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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Silviu Miloiu

**Editorial Foreword** .............................................................................................................. 5

Costel Coroban

**Representations of political power in medieval Iceland: Íslendingabók** .......... 7

Kari Alenius

**The people’s expectations of good governance in German-occupied Estonia, 1941–1944** ................................................................. 25

Luiza-Maria Filimon

**An overview of the Copenhagen school’s approach to security studies: constructing (in)security through performative power** ................................. 47

Mihai Sebastian Chihaia

**Nordic states contribution to peace and security** ................................................................. 73

Adél Furu

**Democratic order and ethnic minority rights: the weaknesses of the Finnish and Turkish democracies** ................................................................. 93

Vladimir Jarmolenko

**The withdrawal of the Soviet/Russian armed forces and the end of the occupation (Essay of the chronology of the troop withdrawal negotiations)** .............................................................................................................. 103

**Call for Papers** ...................................................................................................................... 112
Editorial Foreword

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The current volume (8, issue 2 of 2016) of Revista Română pentru Studii Baltice și Nordice / The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies (RRSBN) publishes mostly the papers presented at the Seventh International Conference on Baltic and Nordic Studies in Romania, Good governance in Romania and the Nordic and Baltic countries, hosted by the Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies and Nicolae Iorga Institute of History of the Romanian Academy, București, 24-25 November, 2016, with the support of the embassies of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway, the Consulate of Latvia to Bucharest and sponsored by Niro Investment Group.

The meeting focused on good governance in Romania and the Nordic and Baltic countries as seen from a variety of angles and from the perspective of various disciplines, institutions and practices related to accountability, transparency, the rule of law, responsibility, equity, inclusiveness, participation, efficiency, human rights protection, tangible, intangible and natural heritage conservation, etc. The conference tackled concepts, issues and good practices in terms of good governance, accountability, welfare, efficiency, gender equality in the public and private sectors in Scandinavia, the Baltic States and Romania as well as the institutions called upon to fight against corruption in these countries. Historical examples of good versus bad governance were also brought forth.

In this issue we included two articles looking at good governance from a historical perspective. Costel Coroban investigates a key source of High Medieval Iceland, the Íslendingabók, in order to capture the images that mirror the ideology of power. The author contrasts the Icelandic and Norwegian sources and finds out that in Iceland the rulers customarily tried to legitimate their power position or to illustrate their weak situation in competition with larger and stronger neighbors. Much had changed in the intermediate six centuries separating the Icelandic stories and the Estonian ones, but the situation of a weaker fellow subdued by a stronger nation remained. Kari Alenius brings a fresh air in the debate concerning good governance by showing that even during foreign occupations and dramatic historical events such as world wars people still need to enjoy some kind of welfare, attention to their needs, competence. Alenius
discovers from the primary sources he uses that leadership cannot be offered without cultivating mutual trust and communication between the governing and the governed.

Peace and security have been chosen to illustrate the conceptual approaches of Nordic states and their contribution to global stability, which is, of course, still more of a desire than a state of affairs. Security, stability, peace are, naturally, core aspects of good governance and safety of human being. Luiza-Maria Filimon tackles the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, its conceptual strengths and applications while Mihai Sebastian Chihaia blends peace and security to the Nordic states’ endeavor to develop the security environment at European level and beyond.

The situation of minorities in a given country offers a hint to the level of democracy and welfare that state grants to its citizens. The capacity to integrate people of various personal histories, cultures, languages, religions, preferences who are locals or incomers cultivates openness and enlarges the prospects of development and general welfare. Adél Furu tackles this issue in a comparative study of Finland’s policy towards the Sami population and Turkey’s policy with regard to the Kurdish minority.

The journal ends with a speech of Former Ambassador of Lithuania to Bucharest, who recollects the time of Russian withdrawal of occupational troops from Lithuania and the responsibility of the Russian Federation as the heir of the Soviet state in respect to the occupation regime imposed upon Lithuania in 1940 and 1944. Historical memory is the arch which governs the architecture of Vladimir Jarmolenko’s essay.

