s government between 1921 and 1922. More information about Vasile Demetrescu-Brăila in Toader Buculei's monograph, Vasile Demetrescu-Brăila. Omul și faptele sale (Brăila: Editura Istros, 2008).

81 Constantin Xeni (1878-1934) was a lawyer, journalist and diplomat. His name was actually Zender, apparently of Jewish origin, after information provided by Enciclopedia Predescu. Member of Parliament and Minister of Labor between 1921 and 1922 in Take Ionescu’s government, collaborator of various literary magazines and newspapers. His name appears in the nomination database of the Nobel Foundation as Xanhi.

82 Efisio Giglio-Tos (1870-1941) was an Italian teacher, member of the French-speaking minority in northern Italy. He was in favor of a greater cooperation with the French and initiated a prolific and creative activity of several organizations that promoted pacifism. He was recommended for the Nobel Peace Prize mainly by Italians (with the two Romanian exceptions for 1932), between 1930 and 1938.


83 Aurelian Ionașcu (1903-1990) was a lawyer and professor at the Law Faculty in Cluj. He defended his Ph.D. in Paris in 1930, being one of the best Romanian lawyers. Ionașcu was the author of numerous works of Romanian and international law.
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The same year a group of professors from the History Faculty at the University of Iaşi recommended Franklin Delano Roosevelt to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Their motivation was mainly the political work of Roosevelt, but they also acknowledged his involvement in economy and culture. The recommendation is addressed on behalf of all university professors from the University of Iaşi.

The next nomination is unwonted, albeit it dates some years after the end of the Second World War. The letter is worth mentioning because it provides information on the political changes Romania went through at the time. A group of professors of the University of Bucharest signed in 1948 a letter of recommendation in support of Vyacheslav Molotov’s nomination. The supporters of this candidacy were famous names of Romanian culture, well-known interwar historians such as Andrei Oţetea, Ion Nestor, Anton Dumitriu and Emil Condurachi. The reason they

84 Francesco Cosentini (1873-1941) was a politician, lawyer and author of several works of American family law and legislation.
85 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 7-2/1938.
86 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 16-1/1939.
87 Det Norske Nobel Institutt Arkivskaper, 11-1,1948.
88 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Skriabin (1890-1986) known as Molotov, takes his nickname from the Russian word molot which means hammer. Active in the Bolshevik movement since 1906. Later he becomes a protégé of Stalin, Prime minister in 1930 and Foreign Minister between 1939 and 1949 and between 1953 and 1956. The improvised incendiary weapon called Molotov cocktail received his name from the Finnish Army during the Winter War.
89 Andrei Oţetea (1894-1977) was a Romanian historian, professor at the universities from Iaşi and Bucharest, specialist in Middle Age and Modern History. After the Second World War he becomes director of the “Nicolae Iorga” Institute of History, member of the Romanian Academy, Vice-President of the Latin Academy in Paris and member of the French Society of Modern History. He has published studies on the history of the Byzantine Empire, the Renaissance and was editor of the history magazine Revue Roumaine d'Historie.
90 Ion Nestor (1876-1962) was a historian and politician, member of the Romanian Academy. He studied in Munich, Leipzig and Berlin and became professor at the University of Vienna in 1911, where he gave lectures on the history of the Romanians. Returned to Romania, he was actively involved in the political actions that led to the unification of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918. Member of government under Ion I.C. Brătianu, minister for Bukovina and for Bessarabia, Minister of Public Works and Labor during the interwar period, he broke out with the Liberal Party in 1939 and went to support the dictatorship established by King Carol II. He was probably forced to sign the recommendation letter for Molotov in 1948, being arrested by the Communists and imprisoned only a couple of years later in 1950.
91 Anton Dumitriu (1905-1992) was a mathematician by initial formation who obtained a PhD in philosophy and was among the first philosophers in Romania interested in the philosophy of science, a subject he treated in The Philosophical bases of Science. He introduces in Romania the latest mathematical logic, mostly by his works The New Logic and The Polyvalent Logic. He researched the problem of logical-semantic paradoxes, convinced that the solution to them was already available in the works of the Scholastic philosophers. He
invoked to back this candidacy was Molotov’s effort to support *peace and democracy* during the Second World War and especially after the war had ended. This recommendation offers a glimpse into Romania’s situation at the time and the harsh conditions the intellectuals were going through. It is difficult to imagine that all these historians were really convinced that the Soviet politician was a promoter of the ideas of peace. The letter is rather one of the concessions they were forced to make in order to be allowed to continue their researches in a country situated under extreme pressure from the Soviet Empire. It is unlikely that the Romanian historians would have so hastily forgotten Molotov’s contribution in the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact with its disastrous consequences for Romania.

In conclusion, I can say that compared with other Nobel Prizes granted in Stockholm where an entire list of Romanian nominees for various scientific discoveries can be found, the Romanian Peace Prize nominees are in lesser number and so far no Romanian, if we except Elie Wiesel, enjoyed the prestige of winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

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92 Emil Condurachi (1912-1987) was historian, archaeologist, and member of the Romanian Academy. A real scholar, his courses and books have become classical for the study of Romanian history.

93 There are a number of recommendations for the Peace Prize that seem at least ironic given the attitude of the nominated to the cause of peace. There are, for example, letters sent for Mussolini in 1935 and one letter sent by a Swedish member of Parliament, Brandt, proposing Hitler for the Peace Prize in 1939. The Nobel Committee ignored some great people who deserved to be honored with the Peace Prize, among them Mahatma Gandhi who was nominated between 1937 and 1948. Det Norske Institutt Arkivskaper and http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/nomination/nomination.php?string=Gandhi&action

94 The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, named after the Soviet and the German foreign ministers was a Treaty of Non-Aggression between Soviet Russia and the Nazi Germany signed in the late hours of August 23, 1939. Each country pledged to remain neutral in the event that either nation was attacked by a third party. It remained in effect until June 22, 1941 when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. The Treaty included also a Secret Protocol dividing Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence, anticipating the territorial and political rearrangements that followed the Second World War.

95 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes.

96 Elie Wiesel (b. 1928) is the first Romanian or rather Romanian born Jewish-American who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1986. The Second World War changed his life after he and his family were deported while under Hungarian administration to Auschwitz, along with 15,000 others Hebrews from Sighet. His parents died in the camp, as well as one of his sisters, the other two survived. In 1948 he began studying literature, philosophy and psychology at Sorbonne and became a journalist. In Paris, he met the writer François Mauriac who encouraged him to write about his memories of the camp. The volume appeared in 1958 under the name *Night* and stories the terrible experience of Jews in
Nevertheless, there was much speculation on account of the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in 1985 to the organization International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War where, among its founders, is likely to have been also a Romanian. In Oslo, the prize was handed to Bernard Lown, the representative of the United States, and to Yevgheny Chazov, the representative of the Soviet Union. Granting the Nobel Peace Prize to this organization was understood as an attempt to mitigate the conflicts caused by the Cold War, sending an encouraging message to President Reagan and to Mikhail Gorbachev before their Geneva Summit of November 19, 1985. The Nobel Committee Chairman at the time, Egil Aarvik, pointed out that the initiators of the institution were specially invited to Oslo to receive their Prizes. It was alleged that the Romanian representative of Physicians


97 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War was founded in 1980 on the initiative of American and Soviet doctors who wanted to contribute to the prevention of nuclear war, while defying the Cold War. They started a campaign of research and collaboration with Japanese physicians to collect data on the consequences of using nuclear weapons. www.nobel.no/laureates/1985.

98 Bernard Lown (b. 1921) was an American physician and researcher of Lithuanian origin who invented in 1960 the defibrillator. Founder of organization Physicians for Social Responsibility, and then co-founder of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

99 Yevgheny Chazov (b. 1929) was a famous Soviet surgeon, specializing in cardiology, member of Russian Academy of Sciences, director of the Institute of Cardiology, Soviet representative to the WHO, co-founder of the above named organization. Responsible for the health of the majority of the leaders in Kremlin, he published his memoirs under the name Health and Power where he described the health status, mental or otherwise, of those leaders.

100 Egil Aarvik (1912-1990) journalist and politician, member of the Christian Party. He became member of the Parliament in 1961, then Minister of Labor between 1965 and 1971. Member of the Nobel Committee from 1974 to 1990 and its President from 1982 to 1990.

101 Since I did not have access to the recommendation letters of 1984 -1985 (the Nobel Institute archives are made public fifty years after the event), the main source of information was the Norwegian and foreign press from October to December 1985. That year, the media insisted on respect of human rights and accused Chazov of duplicity and hypocrisy because he signed a letter denouncing Andrei Sakharov in 1973. This caused a series of protests in the Norwegian capital, Chazov being suggested to refuse the Prize. The newspapers of the period make no reference to a Romanian as winner of the Nobel Peace prize for 1985. See: Karl Holl, Anne C. Kjelling, The Nobel Peace Prize and the laureates: the meaning and acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in the prize winners' countries (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994), 22.
for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Ioan Moraru\textsuperscript{102} was one of founders of this organization, being therefore invited also to receive the Prize. It was also supposed that Ceauşescu had denied him the necessary travel documents because he was jealous, being himself one of those dreaming to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. There is no documentation showing that Moraru received an invitation to Oslo as one of the founders of this institution. The Norwegian newspapers of December 1985\textsuperscript{103} and other articles\textsuperscript{104} on the subject mention only Lown and Chazov. Moraru is likely to have received an invitation to the ceremony as many others, but not as a recipient of the award. The acceptance speeches\textsuperscript{105} were presented only by the two aforementioned representatives, with no indication to a Romanian numbering among the winners of this prize.

The Nobel Awards have often been accompanied by controversy. The most frequent accusation is that many awards have been granted to certain individuals based on interests or according to political conjectures\textsuperscript{106}. It has been alleged that representatives of small states were often overlooked by the Oslo or Stockholm jury or that some of the Nobel laureates were, in fact, promoters of war, terrorism and had nothing to do with the struggle for peace. Answering these accusations, Geir Lundestad\textsuperscript{107}, the Secretary of the Nobel Committee, pointed out that the

\textsuperscript{102} Ioan Moraru (1927-1989) professor and researcher, head of Pathology Department at the Romanian Institute of Medicine “Victor Babeş” in Bucharest. Because of his remarkable qualities he held senior positions in health care and medical research. He was among the Deputy Chairperson of the WHO Executive Board during the period Halvdan T. Mahler was its President (1973-1988), member and Vice-President of the Academy of Medical Sciences, President of the Romanian section of the Balkan Medical Union, President of the Society of Normal and Pathological Morphology, President of the National Electronic Microscopy Institute, Chairman of the National Immunology Institute, a member of the International Academy of Forensic Medicine, the WHO expert in human genetics, a member of the board of the International Union of Societies of Immunology, honorary member of the French Society of Immunology, board member of the Association International Phisiacians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). He received posthumously the title of academician.

\textsuperscript{103} Det Norske Nobel Institut, Avis arkiv, Newspapers Archives, oktober-desember 1985.


\textsuperscript{105} http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1985/physicians-lecture.html

\textsuperscript{106} The most recent case which caused much controversy is that of Barack Obama. The Nobel laureate as well as the Nobel Committee were criticized by both Norwegian and international press. Vasilica Sirbu, “Impresii în urma unui Nobel pentru Pace,” Revista Română 1, Calendarul Activităților Despărțămîntului Astra « Mihail Kogălniceanu » nr. 59 (2010).

\textsuperscript{107} Geir Lundestad (n.1945) historian, researcher, director of the Nobel Institute and secretary of the Nobel Committee.
Nobel Prize has undoubtedly political effects, but no political intention. The Nobel Committee has shown a flexible approach to the concept of peace, especially in recent decades, giving a broad interpretation of Alfred Nobel’s Testament. Under the broad umbrella covered by the concept of peace are nowadays included different achievements in conflict prevention, the fight for democracy and human rights, poverty eradication and environmental policies, the concept of war acquiring a new definition, in opposition to its classical interpretation.

Romanians have always been a part of these efforts for a better world. The scientific and cultural map of Europe would have been poorer without their contributions, even though their efforts were not rewarded with the Nobel Prize.

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The Nobel Peace Prize from a Romanian perspective – The Interwar Period


D. Articles:


The Nobel Peace Prize from a Romanian perspective – The Interwar Period


**E: Internet sources**


**F. Newspapers:**

THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND NORWAY DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

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Abstract:
This article aims at reconstructing on the basis of diplomatic archives records the history of diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries during the interwar period. The diplomatic bonds between the two countries date back already before Norway had obtained its sovereignty by dissolving the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway in 1905. Eventually, Romania recognized the Norwegian independence and conducted diplomatic relations with Norway through its legation in Berlin. The first official legation in Norway was established in 1917 by Grigore Biliurescu’s appointment as chargé d’affaires in Christiania (Oslo). On the other hand, the first Norwegian diplomat who resided in Bucharest was Terje Knudtzon in 1935. During most of the interwar period the diplomatic relations between the two countries were conducted through envoys residing in other European capitals. The article fits into the category of historical evidence works and since it has adopted a chronological approach, it does not raise, more than is necessary, the prospect of a theoretical interpretation of these relations.

Rezumat:
Acest articol îşi propune, pe baza arhivelor diplomatice, să reconstituie istoria relaţiilor diplomatice si consulare dintre cele două țări în perioada interbelică. Contactele diplomatice dintre acestea datează încă din perioada anterioară obținerii suveranității Norvegiei prin dizolvarea Regatului Unit al Suediei și Norvegiei în 1905. România a recunoscut independența Norvegiei și a desfășurat relații diplomatice cu aceasta prin intermediul legației sale la Berlin. Prima legație în Norvegia a fost înființată în 1917 prin numirea lui Grigore Biliurescu ca însărcinat cu afaceri în Christiania (Oslo). Pe de altă parte, primul diplomat norvegian care a locuit în București, a fost Terje Knudtzon în 1935. În perioada
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interbelică relaţiile diplomatice dintre cele două țări s-au derulat prin intermediul legațiilor deschise în alte capitale europene. Acest articol se încadrează în categoria lucrărilor de evidență istorică și întrucât a ales o abordare cronologică, el nu are în vedere, mai mult decât este necesar, perspectiva unei interpretări teoretice a acestor relații.

Keywords: Romania; Norway; bilateral relations; interwar period

Context

For a long time, Romanians regarded Northern Europe as a remote geographical area and hence they did little to enhance their knowledge of it. According to the opinion of some experts in the field\(^1\), the cause of this fact is due, in the first phase, to geographic distance and then to the cultural, social and economic differences between the two areas\(^2\). These differences have partly inhibited the motivation for initiating and maintaining relationships of any kind, including those of diplomatic, economical or cultural character. The progress in technology and logistics occurring in the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries and the widening of the network of diplomatic bonds among European countries that followed the First World War led to a ”shrink” of geographical distances and had a positive effect on Romania’s relations with the Nordic nations. Even so, the contacts between Romania and the Nordic countries in the interwar period did not acknowledge a sudden upswing and their evolution was not always a linear one.

The relations between Romania and Norway do not deviate from the general trend described above as I will prove in this article. In this article I will approach, as a general objective, the chronological reconstruction of the history of diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway in the interwar period. The analysis will have as a starting point the setting up of the first Romanian diplomatic office in the capital of Norway in 1917 and will cover all stages of evolution of the diplomatic relations between the two countries to the closing up of the Romanian Legation in Oslo following the occupation of Norway by German troops in the spring of 1940. The article fits into the category of ”historical evidence” works\(^3\), and as such, it does not raise, more than is necessary, the prospect of a theoretical interpretation of these relations, a subject that is intended to be the core of a separate study. The article is based on the systematic

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1 See for example Silviu Miloiu, Oana Laculiceanu-Popescu and Elena Dragomir, *O conceptie româneasca a Nordului, sec. XIX-XX*, (Targoviste: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2009).
2 Miloiu, Laculiceanu and Dragomir, 9.
3 Ibid., 117.
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research of archival documents. However, writing the history of the diplomatic relations between the two states, even from an inventory point of view, cannot be achieved outside the international context.

The intention to investigate the subject is motivated by the fact that the issue is highly neglected in the historiography of the field. If the history of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Western European countries has enjoyed substantial attention from researchers, the study of Romania’s relations with the countries placed at Europe’s periphery is part of a new current in Romanian historiography. Part and parcel of this new current in historiography, the research of relationship with Northern European countries of Finland, Denmark and Sweden has attracted some measure of interest and was the subject of recent works in the field, while the relations with Norway have been less discussed in the historical literature. An exception to this pattern makes the volume of documents entitled Romanian-Norwegian Relations. Diplomatic Documents 1905-1947 published under the Romanian Cultural Institute aegis in 2007 and a chapter of Vasilica Sarbu’s PhD thesis entitled The Nobel Peace Prize in the interwar period (1918-1939)⁴. The documents edited by a bundle of Romanian and Norwegian historians (Jardar Seim, Stelian Obiziuc and collaborators) start from 1905, the year of Norway’s independence, and end in 1947, the year of resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries following the World War II. Due to the intensity of diplomatic exchanges, the editors consider this period as representative for the history of diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway. Although an important contribution to the knowledge of Romanian-Norwegian relations, the work is limited to the publication of official documents that provide the main lines of the diplomatic relations between the two countries without revealing the complexity of these bonds through the publication of related documents. Vasilica Sîrbu’s chapter undertakes, in the context of Romanian nominations for the Nobel Prize in the interwar period, a brief review of diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway. The author uses as the main bibliographic source the aforementioned collection of documents⁵ and consequently the account of events and of the dynamic of diplomatic relations between the two states do not deviate from the direction laid down by the documents published in this reference work. The topic covered by this article is sporadically treated

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in other works of general knowledge regarding the diplomatic relations between Romania and the Nordic states.

Such as Sirbu’s chapter, the basis of documentation for the first part of this study is formed by documents already published by Seim and Obiziuc. Instead, in the second part of the study other archive documents from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are used: reports of plenipotentiary ministers accredited to these countries, diplomatic dispatches, telegrams exchanged between the Royal Houses of the two constitutional monarchies, notes from the specified period.

Beginnings

Given the fact that the establishment of bilateral relations between states require them to be independent and sovereign, we cannot discuss about diplomatic relations with Norway until this country’s independence was not gained by the peaceful separation from the union with Sweden on October 31, 1905. Both Sweden and Norway informed the Romanian state on the new international status of the latter country. In a letter dispatched by the Norwegian Foreign Minister to its Romanian counterpart, it was expressed Norway’s intention of setting up official relations between the two countries and creating a consular mission in Romania. The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the receipt of the notification of the proclamation of independence by Norway and expressed the desire to establish formal relations with the Scandinavian state. The two countries agreed to entrust their legations in Berlin with the mission of watching over their interests in Oslo and Bucharest respectively. The opening of diplomatic ties process proved to be characterized from the beginning by the desire and effort of the two countries to expand their relations.

Eventually, the intensification of contacts between Romania and Norway and the closing down of the Romanian legation in Berlin that had previously mediated Romania’s diplomatic relations with the Scandinavian countries required the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions in

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7 Seim and Obiziuc, 29-30.

8 Ibid., 31.

9 Ibid., 34-35.
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The capitals of two states\(^{10}\). Grigore Bilciurescu\(^{11}\) was appointed in the capacity of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Christiania\(^{12}\) and presented his credentials on June 8 / 21, 1917. The establishment of the first Romanian Legation in Norway’s capital occurred in the context of World War I conflict. At the beginning of the war, like other Scandinavian states, Norway adopted a position of neutrality. The country experienced an important economic growth as a result of its capacity of maintaining commercial ties with both warring camps. Norway, a country with wide open port whose economy was based on trade and shipping, wanted broadening markets for local products, especially cereals. As for Romania, maintaining good relations with a neutral state, such as Norway, could bring about significant economic benefits. The affirmation of Romania’s envoy to Oslo Dimitrie Jurascu who two decades later in his report dated January 4, 1939 drew the attention of Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigore Gafencu that:

“\textit{The Northern European countries are playing an important role in the international exchange of goods. Their trade with foreign countries reaches figures that evoke a particular interest in comparison to other countries. (…) Customarily, the existence of these countries largely depends on their external trade\textsuperscript{13}}”

was no less appropriate to describe the situation of these countries during WWI than during the interwar period or the beginning of WW II. Therefore, we can conclude that the first impulse for developing the relations between the two countries was economic.

As such, one of the first achievements of the relations between the two states was the signing of a Maritime and Commercial Convention in

\(^{10}\) The closing down of the Romanian diplomatic office in Germany's capital was caused by Romania’s decision to enter the war on Entente’s side.

\(^{11}\) Grigore Bilciurescu (1874-1939). Graduated in 1895 of the Faculty of Law of University of Bucharest with the BA thesis entitled \textit{Conditiiunea juridica a strainilor in Romania} [The juridical status of foreigners in Romania], he eventually joined the Foreign Ministry. He was appointed Charge d’Affaires in Stockholm (13/16 November 1916). By Royal Decree no. 408 dated May 3/16, 1917 issued in Iasi, Grigore Bilciurescu was posted from May 1, 1917 as envoy to the Norwegian capital.

\(^{12}\) Christiania or Kristiania - the name of Norwegian capital from 1624 until 1924 when it was changed in Oslo as a result of the spelling reforms aimed at eliminating the Danish influences in Norwegian language.

\(^{13}\) Arhivele Diplomatice ale Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al României (The Diplomatic Archives of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, hereafter AMAE), Folder 71/1939-1940, Norvegia, vol 11, Dispatch no. 18 of 04.01.1939 to Foreing Affaires Minister, Grigore Gafencu, 11-15.
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Berlin on March 18/31 1910\textsuperscript{14}, denounced by the Romanian party in April 1921\textsuperscript{15}.

Romania’s interests in Norway were also political. Already before declaring its neutrality, Romania was striving for signing secret agreements with the Entente powers in order to enlist support in its bid to achieve the unification with Transylvania\textsuperscript{16}. The purpose of Romania’s participation in the WW I was the recovering of the Austria-Hungary’s provinces inhibited by Romanian majorities. In this respect, the Romanian foreign policy was to attract the support of as many European countries as possible, which also explains the purpose and interest regarding Norway’s position.