The journal will continue to integrate aspects of good governance in its future issues, as it is a need, a desire, a right and an obligation of our modern world to grant and guarantee that it is offered and spread.
REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICAL POWER IN MEDIEVAL ICELAND: ÍSLENDINGABÓK

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Abstract:
This paper aims to analyse emblematic sources from the Golden Age of literature in High Medieval Iceland, such as Ísleðingabók, from the point of view of the ideology of power, in order to compare the findings to those from other sources of the time. If in Norway towards the 13th century all power gravitated around the person of the King and the institution of the court, in Iceland the political situation from the assembly of the Alþingi in 930 up to the country’s annexation (1262) was wholly different, owing to the different political organization of the Old Icelandic Commonwealth (Þjóðveldið). The Icelandic political milieu has not been researched very extensively from the point of view of political ideology, as one of the pioneers of this approach, Jón Viðar Sigurðsson noted. There is much to be said on the subject of the worthiness of the Icelandic Family sagas as useful in describing the political ideology of power due to their role as both historical and literary sources. These skaldic texts were sponsored with specific purposes by rulers who understood how songs and stories could improve a leader’s position and prestige. As a similarity to the literature sponsored by the kings of Norway, the texts created in Iceland during the literary miracle of the Middle Ages had a greater importance for those chieftains who did not enjoy a strong position, who were either attempting to legitimate themselves as rulers of newly usurped positions, or who were threatened by stronger neighbouring rulers.

Rezumat:
Scopul acestei lucrări este de a analiza surse din Epoca de Aur a literaturii din Islanda medievală, cum ar fi Ísleðingabók (Cartea Islandezilor) din punctul de vedere al ideologiei pătrii, cu scopul comparării rezultatelor cu analize ale altor izvoare ale vremii. Dacă în Norvegia către sfârșitul secolului al 13-lea toată puterea politică gravita în jurul persoanei regelui și a instituției Curții regale, în Islanda situația politică de la întrunirea Althing-ului din anul 930 p.Chr. până la anexarea țării de către Norvegia (1262) a fost cu totul diferită. Aceasta s-a datorat organizării politice diferite a vecheiui stat Islandez liber (Þjóðveldið). Mediul politic islandez din perioada Evului Mediu nu a fost cercetat amănunțit din punctul de vedere al
ideologiei politice, după cum aprecia unul din pionierii acestei abordări, istoricul Jón Viðar Sigurðsson. Ar exista multe aprecieri de fapt în legătură cu oportunitatea utilizării unor surse cum ar fi saga de familii islandeze drept izvoare pentru identificarea unor elemente de ideologie politică, datorită rolului lor atât de sursă literară cât și istorică. Aceste texte scaldice au fost sponsorizate de către conducători care erau conștienți de puterea unor saga de a le mări prestigiul. Ca o asemănare cu literatura promovată de către regei Norvegiei, aceste texte create în Islanda în timpul miracolului literar al Eului Mediu au avut o importanță mult mai mare pentru acei șefi locali islandezi care nu beneficiau de o poziție politică prea puternică, aceștia încercând astfel să se legitimeze drept conducători ai unor fiefoi uzurpate, sau folosit puterea propagandistică a saga drept mijloc de apărare împotriva unor vecini amenințători.

**Keywords:** medieval Iceland, power, ideology, Bishop Gizzur, Ari fróði

**Introductory aspects**

Probably one of the best known literary production of Medieval Iceland and the earliest vernacular prose work is the *Book of Icelanders* (also known as *Saga of the Icelanders* or *Libellus Islandorum*). It was written in Old Norse by Ari fróði Þorgilsson (1067–1148) during the early 12th century (circa 1122-1133), and is regarded by most scholars as the first history of Iceland and the foundation of Icelandic literature. The manuscripts are preserved at the Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies in Reykjavik in two documents (AM 113 a fol and AM 113 b fol) copied in the 17th century by priest Jón Erlendsson at the indications of Bishop Brynjólfur Sveinsson (14th September 1605 – 5th August 1675) of Skálholt from an original copy from the 12th century that had been lost afterwards.