An interesting episode in the history of diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway, which also highlights the good cooperation between them, occurred in early 1918 when Norway was required to represent Romania’s interests in the Russian capital, Petrograd. Having as a background the Russian Revolution and the conflict regarding the entering of Romanian army in Bessarabia\textsuperscript{17}, the Romanian-Russian diplomatic ties were broken on January 13/28, 1918 at the initiative of the Russian party\textsuperscript{18}. The Romanian Legation and all the representatives of the Romanian authorities in Russia were first arrested and eventually expelled in great haste. At the request of his Romanian counterpart, Nikolai Prebensen, the Norwegian envoy at Petrograd, requested the approval of the Foreign Ministry in Oslo to take over and represent the interests of Romania in Petrograd\textsuperscript{19}. Before receiving confirmation from Norway, Romania’s interests were represented by the French Legation. Soon, the French

\textsuperscript{14} Seim and Obiziuc, 36-37.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{17} The fall of the Tsarist regime contributed to social unrest and instability in Bessarabia. When the Bolshevik forces intervened to restore order, the Country Council asked for help of the Romanian government. Thus, in January 1918 the Romanian army crossed the Prut River with the aim of maintaining order and liberating Bessarabia. The immediate consequence of these events was the confiscation of the Romanian Treasure by the Russian Government. The Romanian Treasure contained the National Bank of Romania’s private collections, documents and heritage goods, art objects and jewelry, etc. The Treasure was sent to Russia during the First World War in order to be protected from the threat of falling into the Central Powers’ hands. Another consequence was the arrest and internment in the Petropavlovsk of Romanian diplomatic corps in the Russian capital led by envoy Constantin Diamandy. They were released several days later following the intervention of the Entente’s diplomatic corps.
\textsuperscript{18} Ion Ciuperca, Romania in fata recunoasterii unitatii nationale. Repere (Iasi: Editura Universitatii „Al. I. Cuza”, 1996), 35.
\textsuperscript{19} Seim and Obiziuc, 43.
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diplomats indicated their intention to leave the Russian capital, so the defense of Romanian interests was transferred to Norwegian representatives. In February 1918, N. Prebensen received the consent to handle Romanian interests in the Russian capital\textsuperscript{20}. In these circumstances, Bilciurescu received from the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and forwarded to the government in Bucharest the list of expenses made by the Norwegian part with regard to the defense of Romanian interests in Petrograd. During the same year the remaining part of the Romanian representatives in Russia sought the help of the Romanian Government through Chargé d’affaires in Stockholm, Michael A. Arion\textsuperscript{21}. They were unable to leave Russia or recover the archives of the former Romanian Legation in Russian capital. The Romanian envoy in Stockholm intervened at the Romanian Legation in Christiania, which was able to enlist the backing of the Norwegian government in order to solve which issue. Arion’s request was that the Legation from Christiania should obtain from the Norwegian part for the Romanian officials who were already in a critical situation the right to be treated as Norwegian citizens in Russia. The Norwegian legation in Petrograd was also requested to provide with the Norwegian passport those Romanians who wanted to take refuge in the Scandinavian countries. In a telegram dispatched to Ion I.C. Bratianu, Bilciurescu informed that as a result of the steps taken by the Norwegian part, the Central Committee of the Russian People Commissariat had informed the Norwegian Consulate in Moscow that the Romanian citizens were allowed to return to Romania\textsuperscript{22}. The diplomatic support given, whenever possible, by Norway to Romania in this dramatic episode of Romania’s strained relations with Russia was a herald of good diplomatic relations to be developed between the two countries.

The Romanian Legation in Norway’s capital will function from 1917 until 1922 when it will be closed for financial reasons\textsuperscript{23}. The diplomatic activity of Bilciurescu in the capital of Norway was prolific and advanced

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 45. Ciphered telegram dated February 25, 1918.

\textsuperscript{21} Dumitru Preda et. al., ed., Romania la Conferinta de Pace de la Paris (1919-1920) (Bucuresti: Editura Semne, 2010), 40. Radiograms from Mihail A. Arion, Charge d’Affaires in Stockholm to Ion I.C. Bratianu, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, regarding the situation of the Romanian officials in Russia and the recovery of the archives of the former Romanian Legation in Petrograd. Telegram no. 666 sent on December 10 and received on December 22, 1918 according to Telegram no. 690 dated January 3, 1919. See page no. 68, doc. no. 82.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 40. Telegram no. 825 of December 24 / January 6, 1919 from Grigore Bilciurescu to the President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

\textsuperscript{23} Seim and Obiziuc, 50. Royal Decree no 1178 of 09.03.1922 regarding the suppression of Romanian diplomatic offices abroad, including those in Norway and Finland.
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The Romanian interests. For instance, the request of Hungary’s protestant churches addressed to the Nordic kings for protection “against the threatening destruction of Hungary which was the most advance dam of Protestantism in Eastern Europe” was an attempt of contesting the new borders established after World War I. In order to clarify the situation, the Romanian diplomat asked for an audience to King Haakon VII to whom he presented the religious and nationalities situation in Transylvania. The Romanian diplomat also highlighted the great tolerance of the Romanian government and nation as regards the religion, nationality, culture and customs of minorities living within Romania’s new borders. Bilciurescu’s views were shared by King Haakon VII who adopted a favourable position concerning the Romanian cause. With the downfall of the large multinational empires following the World War I, such challenges to the new Romanian borders by Budapest were frequent. The rumours spread by Hungarian representatives in the Norwegian and German press regarding the troubled situation in Transylvania and an alleged uprising in Cluj on November 30, 1919, which the government in Bucharest had violently and bloodily suppressed, fall into the same category. In his response, Bilciurescu emphasized in a letter published in Tidens Tegn “the absurdity of the news from the telegram, their origins and trends.” The Romanian diplomat also requested from the Romanian Legation in France for concrete information from inside the country in order to give an official disclaimer. Victor Antonescu, the Romanian envoy in Paris, assured his colleague in the capital of Norway that: «Nouvelles annonçant révolution socialiste ou paysanne en Roumanie sont complètement fausses. Vous pouvez les démentir. Situation pays calme. Ordre règne partout». Based on this document, Bilciurescu formulated a refutation of such defamatory news against Romania and asked it to be published in the same Norwegian newspaper, Tidens Tegn, informing of this Ion I.C. Bratianu, the President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania who

26 Ibid.
27 “The announcement of a new peasant or socialist revolution in Romania is completely false. You can deny. The situation in the country is calm. Order reigns everywhere”, Ibid., 191-192. Telegram from Grigore Bilciurescu to Mihail I. Pherekyde, The interim President Council of Ministers and Minister of Romanian Foreign Affairs regarding the retraction of the Norwegian press rumors of an alleged troubled situation in Transylvania.
was also the head of the Romanian delegation during the Paris Peace Conference\textsuperscript{28}.

Taking into consideration the status of both Romania and Norway in the context of the new international realities in the aftermath of World War I, we can say that both countries were now \textit{in a similar position of “minor powers” suffering various perceived or real pressures and threats coming from the great powers}\textsuperscript{29}. Although during the World War I Norway had maintained neutrality, when the conflagration ended, in the context of new international realities, it abandoned its policy of isolation and joined the League of Nations on March 4, 1920\textsuperscript{30}. The reasons why Norway decided to join this international body were based upon the Norwegian state’s intention to promote the principles of security and peaceful resolution of conflicts but also upon its desire to avoid international isolation. Moreover, given the fact that Norway belonged to the small countries’ category and its influence in international decision-making was directly proportional to its size and number of inhabitants, being active in the international system allowed her to promote its peaceful foreign policy and its interests to another level.

On the other hand, by signing the Paris peace treaties, Romania became a founding member of the League of Nations. Its foreign policy aimed at organizing a security system by entering into alliances with former belligerent and non-belligerent states in order to assure the confirmation of its new boundaries. One of political figures who campaigned for this goal during the Paris Peace Conferences was Nicolae Titulescu, a representative figure of the Romanian diplomacy in the interwar period. With respect to the personality of the Romanian diplomat and the role he played at the League of Nations, the Norwegian Foreign Minister J.L. Mowinckel\textsuperscript{31} appreciated in a discussion with the Romanian envoy Barbu Constantinescu\textsuperscript{32} that:

«\textit{Monsieur Titulesco a été surement le meilleur Président de la Ligue, et le plus habile aussi. C’est un grand bonheur pour votre pays d’avoir un Ministre des Affaires Étrangers de son envergure. Vis-à-vis de l’étranger}}\textsuperscript{35} 

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 172 - 173.

\textsuperscript{29} Miloiu, Laculiceanu and Dragomir, 9.


\textsuperscript{31} Johan Ludwig Mowinckel (1870 - 1973) - Norwegian politician original from Bergen, distinguished himself in both external and internal politics leading three governments in the interwar period.

\textsuperscript{32} Barbu Constantinescu (1886 - 1948) - Romanian jurist and diplomat, accredited to Romanian diplomatic missions in Stockholm and Scandinavia since 28.06.1923.
That fact that Titulescu was so highly appreciated in the society of diplomats in Geneva had a positive impact on the influence of Romania on the international arena and on the development of Romania’s relations with other countries.

By and large, one can observe a synchronization of the foreign policy objectives of the two countries at the League of Nations at least in the first stage of its existence. By their activity in support of this organism, Romania and Norway sought to preserve their integrity and sovereignty by maintaining peace in Europe and counterbalancing the emerging Great Powers. According to article 10 of the Pact of the League of Nations, the signatories were committed to respect and maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of all members.

Yet, differences in the vision of the two states regarding the League of Nations can be noticed and the worsening of the international climate threatening with the outbreak of a new world war served to deepen them. This became obvious in spring of 1936 during a meeting between Gheorghe Tatarescu, the Romanian Prime Minister, and Havdan Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister. During a trip occasioned by his participation in the National History Conference organized in Bucharest, Koht expressed his country’s position on the new European developments. On his way to Romania, Koht had visited several European capitals with the stated purpose of making an “exchange of ideas on the international situation created by German policy” according to envoy Dimitrie Jurascu. In his discussion with Prime Minister Tatarescu, whom he met in the absence of Foreign Minister Titulescu, Koht explained the basic conceptions behind the Norwegian foreign policy and the scope of his visit to European capitals. In accordance with the peaceful principles promoted by his country at the League, he argued that small and medium sized countries

33 Seim and Obiziuc, 92-93, Dispatch no. 1702 of 26.10.1933, Oslo.
35 Halvdan Koht (1873 - 1965) - Professor of history and Norwegian diplomat, in 1936 as a Foreign Minister was the one who supported a shift in Norway’s foreign policy under the impact of the failure of League of Nations. Norway will no longer back any League of Nations’ decisions that were not based on the principles of equality and universality and will move towards a system of alliances with northern states, Silviu Miloiu, O istorie a Europei Nordice si Baltice. De la epoca nationalismului la Razboiul Rece, Vol. I (Targoviste: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2003), 162.
should obtain at least a moral influence on the decisions of major powers in order to prevent conflicts. Discussions were held on the latest decisions taken at the League of Nations and reached a deadlock when the Romanian representative expressed his support for the rearming of states and of the League of Nations. The views of the Romanian chief of diplomacy ran contrary to the non-aggression policy and dispute resolution by arbitration as expressed by Norway at the League of Nations and Koth regarded with scepticism Tatarescu’s opinions. This disagreement is relevant with regard to the differences manifesting in the foreign policy conduct of the two countries, which were based on the interpretation of their national interests in the context of the new international realities. If Norway’s foreign policy was driven by the idea of conservation and the desire to keep at bay from a possible conflict, the Romanian policy was based on the defence of the territorial integrity by any means, be they diplomatic or military. Norway “considered itself to be a security supplier and not a consumer”, especially because it “feels safe” having no major conflicts with its neighbors. Instead, Romania, besides maintaining national unity, aimed at economical and administrative uniformisation, which could only be achieved during peacetime. However, a common point existed in the foreign policy goals of the two countries, namely the desire to preserve peace on the continent and the efforts that should be made in order to prevent the outbreak of a new war. The diplomatic ties between Romania and Norway and their bonds within the League of Nations during this period were overshadowed by their relations with Europe’s great powers and with their neighbouring states.

The Romanian Legation in the Norwegian capital operated until April 1, 1922 when King Ferdinand I decided the closing down of several diplomatic missions in Europe. This decision was taken during a period of financial stress that Romania was crossing and was motivated by budgetary constraints. A new Romanian legation in Norway’s capital was

37 In 1933 Germany left the League of Nations and in March 1936 began the remilitarization of Rhenania. The League of Nations decides not to intervene. The Pro-German attitude of Norway was motivated by Norway’s acknowledgement of the common roots of the two states, but foremost by the Scandinavian economic interests.

38 Miloiu 2003, 165.

39 Seim and Obiziuc, 128-129. Dimitrie Jurascu, the Plenipotentiary Minister in Oslo, to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the discussion with the French envoy in Norway’s capital about the critical international situation and the prestige of the League of Nations.

40 Ibid., 50. Royal Decree no. 1178 of 9.03.1922 regarding the closing down of the Romanian legations in Portugal, Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Finland, Tokyo and of the diplomatic agency in Egypt.
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not open until 1934. However, in order to continue the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway, another royal decree was issued by which Mihail M. Paclianu\textsuperscript{41} was appointed envoy in Stockholm, Copenhagen, Christiania and Helsinki\textsuperscript{42}. The residence of the Romanian legation was in Stockholm. This episode can be considered a setback in the evolution of the Romanian-Norwegian diplomatic relations. The appointment of a single representative for all Northern countries certainly limited the development of diplomatic relations at a high level because of the incomplete knowledge of the developments and specifics of these countries and their leaders.

The diplomatic activity performed by Paclianu continued in the footsteps of his predecessor, efforts being made to endorse the new Romanian realities. The fact that Greater Romania was discredited and contested in the Norwegian press as a result of real media campaigns\textsuperscript{43} nourished by new agencies belonging to Central European countries whose borders were altered as a consequence of the Trianon\textsuperscript{44} and Saint Germain peace treaties\textsuperscript{45} compelled the Romanian envoy to undertake an intense activity in the four Scandinavian countries in which he was accredited in order to deny these allegations. To illustrate this idea, I can mention the article entitled “The causes of war in the peace treaties. Europe's new irredentism. Hungary” (Fredstraktatenes krigsaarsaker. Europas Nye irredenta. II. Ungarn\textsuperscript{46}) published in the newspaper Aftenposten on August 20, 1923. From a report submitted to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania Ghisorhe D lurzi one can learn that the Romanian diplomat was concerned about this news: “I gave precise instructions in various cases to our consuls to deny the bigoted and false news published regarding our country”\textsuperscript{47}. Moreover, the interviews given by representatives of the

\textsuperscript{41} Mihail M. Paclianu was a Romanian diplomat born in a boyar family from Buzau county.
\textsuperscript{42} Seim and Obiziuc, 51, Royal Decree no. 1306 of 16.03.1922.
\textsuperscript{43} AMAE 71 Norvegia vol. 13, Note no. 3141 of 01.03.1926 of M. Paclianu to the Romanian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, IG Duca regarding the defamatory news from the Norwegian
press.
\textsuperscript{44} The Trianon Treaty with Hungary (04.06.1920) refers to the Romanian-Hungarian border and recognition of the union of Transylvania, Banat and Maramures with Romania (Ioan
Scurtu et al., ed., Istoria Romanilor, vol VIII, Romania Intregita (1918 - 1940) (Bucuresti: Editura
\textsuperscript{45} The Saint Germain-en-Laye Treaty with Austria (10.12.1919) refers to the abolition of the
Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary and the return of Bucovina to Romanian borders
(Scurtu 2003, 6)
\textsuperscript{46} AMAE, Folder 71/1920-1944 Norvegia, Vol 4 - Press, 183-201, The article stated the idea according to which after the Peace Treaties that ended the First World War, millions of people suffer because of losing their territories that “were torn from their country and came under foreign occupation”, but that no people is more affected than the Hungarian people.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 289. Report no. 45082 dated August 27, 1924.
Romanian diplomacy to the Norwegian press emphasized the strengthening of the internal situation by Ion I.C. Bratianu government and by the monarchy who undertook a series of decisions in favour of the welfare of the people without making any differences of nationality. The Romanian Legation also stressed the achievements of Romania’s foreign policy placed in the hands of a great value man such as Nicolae Titulescu. This was part of the efforts undertaken by the Romanian legation in order to rehabilitate Romania’s image in Scandinavian countries and uphold the solidity of the new political-administrative organisation of Greater Romania.

Meanwhile, the Norwegian government had expressed through its representative in Poland the desire to open a permanent office in Bucharest. Yet, as it had previously happened in case of Romania, this failed to materialize because of budgetary constraints. If during the WW I the Norwegian economic boom was indebted to its neutrality status which allowed it to develop trade relations with both warring sides, after 1920 its economy acknowledged a downturn which eventually worsened in the context of the Great Depression.

The Norwegian interests in Romania were represented by the Norwegian envoy in Rome, Johannes Irgens, who was invited to attend the coronation of King Ferdinand I and Queen Maria at Alba Iulia and Bucharest in October 1922. Irgens’s participation to this event of national significance to the Romanian people confirmed the links between the two royal houses as well as Romania’s efforts to enlist the support of European states in the confirmation of its new borders. On this occasion, Irgens dispatched an extensive presentation of Romania and of the event to the Norwegian Foreign Minister Mowinckel and undertook a pertinent

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48 Ibid., 220-222, Interview with the Romanian Charge d'Affaires in Oslo, Alexandru Guranescu in Oslo Aftenavis newspaper dated July 26, 1927.
49 Seim and Obiziuc, 48-49, Report of the envoy of Romania in Warsaw, Alexandru Florescu, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania no. 745 of 31.03.1920.
50 Johannes Irgens (1869-1939) was a lawyer, politician and Norwegian diplomat who maintained good relationship with the Romanian diplomats, being also a good connoisseur of the Romanian realities.
51 Ferdinand Victor Albert Meinrad of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (1865-1927), King of Romania in the period 1914-1927 was crowned on October 15, 1922 in Alba Iulia, King of Great Romania. Queen Marie of Romania, Princess of Saxe Coburg Gotha married Ferdinand of Hohenzollern on 29 December 1892 and conducted an intense activity in support of the Romanian cause in Western countries. The crowning event was attended by many Romanian politicians and foreign diplomats. Also, on this occasion on the steel crown of Carol I were symbolically added the symbols of the provinces united with Romania, Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania. Scurtu 2003, 253.
analysis of the international and domestic context. The Norwegian diplomat proved a good knowledge of Romanian developments and concluded that the crowning event conveyed a strong message of national unity and strengthened the impression that the borders of Romania were correctly drawn. Irgens spent the last part of his trip in company of foreign diplomats attending the event, especially with the representatives of Sweden and Finland. He inferred from these discussions that the Romanian market represented an opportunity for Norwegian exports, so that the economic relations with this country needed to be strengthened. Thus, in early 1930, he prepared a note to the Romanian legation in the Italian capital to be presented to the Romanian government. In the subsequent months negotiations started in Bucharest between Romania and Norway for a new commercial and maritime treaty. The development of economic relations between the two countries was endorsed by the National-Peasant government, a supporter of “open gates” economic doctrine.

The death of King Ferdinand I was mourned by the Royal Norwegian House over a period of three weeks. This was part of a complex of factors that marked a new stage in the history of diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway as a consequence of Romania’s volatile domestic politics, global Great Depression and international instability. Internally, King Ferdinand I was succeeded at throne by his grandson Mihai under regency consisting of Prince Nicolae, Patriarch Miron Cristea and lawyer Gheorghe Buzdugan. This situation spread

52 Seim and Obiziu, 52-58, J. Irgens’s report to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, J.L. Mowinckel no. 232 of 01.11.1922.
53 Ibid., Report of envoy of Norway to Rome J. Irgens to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Norwegian intention to negotiate a new commercial treaty with Romania; the note was handed to the Romanian Minister in Rome, Dimitrie I. Ghica. It shall be underlined that the old commercial and maritime treaty between the two countries was denounced by Romania in 1921.
54 Ibid., Irgens’s report (who was named by the Norwegian Government responsible for treaty negotiations) regarding the meeting held in Bucharest on May 26, 1930 with the General Secretary of the Commercial Department of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
56 King Ferdinand I died on July 20, 1927 of intestinal cancer.
57 Seim and Obiziu, 61.
58 Prince Mihai is the son of Carol II and nephew of King Ferdinand and Queen Mary. His father Carol II renounced to inherit Romania’s throne on December 28, 1925 and Mihai became heir to the throne at the age of six and the successor of his grandfather. The monarchical powers were exercised by the regency, Scurtu 2003, 258.
59 Prince Nicolae was the second son of King Ferdinand and Queen Mary and brother of Prince Carol.
anxiety within the Romanian political class\textsuperscript{60}, which only grew worse with the deepening crisis caused by the intention of Prince Carol\textsuperscript{61} to return to his country and to lay claims to the throne. This state of affairs was reflected in the activity carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania. Instability is also obvious with regard to the dynamics of appointments of diplomatic representatives abroad.

**Diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway after 1928**

In this period Romania’s interests in Scandinavia continued to be looked after by an envoy with residence in Stockholm who customarily travelled at least once a year to the other Scandinavian capitals.\textsuperscript{62} However, the large area the Romanians diplomats had to cover prevented them from attaining detailed knowledge of the specific realities of each country and from maintaining extensive contacts with the Scandinavian diplomacies. The immediate effect was that the Romanian-Norwegian relations acknowledged a setback and acquired a superficial character.

On February 1, 1928 Dimitrie C. Pennescu\textsuperscript{63}, Romania’s former envoy to Vatican, was appointed in the same quality to Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen\textsuperscript{64} with residence in the capital of Sweden. No fundamental changes can be observed in the priorities of the new envoy, one of his most important aims being to continue the work for the improvement of Romania’s image in the Scandinavian countries.

\textsuperscript{60} In October 1926 when it was first learned that the health of King Ferdinand was worsening the political class showed an intense concern. In these circumstances Ion Mihalache, Vice-President of the National Peasant Party, supported the return of Prince Carol in the country as he considered that regency will possess ”the powers of a monarch, but without moral responsibility of a monarch”. The clashes between the supporters of the return of Prince Carol (“the carlists”) and their opponents will continue until 1930 when the latter was enthroned as Carol II. Throughout this period governmental instability prevailed, Scurtu 2003.

\textsuperscript{61} Carol II of Hohenzollern-Sigmanringen (1893-1953) was Crown Prince (1914-1926) and King of Romania (1930-1940). In 1926 he informed his father that he had renounced forever to his right of inheriting the throne, Scurtu 2003.

\textsuperscript{62} AMAE 71 Norvegia Vol 4, 215, Report no. 593 of 15.08.1927.