Ari Þorgilsson, the celebrated author of *Íslendingabók* was praised by Snorri Sturluson as “truly learned about past events both here and abroad...eager to learn and having a good memory” as well as having a “perceptive intellect” 3. Despite such examples of praising, more modern

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1 Judy Quinn, "From orality to literacy in medieval Iceland" in Margaret Clunies Ross, *Old Icelandic Literature and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 30-60.
2 In the present work I shall be using the translated version of Siân Grønlie, *Íslendingabók. Kristni Saga*, Viking Society for Northern Research (London: University College London, 2006).
commentators have found Ari’s Íslendingabók lacking in details and breadth. Siân Grønlie, in the introduction to his translation of the saga, considers that this fault of narrowness of Íslendingabók is owed to the “ideological basis” that lied behind the writer’s intentions, namely his partiality regarding certain families or chieftains⁴. Unlike family sagas or the Norwegian king’s sagas, Íslendingabók remarkably avoids elaborate or detailed references to myths (with the exception of the second appendix) or to Christian bias in its first folios, even including historical genealogies and lists of law-speakers and bishops, therefore being one of the medieval Icelanding writings closest to modern historical works⁵.

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⁴ Grønlie, x.
Political Power, Context and Purpose in Íslendingabók

The Book of the Icelanders is divided in ten chapters with a Prologue in the beginning and a Genealogy at the end (the last two chapters are also lists of the bishops and lawspeakers of Iceland). What interests the present study the most are instances where the political ideology behind the organisation of Iceland are explained. In one of the few studies on the political ideology of Iceland, Norway and the Orkneys, the historian Jón Viðar Sigurðsson points to the fact there have been few analyses of political ideology from this comparative perspective. The same

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6 Jón Viðar Sigurðsson, „Kings, Earls and Chieftains. Rulers in Norway, Orkney and Iceland c. 900-1300“ in Gro Steinsland, Jón Viðar Sigurðsson, Jan Erik Rekdal, Ian Beuermann (eds.),
scholar compares the characteristics of chieftains in Icelandic family sagas (such as Íslendinga saga) as well as contemporary sagas (Sturlunga saga, Orkneyinga saga) to the qualities of kings found in sources such as Heimskringla, Sverris saga and Hákonar saga Hákonarsonar, to conclude that “there was a fundamental difference between kings on the one hand, and earls and chieftains on the other, even though the same terms were used to describe their personal abilities. The king was above all other men” and that later these differences became redundant as the kings legitimized their power by divine grace. The question arises to what extent Ari Þorgilsson’s Íslendingabók prescribes certain important qualities of political leaders, and whether these may be found in similar Icelandic or Norwegian sources.

Given the importance of law in Icelandic society, a short digression on the legislative setting is required before delving more deeply into the political milieu of Commonwealth Iceland. The written law played an important part in the political evolution of Iceland, as law dictated in the relations between the goðar, Church and the people. In Íslendingabók it is mentioned that the first law code of Iceland was introduced by Úlfiljótr, a Norwegian, around the year 930. This law was written after the model of the Gulaþingslög, a 10th century law code of Norway (the “log” of the Gulaping, one of the earliest Norwegian assemblies that took place on the west coast of the country). This law of Úlfiljótr was changed in local things before the Althing was established, by which time the code of Icelandic laws became the collection later known as Grágás (Gray Goose Laws, called so due to their antiquity, or because they had been written in goose quill or bound in
goose skin parchment). After 1264, when Iceland was annexed by Norway, the Grágás were replaced initially by Járnsída (introduced seven years after the annexation, the rather repressive Ironside laws were rapidly dropped in 1282) and then by Jónsbók, also based on the Norwegian National Law but with major modifications regarding royal taxation and copying some parts of the municipal law. Concomitantly, the Church in Iceland adopted the Christian Law (kristinréttr) between 1122 and 1133, which was replaced in the Althing after 1275 with a new reformed law.