\textsuperscript{63} Dimitrie C. Pennescu (1874-1938) graduated from the Law Faculty of Bucharest, was appointed since June 12, 1920 Romania’s first diplomatic representative to the Holy See with the title of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

\textsuperscript{64} Seim and Obiziuc, Royal Decree no 5 of 02.01.1928 issued in Bucharest on behalf of King Mihai I by the Royal Regency established following the death of King Ferdinand I.
After only two years, starting with March 1, 1930, Pennescu was replaced by the former envoy to Vienna Carol M. Mitilineu who was also required to watch over Romania’s interests in Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen. With the occasion of presenting his letters of accreditation to King Haakon VII of Norway, envoy Mitilineu undertook a visit to Oslo and gave an interview to newspaper Aftenposten. He expressed in this interview his intention to contribute to the intensification of the diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The focus was however to be maintained on economic relations where more common interests existed that could form the bases of friendship relations between the two states. In this sense, the Romanian diplomat pointed out to the picturesque landscape, but also to the natural resources richness and to the agricultural potential of Romania, all of these providing favorable premises for Norwegian capital investment in Romania. Mitilineu wanted to convey a strong message of support to potential Norwegian investors and promised his personal assistance to them. Mitilineu’s statements were also meant to encourage the negotiations for a commercial and maritime treaty between the two countries which were taken place in Bucharest. The person in charge with negotiating and signing of this treaty on behalf of Norway was Irgens, Norwegian envoy of Rome, who was in 1930 accredited to Bucharest, too. The negotiations overlapped with the political instability caused by the return in the country of Prince Carol who became the new sovereign of Romania. Irgens reported these changes in his reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. While Mitilineu was trying to reassure the Norwegian public opinion on the welfare of the Romanian people and the thrill Prince Carol’s return in the country evoked to his compatriots, Irgens was concerned over the dynamics of Romania’s domestic politics. In his report of June 7, 1930, the Norwegian diplomat

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65 Carol M. Mitilineu (1865-1942) was a lawyer and diplomat who represented Romania in several European capitals, Vasilica Sarbu, Premiile Nobel pentru Pace in perioada interbelica (1918-1939) (Iasi: PhD thesis, Univ. Al. I. Cuza, 2010.)

66 Seim and Obiziuc, Royal Decree no. 284 of 30.01.1930.

67 AMAE 71 Norvegia, Vol 4, 240-246, Minister Carol M. Mitilieu’s report to the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister, Prince Alexandru Vaida, on his visit to Oslo in order to present his credentials and the interviews he had given to the Norwegian press. The report is dated August 21, 1930.

68 Prince Carol took the advantage of the internal crisis caused by the divisions between the political parties and the discontent of the people with this situation and decided to return home to ascend to the throne of the country. Carol was restored as the King of Romania in June 8, 1930 under the name of Carol II, Scurtu 2003, 280.

69 Seim and Obiziuc, 71-74. Report regarding the return of Prince Carol in Romania, the domestic situation and the audience to Princess Elena of Romania and Queen Mary.
reported about the social and political context of Prince Carol’s return and considered necessary to hustle the signing of the commercial treaty because of concern of government change that might render futile all the efforts undertaken in the negotiations. The completing and signing of the treaty was equally important to both countries in the context of the global economic crisis. In Norway, the economic crisis caused by overproduction instantly reduced the shipping and export trade, which determined the government to search for new markets outside the traditional partners. Irgens’ concerns proved to be unwarranted and the Commercial and Maritime Treaty between Romania and Norway was signed and fully came into force in 1931.

Carol’s assuming of the throne marked an increase of the Crown’s role in Romania’s external policy. Immediately after his coronation, the international press started to extensively discuss both the King’s personal life and his propensity toward dictatorship. To limit such media news and interpretations spreading out, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched on September 12, 1930 a ciphered telegram to all diplomatic Romanian offices abroad whereby they were required to combat the negative news regarding the King and to cultivate a positive image of Romania.

Princess Elena (1896-1982) was the wife of King Carol II and the mother of Prince Mihai, heir to the throne. The Princess married Prince Carol at the age of 24, but she was soon abandoned by her husband in favor of Elena Lupescu. Princess Elena divorced from Carol on July 21, 1928. When Carol returned to the country, his enthronement was accepted by the political class on the condition that he restored his marriage to Princess Elena, a promise he eventually shelved.

When Carol returned to the country the government was chaired by Maniu (President of the National Peasant Party). The PM had sworn to respect the laws of the country, including the law of January 4, 1926 which acknowledged the renouncing of Carol to the throne and instituted the Royal Regency. Carol’s return to Romania placed Maniu in an awkward situation. He who could not disregard his commitments and therefore he proposed in the first phase to Prince Carol to join the Regency. But Carol’s ambitions were far larger. Because the Liberal National Party would not support Carol’s accession to the throne, he resorted to a series of maneuvers to sow strife in the Romanian political class. Maniu resigned from his position of head of government and was replaced by Gheorghe Mironescu (7-8.06.1930). Eventually, the Parliament decided the cancellation of the law of 4.01.1926 and King Carol II was crowned before the Parliament and the foreign diplomats who attend to this event. The intervention of King Carol II in Romanian political life fostered political instability, Scurtu 2003, 284-285; Seim and Obiziuc, 74-76.

Miloiu 2003, 160.

For example, Germany which mediated the commercial relations between Romania and Norway.

Seim and Obiziuc, Telegram of Romanian representative to Oslo, Alexander Flondor to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs dated July 3, 1931.

Scurtu 2003, 291.
The second decade of the interwar period represented a crossroads in the evolution of international relations that affected the relations between the two distant European countries. The problems generated by the economic crisis were reflected both in the internal policy conduct of the European countries as well as in their foreign policy. Romania’s foreign policy was gradually being affected by the dynamics of change in its international and domestic environments. Its geopolitical situation after the Great Union was already delicate. Although the structure of the country’s borders was changed, the dangers at its gates were still present. Already from the dawn of the interwar period, Hungary, Soviet Russia and Bulgaria fostered a hostile attitude towards Romania, which tended to worsen in the second decade of the interwar period.

Meanwhile Norway was experiencing the negative effects of the economic crisis which generated strong political and social implications. Besides the economical problems caused by the loss of export and maritime trade of which Norway’s economy strongly depended, the small Scandinavian nation also faced strong strikes of disgruntled segments of population. In this context, the internal political strife is not hard to imagine.

The economic crisis had also a negative impact on international relations by increasing the competition between great powers and threatening the world peace\textsuperscript{75}. The alteration of international relations during the 1930s was caused by a complex of factors such as the ever more aggressive foreign policy of Nazi Germany, the tacit threats coming from the Soviet Union, Japan’s expansion in China and Italy’s intervention in Ethiopia, the revisionist policies of Hungary and Bulgaria and the lack of reaction from the League of Nations. All these events changed the course of international relations and dramatically lowered the prestige of the League of Nations. The small and middle sized states that previously regarded the existing international system of alliances as a security guarantee were forced to seek for protection outside the body of the League of Nations.

In these conditions that threatened to jeopardize its territorial integrity, Romania took a series of steps designed to strengthen its security\textsuperscript{76}. These steps materialized in the concluding of a series of treaties and regional alliances\textsuperscript{77}. While Romania was endeavoring to preserve its

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 463.

\textsuperscript{76} Romania continue “to woo” its traditional partners, France and Great Britain, and the Balkan neighbors. It also initiated the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, violently interrupted in January 1918.

\textsuperscript{77} Treaties were concluded with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Yugoslavia. Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia formed the Little Entente in 1921. On February 9, 1934
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territorial status-quo, Norway, with its pacifist tradition, sought to fortify its security without worrying too much about its territorial integrity. The reason was that Norway was surrounded by ocean on all frontiers except for the eastern side where it bordered Sweden and Finland, countries which were not regarded as a threat\(^{78}\). The geographical location at considerable distance from the major European powers and from the complications arising from their policies seemed to shelter Norway from any conflict. In its foreign policy, Norway carefully surveyed the foreign policy of three great powers: Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. Of these, the relations with Britain were the most important both from an economic and political (strategic) point of view. British dominance of the North Sea guaranteed Norwegian security, so that Britain was regarded as a \( de \) facto sponsor of the security of the Scandinavian state. Germany, an important economic partner of Norway, was not perceived as a direct threat. The same can be said about the Soviet Union\(^ {79} \), which however inspired a certain anxiety to the Scandinavian state. Norway believed that if “Moscow would try an attack by surprise, it will be surely directed against states which would oppose the weakest resistance, namely the small Baltic republics”\(^ {80} \). So, Norwegian foreign policy rested on a certain sense of security that helped Oslo promoting during the interwar period a peaceful policy close to idealism. The Norwegian foreign policy idealism in respect of collective security proved to be erroneous. The lack of concern for a coherent security policy contributed to the fact that the country traversed in late 1930s one of the most dramatic chapters of its existence.

The events unfolding in Europe in the 1930s did not run without an echo in the Norwegian capital. Subsequently, the failure of collective security spawned real reasons of concern to the entire international community. In these circumstances, Norway showed an interest in Romania’s foreign policy.\(^ {81} \) Thus, in March 1931, the Romanian envoy to

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Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey signed the Balkan Entente in Athens. In May 1934 Romania resumed diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.

\(^ {78} \) After the collapse of the Union of Norway and Sweden in 1905, Sweden continued to be perceived as a threat by the Norwegian people, but this feeling diluted over time.

\(^ {79} \) In the interwar period Norway signed with the Soviet Union important trade agreements advantageous to the economy, AMAE 71 Norvegia Vol. I, 6-7. Telegram no 892 of 3.07.1931.

\(^ {80} \) Seim and Obiziu, 78-79. Report no. 1642 of 21.08.1930 of the Romanian Minister in Oslo, Carol Mitilineu regarding the audience at King Haakon and the sovereign’s assessment of the international situation.

\(^ {81} \) Seim and Obiziu, 79-82. Discussion between Ove Vangensten, Norwegian Charge d’Affaires and Prince Ghika, the Romanian Minister in Rome on the strained relations between Romania and the Soviet Union. They also talked about Romania’s relations with Italy, France and the Great Britain and possible help that Romania could receive in the event of a Russian attack.
Rome Dimitrie I. Ghika\textsuperscript{82} notified the Romanian Government of the Norwegian Government’s intention to appoint as minister plenipotentiary to Romania Sigurd Bentzon\textsuperscript{83}, the envoy to Turkey. Henceforth, the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway were to be conducted through the Norwegian Legation in Ankara. The Norwegian Government’s argument was the geographical proximity of Ankara and Bucharest. Bentzon was accredited in Bucharest from 1931 to 1934. A few months after his appointment, the diplomat undertook a visit to Romania wherein he brought into consideration the conclusion of an arbitration treaty between Romania and Norway. According to Norway’s idealistic vision of international relations aimed at maintaining peace and security on the continent, most of the Norwegian politicians considered to be of vital importance the peaceful resolution of conflicts by means of arbitration. Norway, which lacked the WW I experience and where a sense of security prevailed in connection to the continental powers, had a different opinion than Romania in this respect. Unlike the Scandinavian state, Romania considered any means, whether diplomatic or military, to preserve its territorial integrity. Therefore, Romania was not interested in signing such an agreement. Hence, due to the aforementioned circumstances, the foreign policy means of the two countries were quite different in this respect, as evidenced on several occasions in the meetings of the representatives of the two countries.

Starting with June 1, 1932 for a brief period of time, Romania’s interests in Norway were represented by envoy Matila Costiescu-Ghika\textsuperscript{84}, who was named in the same capacity in Stockholm, Copenhagen and Helsinki (with residence in Stockholm)\textsuperscript{85}. His mission in the Nordic countries ended a year later when the responsibility was transferred to Barbu Constantinescu\textsuperscript{86}. The short time period of his nomination prevented the Romanian diplomat to carry out a perceptible activity.

Barbu Costantinescu, alike his predecessor, represented Romania’s interests in Norway for about a year. Presenting his letters of accreditation

\textsuperscript{82} Seim and Obiziuc, 82. Report no. 586 of 20.03.1931.
\textsuperscript{83} Sigurd Bentzon (1877-1945) was a Norwegian diplomat who started his career in London in 1901 and represented the interests of his country in many other countries.
\textsuperscript{84} Matila Costiescu-Ghika (1988 - 1965) was a naval officer with an interest in philosophy (esthetician) and also a diplomat, writer, mathematician, engineer and historian. He began his diplomatic activity in 1910 in Romanian Legation in Rome. (http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matila_Ghyka).
\textsuperscript{85} Seim and Obiziuc, 93. Decree no 1762 of 20.05.1932.
\textsuperscript{86} Barbu Constantinescu represented Romania’s interests in Norway from June 28, 1933 to April 15, 1934.
to Oslo\textsuperscript{87}, the Romanian diplomat obtained an audience with King Haakon in which the two interlocutors tackled economic, domestic and foreign policy issues regarding the two countries. Amid economic crisis, 1933 was to Norway a year of internal governmental instability that allowed the manifestation of the totalitarian current\textsuperscript{88}, which was worrisome for an ultra democratic country like Norway. As regards the international developments, King Haakon of Norway voiced the antipathy of the Norwegian public opinion against Germany in general and against Hitler particularly, which culminated in the lowering of the prestige of this country in Norway. The Norwegian sovereign also expressed his admiration to Great Britain’s political and constitutional traditions and saw in this state a model. The conversation served to evaluate the position of the two countries regarding the international situation. During his accreditation to Oslo, Barbu Constantinescu reported on Romania’s image in the Norwegian press\textsuperscript{89}. According to widely circulated newspapers listed by the diplomat\textsuperscript{90}, there was a favorable current towards Romania. Consequently, the Romanian efforts \textit{vis-à-vis} the Norwegian press had managed to achieve their goal, i.e. to combat unfounded rumors about Romania and replace them with a favorable image of the country.

Both the government in Oslo and the one in Bucharest felt that the appointment of zonal representatives did not adequately serve the interests of the two countries. In order to strengthen the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway, the Romanian Government requested through Barbu Constantinescu the approval of its Norwegian counterpart for the appointment of Dimitrie Jurascu\textsuperscript{91} as envoy of Romania to Oslo\textsuperscript{92}. Jurascu received his appointment by royal decree on April 15, 1934\textsuperscript{93} and obtained

\textsuperscript{87} AMAE, 71 Norvegia 1933-1939, vol. 13, 97-100.
\textsuperscript{88} Vidkun Quisling (1877 - 1945) was born into a family of Danish immigrants, completed Military Naval Academy in 1908 and showed sympathy to totalitarian regimes. From 1931 to 1933 he was Minister of Defense. Since 1933 he promoted in the Norwegian press the ideal of establishing a dictatorship to solve the economical and social implications of the global crisis. To this purpose Quisling launched on May 16, 1933 his own pro-fascist party called \textit{Nasjonal Samling} (National Unity Party). In this framework, in Norway appeared more and more supporters of Germany and Hitler, but the low electoral performances of Quisling’s party and the strong democratic tradition of Norwegian people prevented this from gaining a momentum. As a result of his fascist actions, at the end of WWII Quisling was declared traitor and shot dead, Miloiu 2003, 160.
\textsuperscript{89} AMAE 71 Norvegia, vol 4, Media, non-paged. Report no. 1835 of 07.12.1933.
\textsuperscript{90} Nationen, Norges Handels, Morgenbladet, Aftenposten, Morgenposten, Tidens Tegn.
\textsuperscript{91} Dimitrie Jurascu (1894-1962) was a Romanian diplomat and jurist born into a boyar family in Moldova, Vasilica 2010.
\textsuperscript{92} Seim and Obiziuc, 97. Telegram no. 17 676 of 29.03.1934.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 97. Decree no. 1010 of 5.04.1934.
the agreement of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 26\textsuperscript{94}, this date marking the reopening of the Romanian embassy in Norwegian capital. The setting up of a permanent diplomatic mission in Norway led to a better collaboration between the two countries in both foreign policy and economic exchanges.

The merit of this demarche must be attributed to the Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu who was always concerned with establishing diplomatic relations with as many countries as possible in order to increase Romania’s influence on the international scene. The establishment of permanent diplomatic offices in the capitals of Scandinavian countries\textsuperscript{95} was also due to the perception that these countries “\textit{enjoy a certain moral authority in international relations}”\textsuperscript{96}. Besides foreign policy reasons, there were also economic motives behind this decision.

Romania’s economic interests and goals regarding Norway are highlighted by Jurascu in an interview he gave to the respected economic newspaper \textit{Norges Handels og Sjofartstidende}\textsuperscript{97}. Between the two countries important commercial exchanges according to the provisions of the commercial and maritime treaties of 1910 and 1931 were taking place. Norway was an important supplier of fish products to Romania, while the latter country was sending large quantities of grains through Norwegian ports. Nevertheless, there was a decrease in the export of Romanian products to Norway and the Romanian diplomatic office aimed to change this situation\textsuperscript{98}.

The improvement of the diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries and the \textit{ius non scriptum} of reciprocity required the opening of a permanent Norwegian diplomatic office in Bucharest. Jurascu advocated with the political circles in Oslo in favor of correcting the diplomatic anomaly between the two countries\textsuperscript{99}. After a meeting with the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Koht, Jurascu obtained the appointment of a Chargé d’affaires in Romania starting with October

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 98-99.
\textsuperscript{95} In Stockholm, Copenhagen and Oslo.
\textsuperscript{96} Oana, Popescu \textit{Romania si Danemarca in prima jumatate a secolului XX}, (Targoviste: Editura Cetatea de Scun, 2010), 55.
\textsuperscript{98} Following the end of the First World War in order achieve homogenization of the new political-administrative realities of Greater Romania a series of social and economic reforms were adopted. In the second decade of the interwar period, they caused an increase in agricultural production and improved the situation of the Romanian economy even more as the effects of the Great Depression began to diminish. In this context, Romania sought to identify new markets for its agricultural products, including Northern European countries.
\textsuperscript{99} Seim and Obiziuc, 103-104. Report no. 248 of 27.03.1935.
An exchange of diplomatic notes between the foreign ministers of the countries, Titulescu and Koht, provided for the accreditation of the Norwegian diplomat Terje Knudson as chargé d’affaires in Bucharest with permanent residence in the capital of Romania and for the recall of Bentzon. The significance of the opening of a Norwegian Legation in Bucharest was highly evaluated by Knudson who after three months spent in Romania remarked that he could not imagine how the diplomatic relations between the two countries evolved in absence of permanent legations. The progress in the representation of the interest of the two countries may be viewed as a result of both the maturation of their relations and of some common interests in the international developments. In contrast to the previous period when the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway were mediated through third countries’ capital cities, the opening of permanent diplomatic missions in Bucharest and in Oslo contributed not only to the development of the diplomatic relations between the two countries and but also lent them a linear and well organized character. Subsequently, the two heads of legation will maintain their functions until the beginning of WW II.

Diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway at the eve of World War II

The diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway became more intense on the eve of WW II as demonstrated by the increased frequency of diplomatic dispatches. The intensification of diplomatic relations between the two countries can be explained in two ways. If the existence of permanent diplomatic offices in the two capitals provided the ties between the two countries with the institutional framework to facilitate their growth, the international developments should not be overlooked. The strained international climate required a better collaboration between the small and medium states who perceived themselves as being threatened as a result of the clashes between Europe’s Great Powers.

101 Terje Knudson (1886-1953) was a Norwegian diplomat with extensive diplomatic experience. He was the representative of his country in states such as Brazil, Japan, Cuba and Poland.
102 Seim and Obiziuc, 105.
103 Between the departure of Bentzon and the arrival of Knudson in Bucharest there was a break of several months during which the relations between the two countries were carried out through the Norwegian embassy in Poland, the Norwegian Minister in Warsaw, Christian Nielns Ditleff, being accredited to Bucharest, Seim and Obiziuc, 106, note 38.
104 Ibid., 113. Terje Knudson’s report no. 40 of 10.02.1936 regarding his activity in Romania from November 1935 to February 1936.
Without perceiving any direct threat from the big powers, Norway closely monitored the international developments. The conversations of Romanian envoy Jurascu with the Norwegian Foreign Minister Mowinckel also approached the growing tension among the European states\textsuperscript{105}. Also, with the stated purpose of promoting peaceful international relations, the Norwegian chief of diplomacy welcomed the improvement of the Romanian-Soviet relations\textsuperscript{106}. Additionally, Oslo’s positive attitude towards the Romanian-Soviet rapprochement can be explained in the context of Norway’s friendlier stance towards Soviet Union than towards Nazi Germany. The imperialist policy as pursued by Germany engendered a feeling of fear within the Norwegian public opinion. In respect to Soviet Union, the Norwegian Government started to move towards a more positive attitude, which is proven by the improvement of the economic relations between the two countries\textsuperscript{107}. Gradually, the Romanian-Soviet relations started to cool down after the replacement of Titulescu from the position of Foreign Minister. Subsequently, Norway’s attitude in respect to the Romanian foreign policy will be affected by the different perspective of the two countries regarding the two great powers. Threatened by the revisionism of its neighbors (the Soviet Union included), Romania sought a rapprochement with Germany rather than with the USSR.

Jurascu carried out an intense diplomatic activity in Oslo and maintained good relations with the Norwegian political elite and especially with Foreign Minister Koht\textsuperscript{108} whom he met frequently. In their meetings

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\textsuperscript{105} AMAE 71 Norvegia, vol 13, 101-103. Chipered telegram recorded as no. 29.124 of 29.05.1934 from D. Jurascu to the Romanian Foreign Minister N. Titulescu. During the discussions, JL Mowinckel referred especially to the growing tension between France and Germany amid developments leading to the Franco-Soviet collaboration. Germany perceived this cooperation as a threat to its eastern borders. In the context of the deterioration of the German-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union acknowledged a fundamental change in its policy and started to show support to the maintaining of peace through alliances signed with continental European countries. This resulted into its acceptance in the League of Nations on September 18, 1934 to the dismay of some Member States such as the Norway which at the time had not trust in the Soviet policy, AMAE 71 Norvegia, Vol. 1, 71 - 73.
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\textsuperscript{106} The Romanian-Soviet negotiations in Riga of January 1932 on the signing of a nonaggression pact ended unsuccessfully, but at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva negotiations were resumed and completed in May 1934 with the restoration of diplomatic relations between Romania and the USSR (exchange of diplomatic notes 09.06.1934).
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\textsuperscript{107} AMAE 71 Norvegia, Vol 13, Relations with the USSR, 236-237, Report no. 667 of 18.05.1931 on improving trade relations between Norway and Russia to support the two governments in this sense.
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\textsuperscript{108} Halvdan Koht reorganized Norway’s foreign policy direction under the impact of the apparent failure of the League of Nations. Thus, in 1936 Norway joined Sweden, Denmark,
The history of diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway during the interwar period

The two diplomats discussed issues regarding their countries’ economies, their domestic policies and the evolution of the international relations. The purpose of these meetings was customarily to analyze the attitude of the two countries towards the great powers and the tense European atmosphere which heralded a new world conflagration. In his dispatches to Titulescu, Jurascu also revealed the attitude of the Norwegian political elite towards the League of Nations: “many believe that there can be no world body, not even of European nature, capable of a peaceful reorganization of the peace of our continent, but in the future we should assemble «an alliance of Western European states as the only way to remove the fears regarding a new war which threatens us»”\(^{109}\). The foreign policy direction taken by Oslo regarding the international situation was that “Norway will keep itself at all costs away from being drawn into a war. Norway wants to bring an effective peace policy into the League of Nations”\(^{110}\).