From Íslendingabók we learn, first of all, that those who spoke in the Althing – on the occasion of modifying the local calendar, be they höfðingi or not – were sagacious men: “they were both very wise men” (chapter IV). Little other information is offered in the early chapters regarding chieftainship or the chieftain’s relations to the King of Norway. The relations between the Icelanders and the Norwegian monarchy stands out in regards to the process of the Christianization of the country (Siân Grønlie advises that Íslendingabók may be read entirely as an ecclesiastical or missionary history). Thus we find out that King Óláfr Tryggvason (ca. 960-1000) felt offended when the missionary Þangbrandr returned unsuccessful from Iceland. The King’s political ambition of having a united, subdued and Christian Iceland explain his harsh reaction, as he wanted “to have those … who were there in the east maimed or killed for it”. This shows that in Arni’s time (the first half of the 12th century) there existed the perception that the king of Norway had seen it as his duty to Christianize and eventually control Iceland, a country where many Norwegians resided but one that was outside the power of the king. Hence it could be argued that around the middle of the 12th century Christianity was imagined as a vector for the expansion of the Norwegian king’s power. This hypothesis is aided by the argument that Íslendingabók, with its references to Iceland as a distinct realm, represents a nation-building

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12 The Grágás are preserved in two manuscripts – which are actually two different versions of it – Konungsbók (Copenhagen, Royal Library, GKS 1157 fol, written circa 1260) and Staðarhólsbók (Reykjavík, Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies, AM 334 fol, written circa 1280).
13 Sigurðsson 2007, 175.
14 See the introductory study in Grønlie, xli-xliv.
15 Íslendingabók, chapter VII.
16 Ibid.
document in the context of the “emergent sense of Icelandic identity in the early twelfth century”\textsuperscript{17}.

Returning to the qualities of political leaders in Iceland as evident in Íslendingabók, we learn that Skapti fióroddsson (who became lawspeaker and held the office for 27 years, when his uncle, Grimr Svertingsson, from Mosfell, bestowed upon him the office due to his voice becoming hoarse), was appreciated as a just ruler and a peace promoter: he created a Fifth Court for appeals against cases in which witnesses or where juries could not reach a decision, decreed that nobody could be pronounced guilty for a murder except the killer, exiled or outlawed chieftains and powerful men who were guilty of violence or crime\textsuperscript{18}. Justice represents a desirable attributes for kings too. It appears as one of the king’s most important attributes in Konungs skuggsjá, together with wisdom\textsuperscript{19}. Justice is part of the four cardinal virtues existent in medieval political thought, together with prudence, temperance and fortitude; in the medieval political ideology, a just ruler gives everyone his due (according to the famous dictum: suum cuique tribuere\textsuperscript{20}), as detailed by Engelbert of Admont’s De regimine principium and other 13\textsuperscript{th} century works of ethics and philosophy\textsuperscript{21}.

Bishop Gizurr (in office 1082-1118) is likewise lauded for his achievement of having introduced the tithe. This is praised in Íslendingabók as an accomplishment that had been possible thanks to the popularity of Bishop Gizurr and the persuasion of Sæmundr\textsuperscript{22}. Ari admits that convincing the population to correctly declare the value of their possession in order for it to be taxed required great political skill and obedience on behalf of the Icelanders towards Gizzur. Therefore it seems safe to assume that Bishop Gizzur possessed the qualities of a chief. Scholar Siân Grønlie, in one of the notes to his joint edition of Íslendingabók and Kristni saga\textsuperscript{23},

\textsuperscript{17} Grønlie, xxiv.
\textsuperscript{18} Íslendingabók, chapter VIII.
\textsuperscript{20} This Latin phrase comes from Aristotelian philosophy and has been made famous by Cicero in De Natura Deorum where he says "Iustitia suum cuique distribuit" (III, 38) and also by being included in Emperor Justinian’s Institutiones „iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere” (1,1,3-4).
\textsuperscript{21} István P. Bejczy, The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages. A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century (Boston: Brill, 2011), 213.
\textsuperscript{22} Íslendingabók, chapter X.
\textsuperscript{23} Grønlie, 71.
points out that in quite a few sagas Bishop Gizzur is presented as a possible chief, Viking chieftain and even king. Thus, in Hungrvaka (found in Íslenzk fornrit, Reykjavík, 1933, XV 16\textsuperscript{24}) we are told that: “Everyone wished to sit or stand as he commanded, young and old, rich and poor, women and men, and it was right to say that he was both king and bishop over the land he lived”\textsuperscript{25}. To this example, Siân Grønlie juxtaposes Haraldr Sigurðarson’s praise of Gizzur: “‘He could be a viking chieftain, and has the makings for it. Given his temperament, he could be a king, and that would be fitting. The third possibility is a bishop, and that is probably what he will become, and he will be a most outstanding man’”\textsuperscript{26} (from Morkinskinna\textsuperscript{27}).