Romania’s position towards the League of Nations remained the traditional one, the aim being the maintenance of the country’s territorial integrity. Knudtzon confirmed in his diplomatic dispatches this foreign policy orientation of Bucharest\(^{111}\). He also approached the newly established Royal Dictatorship in Romania and the characteristics of this form of leadership. His rich diplomatic experience allowed him to observe the subtlest nuances and the most intimate features of Romanian domestic politics. His analyses would not overlook the economic and social developments. For instance, Kundtzon’s reports frequently approached the treatment of the Jewish minorities in the circumstances of the Romanian foreign policy’s reorientation towards Germany.

In 1938 Paul Koht\(^{112}\), the son of the Norwegian Foreign Minister replaced Kundtzon as chargé d'affaires in Bucharest. The new chargé d'affaires continued to focus his activity on a careful analysis of the evolutions in Romania. However, he will be soon replaced by another in chargé d'affaires, Ferdinand Carl Sandberg\(^{113}\), who held this position from 1939 to 1941. Sandberg’s dispatches emphasized Romania’s growing concerns with regard to the aggressive foreign policy of Germany\(^{114}\). The

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\(^{109}\) Seim and Obiziuc, 126-127.

\(^{110}\) AMAE 71 Norvegia, Vol 3, 6-10. Report no. 122 of 03.02.1938.

\(^{111}\) Seim and Obiziuc, 140-141. Report no. 52 of 21.02.1938.

\(^{112}\) Paul Grudem Koht (1913-2002) was son of politician Halvdan Koht and started his diplomatic career in 1938 as Charge d'Affaires in Bucharest.

\(^{113}\) Carl Ferdinand Sandberg (1880-1954) was a Norwegian jurist and diplomat, representing the interests of his country in several states.

\(^{114}\) Seim and Obiziuc, 168. Report no. 38 from March 1939.
Reich’s occupation of Czechoslovakia\textsuperscript{115} triggered panic among the Romanian public and the government felt the need to censor the press regarding this topic.

Concerns spread to Oslo, too. The Romanian chargé d’affaires in the Norwegian capital Alexandru Georgescu submitted a diplomatic report in March 1939\textsuperscript{116} that reads as it follows:

“\textit{I found Mr. Koht very pessimistic in regard of the international political situation (...) The fact that England is moving so slowly, having not introduced the compulsory military service so far engendered an immense feeling of insecurity among the small states. Norway’s situation is not identical to that of Czechoslovakia, yet with the new mentality manifested recently by the leaders of some of the great powers, it is not to be excluded that this country may also be subject of an attack}”.

Foreign Minister Koht’s statement can be explained in the circumstances in which Norway stood at the crossroads of the relations with the powers on which it depended economically as well as politically and strategically, i.e. Germany and Great Britain. Unlike the situation during World War I when Norwegian neutrality was protected by the British domination of the North Sea, technological development, especially in aviation, deeply affected the international setting for Norway.\textsuperscript{117} The small Scandinavian state started to be not as inaccessible in geographical terms as it was the case before. Since 1937 and especially from 1939 Norway sought to strengthen its military power\textsuperscript{118}. Although adopting a policy of neutrality\textsuperscript{119}, Norway would not forfeit its trade relations with the League of Nations’ countries or with those staying outside this

\textsuperscript{115} On September 30, 1938, in Munich, France, Britain, Italy and Germany decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia’s territorial integrity, this country being forced to surrender territory to Germany, Poland and Hungary. The panic created among the Romanian people is explained by the fact that Czechoslovakia was seen as falling prey to its neighbors’ revisionist threats, threats that were not unfamiliar to Romania, too.

\textsuperscript{116} AMAE 71 Norvegia, Vol 3, 137-138. Report no. 393 of 25.03.1939.


\textsuperscript{118} Prime Minister of Norway Juhan Nygaardsvold (1859-1972) supported the preparation of Norwegian military forces to cope with a possible attack. Nygaardsvold, who served as PM from 1935 to 1945, also undertook a series of social and economic measures designed to strengthen the welfare of his nation, Miloiu 2003, 162.

\textsuperscript{119} AMAE 71 Norvegia, Vol 4, 95-96. Report no. 1072 of 29.08.1939 from Romanian Charge d’Affaires in Oslo, Emil Zarifopol, to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarding Norway’s towards the outbreak of a possible war. After a talk with Carl Joachim Hambro, the President of the Storting, Zarifopol concluded that Norway will take all necessary measures to preserve its neutrality.
organization. Norway would not adopt any sanctions against Germany after March 1936 because of concern that they would have a strong negative impact on the Norwegian economy.

On the other hand, Romania felt the need to increase its efforts designed to conserve its territorial integrity\textsuperscript{120}, the more so as the internal situation grew tenser\textsuperscript{121}.

On the eve of the WW II, on both sides, the diplomatic dispatches show the anxiety of the two countries regarding the evolution of the international situation and the prospect of an impending war. Yet, the imminence of the outbreak of a new war set the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway on a downward course.

Despite Norway’s economic policy favorable to Germany, the latter power would not hesitate to attack and occupy the Nordic state in spring 1940. Emil Zarifopol, chargé d’affaires in Norway’s capital, reported on the precipitating evolutions in Oslo\textsuperscript{122}. Regarding the situation of Romanian Legation, Zarifopol confessed in an undated and confidential report:

\textit{“Since the day of the occupation, the 9th of April, foreign legations and consulates have ceased to have any contact with the outside world. Letters don’t arrive from outside and the ones dispatched are of course subject to censorship. They are allowed to correspond with their governments by telegraph, preferably in clear, and the correspondence with their colleagues in neighboring legations such as the ones in Stockholm, Berlin, etc. is brought to a standstill. The use of diplomatic couriers is not authorized but with a few exceptions granted only to the Swedish, Finnish, American, etc. legations”}\textsuperscript{123}.

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\textsuperscript{120} In this period Romania remained faithful to close ties with Britain and France and took a series of measures both internally and externally to prevent a possible attack.
\textsuperscript{121} Carol II’s royal dictatorship ran from 1938 to 1940. Romania acknowledged in this period a shift from a democratic regime to a system of authoritarian monarchy. On 10/11 February 1938 the King established a state of siege on Romania’s territory, started to censor the press, etc., and a few days later a new Constitution was adopted which outlawed all political parties but National Rennaisance Front and gave the King the right to govern the country. Romania’s internal political strifes are faithfully reported in the documents prepared by the Norwegian Charge d’Affaires in Bucharest, C.F. Sandberg.
\textsuperscript{122} Seim and Obiziuc, 186-187. Report no. 355 of 07.03.1940. After a month during which they hid inside the country, The Norwegian Government and the King escaped to Great Britain from where they will lead an intense campaign designed to free their country. The Norwegian delegation was accompanied by the envoys of Great Britain, France and Denmark, while Sweden, Finland and Romania’s envoys were left behind to the dismay of Zarifopol. See also General Titus Garbea, \textit{Memorial si insemnari zilnice}, vol. 1, ed. Silviu Miloiu (Targoviste: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2011).
\textsuperscript{123} Seim and Obiziuc,190-194.
Norway capitulated on June 7, 1940 and starting with July all foreign legations in Oslo were closed down.\textsuperscript{124} As for the Norwegian legation in Bucharest, it continued to operate until February 1941. In a message dated February 11, 1940, the Foreign Minister of the Norwegian Government based in London requested that the chargé d’affaires in Bucharest should leave Romania as soon as possible and head to Belgrade, where he was accredited\textsuperscript{125}. The documents mention that this should not be interpreted as a breach of diplomatic relations. However, the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway will remain frozen during the WW II.

Conclusions

The history of diplomatic ties between Romania and Norway in the interwar period was generally characterized by the efforts of the two countries to intensify their relations. These efforts resulted in the setting up of legations in Christiania/Oslo in 1917 and again in 1934 and in Bucharest in 1935. An overview of the history of their diplomatic bonds during this period should consider as time limits May 16, 1917, the date of foundation of the first Romanian legation at Christiania, and July 15, 1940 and February 1941 respectively, when the ties were broken off as a result of the violent occupation of Norway by Nazi Germany. For most part of the interwar period, the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway were maintained through legations located in other European capitals. The absence for a long period of permanent diplomatic offices in Bucharest and Oslo shall not be interpreted as an expression of lack of mutual interest, but shall be rather attributed to the budgetary constraints limiting the two countries’ ability to conduct a more active foreign policy in relation with states situated beyond their immediate neighborhood and the circle of great powers. Moreover, the frequent changes of the envoys accredited in the two capitals affected the possibility of pursuing high level and stable diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the Romanian envoys’ activity in the Norwegian capital advanced Romanian interests in this country. The Romanian propaganda in the Norwegian press was not irrelevant as regards Romania’s prestige on the international arena if we take into consideration that the media mediated the perceptions of each other of the two peoples. This was even more important if we also consider the considerable geographical distance separating the two countries.

\textsuperscript{124} Terje Leiren, „A Century of Norwegian Independence“, Scandinavian Review 92, no. 3 (Spring 2005): 6.
\textsuperscript{125} Seim and Obiziu, 196-197.
Behind the development of the relations between the two distant countries such as Romania and Norway stood to a large extent their economic and commercial interests, both countries trying to find markets for their products. Although the economic interests constituted the engine of the evolution of their diplomatic relations, the progress of their diplomatic bonds was also indebted to Romania’s interests of getting acknowledgement and support for the Great Union of 1918 and to Norway’s desire to set up its own network of international relations following its separation from Sweden in 1905.

In the context of the interwar international relations, the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway remained secondary to the ties fostered with their neighboring states and with the European great powers towards which the two countries exhibited a special interest. Therefore, the diplomatic relations between Romania and Norway in the interwar period can be considered peripheral, but by no means can they be regarded as irrelevant both in the context of their foreign policy and in relation to the system of international relations.

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At the end of last year the Romanian historical academic community has had the pleasure of witnessing the publication of a first ever monograph of the history of Finland in the Romanian language. The volume is authored by Associate Professor PhD Silviu Miloiu from the “Valahia” University of Târgovişte, and researcher and PhD (ABD) Elena Dragomir from the University of Helsinki, appropriately under the aegis of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies (RABNS).

Considering how rarely have the Finnish people made the subject of an approach of a Romanian historian, it is not surprising how well has the book been received by the Finnish representatives in Romania. One might not expect that countries such as Romania and Finland to have much in common, but under the present necessities the attention of whole Europe is focused on Finland as a successful economic, scientific and educational model. In this regard, Romania does not stand outside Europe, and should not. That is why this book can and should be read not only to satisfy a historical curiosity but also in the more pragmatic purpose of offering guiding and answers to problems that individuals, companies and states alike face nowadays.

The authors, Dr. Silviu Miloiu being the president of RABNS and Elena Dragomir its secretary, are unquestionably ones of the most pertinent Romanian researchers in the history of Nordic Europe and the history of Romania’s relations to Northern Europe. Dr. Silviu Miloiu, now deputy dean of the “Valahia” University of Târgovişte’s Faculty of Humanities, is the author and co-author of over 5 volumes in these fields, also having edited more than 7 volumes of historical studies. He has published extensively (over 50 articles) in journals abroad as well as in Romania, has participated in over 60 international scientific conferences, and has also taught at universities abroad. Furthermore, together with Elena Dragomir and other members of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies and students from the “Valahia” University of Târgovişte, Dr. Silviu Miloiu has already organized two conferences dealing mostly with relations between Romania on one side and Baltic and Nordic Europe on the other, and plans to organize a third one in 2012. Elena Dragomir is co-author of more than three volumes and author of many articles in international peer reviewed journals in the fields of international relations during the Cold War period.
Taking the high international recognition of the authors in consideration, it is no wonder that the volume presented here has enjoyed a very warm welcome across the Romanian academic and diplomatic world. Moving on to the contents of it, the opus is divided into XXXII parts plus an Introduction and also features a Preface and, very usefully, a general and toponymic Index plus a very broad Bibliography.

The first part of the book begins with the ancient history of Finland and covers the birth of the Finnish people at the beginning of the middle ages. The role of the Vikings is assessed in the second part, while the third one brings in discussion the Swedish and Russian expansions. Part IV discusses the Swedish rule over Finland during the later middle ages, while the next one ends the whole age with a final portrayal of the Finish medieval culture. Naturally, the Renaissance and Reform of Finland follow. Then the authors approach the expansion of Russia, the Diet of Porvoo, the organization of the Grand Duchy of Finland and birth of the modern Finnish nation including its loyalty as a part of the Russian Empire.

Part XI significantly portrays World War I followed afterwards by the founding of the state of Finland amid the Civil War between the Pro-communist and Anti-communist factions of Russia and until the peace treaty of Tartu of 1920. After this, all the important aspects of the interwar years are approached: politics, the economy, culture and external policy.

Starting with parts XIX and XX, the Winter War (Talvisota) and Continuation War (Jatkosota) are approached. Then the next part is reserved to the evolution of Finland until the peace treaties ending World War 2, and the following ones to the reconstruction after the war, Finland under Kekkonen and the period of the return to parliamentary democracy until 2008. As with the interwar years, the Finnish culture, economy and external policy are treated in broad parts each. Interestingly, the role of Nokia is not left aside, as this company is inevitably tied to Finland’s image across the globe.

Starting with the XXVIIIth part, accent falls on Finland and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and NATO, while the penultimate part deals with Finland’s foreign policy in general after the fall of the Soviet Union. For the Romanian reader the most copious chapter is the last one, where Finland-Romanian relations during the 20th century are detailed.

Considering this complete, clear and explicit structure of the volume and the international prestige of the two authors, I am overwhelmingly compelled to recommend this book not only to history prodigies but to the larger public as well. I could hardly imagine a reader that would not benefit from finding out more about Finnish culture, politics and the Finnish economic model, in the current state of worldwide financial turbulences. With this occasion I am also expressing my confidence that in the following years this book will become a “classic” of the Romanian historiography, and cannot help but notice that the society owes much recognition to the authors for this undoubtedly difficult and time-consuming project.

In times when people and countries alike face economic hardships and seem to seek only pragmatism and profit, and when the very morals of whole generations come into question, the public must realize how great a privilege is to receive the blessing of knowledge from talented and gifted researchers.
YEARS SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

1. EXHIBITION OF HISTORICAL AND DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

The Princely Court National Museum Complex of Târgoviște, May 20, 2011
The Museum of History of Galați, September 29, 2011
Speech by H.E. Ambassador of Lithuania
Dr. Vladimir Jarmolenko
on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the
re-establishment of diplomatic relations between
Lithuania and Romania

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very pleased to welcome you today, here, in Galaţi, at the opening of the exhibition of diplomatic documents, which celebrates 20 years from the reestablishment of the diplomatic relations between Romania and Republic of Lithuania.

On this occasion I would like to thank the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies, headed by professor Silviu Miloiu from the University Valahia, Târgovişte, the Diplomatic Archives Direction of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Archives of Lithuania, the Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, the Princely Court National Museum Complex of Târgovişte, the Lithuanian company ARVI Agro, all Romanian and Lithuanian historians who contributed to the gathering of the diplomatic documents that we can see today exposed in this wonderful Museum of History. I am also happy for the fact that eventually all these documents will be included into a larger volume of diplomatic documents related to the relations between Romania and Lithuania in the interwar period.

I am not a historian. I am a diplomat, a former politician and scientist in the field of biophysics, but during all these six years that I have been staying in Romania, I was interested in getting to know your country, your people and your history better. This exhibition is the result of a great collaboration between people who are deeply in love with their countries. And I was lucky to meet such persons, because in our common history there are still so many historical issues to be discovered!

20 years ago the communist regime in my country fell down. Our revolution, called the “Singing Revolution” was not as bloody as the Romanian one. The years 1990-91 were not the beginning of our history,
but rather its continuation after an abnormal period of absence from the international stage.

On August 26, 1991 the Foreign Minister of Romania welcomed the proclamation of Lithuania independence as it abolished the injustice than had been perpetrated through realization of the secret protocols of Molotov – Ribbentrop pact. Romania opened its Embassy in Vilnius in 1992 and in 2006 Lithuania opened her Embassy in Bucharest.

20 years have passed. Fundamental changes took place in our countries, some are good, and some are probably not as good. In the present context of EU and NATO membership, we move towards understanding better our own identity and our common European history.

I would like to wish all of us good luck in discovering our own history, because the person without past is a person without future. This exhibition is a step, and I am extremely honored that we are making this step in this old, warm and beautiful city of maritime Romania – Galaţi.

Let me express my gratitude to the people who made it possible: Dr. Silviu Miloiu, President of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies, Mr. Cristian Căldăraru – Director of the Museum of History of Galaţi, and to welcome here the Executive Director of the County Direction for Culture and National Heritage of Galaţi Mr. Cătălin Negoiţă, and President of Galaţi County Council Eugen Chebac, whom I would invite to tell some words.
2. VOLUME OF DOCUMENTS THE ROMANIAN-LITHUANIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1919 - 1944) AND BOOK HISTORY OF LITHUANIA
20 years from the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Romania

Foreword by H.E. Ambassador of Lithuania
Dr. Vladimir Jarmolenko
of the volume of documents dedicated to
the 20th anniversary of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Romania

This year we celebrate the 20th anniversary of re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Romania. Lithuania remembers with gratitude that Romania has welcomed the restored independent Republic of Lithuania on August 26, 1991. It is even more significant that the book “Istoria Lituaniei” in Romanian language was recently published. And now you keep in your hands a new book written in three languages - Romanian, Lithuanian and English: “The Romanian-Lithuanian Relations. Diplomatic Documents (1919 – 1944)”, created by a great team of both Romanian and Lithuanian historians: Silviu Miloiu (coordinator), Florin Anghel, Dalia Bukelevičiute, Alexandru Ghişa, Ramojuš Kaujelis, Bogdan-Alexandru Schipor.

Today Romania and Lithuania stand side by side, united in a large European family together with other partner countries, all sharing the same fundamental values and working together for a peaceful and prosperous European future. Centuries ago, in the medieval period, our nations were also standing side by side, being neighbors. Later on, on February 16, 1918 Lithuania declared its independence and was trying and hoping to open the gates to Europe with the help of Romania, because at that time Romania was Poland’s “strategic partner”. Nevertheless, only in August 1924 diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Romania have been established. Obviously, when both nations were striving to consolidate their newly acquired favorable status on the international scene, the bilateral relations between Romania and Lithuania have witnessed periods of varying activity, often influenced also by the international context at the moment (League of Nations, etc.). Before the Second World War we were seeking each other’s support mainly in order to tackle the common external threats both nations were facing.

This collection of documents is also interesting because it reflects the situation after August 25, 1940, when the diplomatic relations between Lithuania and Romania have been violently interrupted. And what is necessary to be mentioned, is that on the historical intersections of events in Europe, Romania never de jure recognized the fact of occupation and annexation of the Republic of Lithuania by the Soviet power.
I really hope that this unique collection of diplomatic documents will find your appreciation and will contribute to the strengthening of relations between our nations.

Let me express my deepest gratitude to all those who made the dream of creating and publishing this book come true: the members of the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Embassy in Bucharest, the National Cultural Fund Administration, the Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives, the Lithuanian National Archives, the “Cetatea de Scaun” Publishing House, the Valahia University of Târgoviște, local officials of Târgoviște, the Lithuanian company ARVI based in Iasi, diplomats and honorary consuls from Nordic and Baltic countries, who were supporting the idea of close cooperation with Romanian historians.

Vladimir Jarmolenko,
Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to Romania
October, 2011
BOOKS AND JOURNALS RECEIVED

Books:

Journals:
*Baltic Worlds* (edited by the Center for Baltic and East European Studies - CBEES of Södertörn University, Stockholm), vol. IV, issue 1 (2011), ISSN: 2000-2955
*Faravid* (edited by Pohjois-Suomen Historiallilinen Yhdistys), vol. 35 (2011), ISSN: 0356-5629
*Journal of Baltic Studies* (edited by Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies), vol. 42, issues 1-4 (2011), ISSN: 0162-977
*Revista Română pentru Studii Baltice şi Nordice – The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies* is a biannual peer-reviewed journal dedicated to publishing the results of research in all fields which are intertwined with the aims of *The Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies* such as:

- History of Baltic and Nordic Europe;
- Baltic and Nordic Europe in International Relations;
- Baltic and Nordic Cultures and Civilizations;
- Economics of Baltic and Nordic Europe;
- Relations between Romania and the Baltic and Nordic Europe;

The journal has been established with the aim of fostering research and dialogue among scholars working in Romania and abroad in fields of research related to the interests of ARSBN. In the interest of pluralism, RRSBN accepts contributions in English or any other major European languages.

In order to promote the knowledge of the Baltic and Nordic languages and cultures in South-Eastern Europe, additional issues of the journal may be published on the internet with articles in any of the Baltic or Nordic languages or in Romanian, case in which a different ISSN and numbering system will be used. The general submission guidelines apply in this case two, except for the English language abstracts which must consist of some 300 to 400 words.

We are eager and honored to open our pages to all both senior and young scholars engaged in studies regarding the Baltic and Nordic Europe and Romania’s relations with these regions, along with any reviews on other published books and articles calling attention. Our journal will also host reviews of any scholarly events focusing on any of the themes of the Association.

**Submission Guidelines** ([http://www.arsbn.ro/submission-guidelines.htm](http://www.arsbn.ro/submission-guidelines.htm)):

- Articles should be submitted as email attachments in Microsoft Word format to the Editorial secretary (Ioan Bodnar) at editorial@arsbn.ro.
- Contributions must be original and should not be under consideration by any other publication at the time of their submission. A cover letter in this sense should accompany the manuscript.
- The maximum length for consideration of an article is 6,000 – 12,000 words (including footnotes), and 700 – 1,000 words for a review.
- Please submit double-spaced papers in 11-point Book Antiqua font with 2 cm margins. Footnotes should be in 9-point.
- All research articles must include a 100-200 word English language abstract (and in Romanian or one of the Nordic and Baltic languages when applicable) and at least five English language key words.
- Submissions should include complete bibliographic references (including page numbers) in footnotes.
- Final bibliography should be inserted at the end of the article.
- For general rules of grammar, form, and style, authors should refer to *The Chicago Manual of Style* (The University of Chicago Press).
- All manuscripts will be subject to anonymous peer review, and will be evaluated on the basis of their creativity, quality of scholarship, and contribution to advancing the understanding of the regions concerned.

**Next deadlines**: April 1, 2012 (vol. 4, issue 1) and September 1, 2012 (Vol. 4, issue 2).