Figure 2. The Constitutional structure of the Icelandic Commonwealth after ca. 1030. Source: Gunnar Karlsson, The History of Iceland (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 23.

Ari also praises Gizzur’s great administrative capabilities in establishing the first Icelandic episcopal see at Skálholt, endowing it with lands as well as other possessions and for giving up his land for the creation of a second Icelandic bishopric, according to the indications received from Norway. Another accomplishment and proof of good administration was the census held during Gizzur’s time “and at that time there were a full 840 in the Eastern Fjords Quarter, and 1200 in the Rangá Quarter, and 1080 in the

\textsuperscript{24} Hið íslenzka fornritafélag (The Old Icelandic Text Society) founded in 1928 published many editions of Icelandic sagas with rich comments and introductions.
\textsuperscript{25} Grønlie, 71.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
Breiðafjörður Quarter, and 1440 in the Eyjafjörður Quarter”\textsuperscript{28}. Such examples of good governance that are found in Íslendingabók are comparable to descriptions of chieftains. For example, in Sturlu saga it is said that Oddi Þorgilsson was “better spoken than most other men” and \textit{vitr}, “clever”\textsuperscript{29}. Historian Jón Viðar Sigurðsson shows that most sagas only ascribe one quality to the Icelandic chieftains of renown, while the earls of the Orkneys are portrayed with two to four features and the kings of Norway with five to six characteristics\textsuperscript{30}. Judging by these standards, Bishop Gizzur’s description in Íslendingabók is similar to that of the early earls in Orkneyinga saga\textsuperscript{31}. Perhaps this is explainable because he was a bishop whose power and scopes were greater than those of a chieftain, and whose lineage (genealogy) was nobler than that of a simple chief.

In regards to wisdom, culture and education as attributes of leader, Íslendingabók only refers to such qualities as belonging to certain notable men that spoke in the Althing – as seen above – and to bishops. Thus, Bishop Ísleifr of Skálholt (1056-1080), described as “far abler than other clerics”\textsuperscript{32}, and as having attracted the admiration of many chieftains who sent their sons to study with him (two of whom, the source tells us, later became bishops), therefore proving the value they ascribed to education. The fact that Bishop Ísleifr’s three sons became chieftains is also presented as a merit of their father’s renown\textsuperscript{33}, and Ari mentions – as an act of reverence – that he personally had been present at Bishop Ísleifr’s death when he was only 12 years old and that it “was on a Sunday, six nights after the feast of Peter and Paul, eighty years after the fall of Óláfr Tryggvason”\textsuperscript{34}. Discussing wisdom as an attribute in the sagas, Jón Viðar Sigurðsson observes that:

\\textsuperscript{28} Íslendingabók, chapter X.
\textsuperscript{29} Sturlu saga, Sturlunga saga, Ch. 6, apud Sigurðsson 2011, 73.
\textsuperscript{30} Sigurðsson 2011, 73-74.
\textsuperscript{31} Such as, for example, that of Earl Erlendr Haraldsson, who “went off on Vikings trips. He was an exceptional man, talented in almost every way, open-handed, gentle, always ready to take advice and much loved by his men, of whom he had a large following” Hermann Pálsson and Paul Edwards (eds.), The history of the Earls of Orkney, (London: Penguin Classics, 1981), 184 apud Sigurðsson 2011, 73.
\textsuperscript{32} Íslendingabók, chapter IX.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
The most common word for describing wisdom in the Old Norse sources is *vitr*, and in a few episodes a person is depicted as *stórvitrir* or *allra manna vitrastr*. None of these words were, however, reserved for secular leaders only, not even the terms *stórvitr* or *allra manna vitrastr*. [...] It is obvious that because of the king’s superior position he had to be cleverer than other men. It is, however, more difficult to explain why the sagas attach such small importance on the earls’ shrewdness. [...] However, to be a good military leader one also had to be intelligent. Thus the sagas underline the earls’ wisdom indirectly.\textsuperscript{35}

Bishop Ísleifr position as wise church leader (officially he was a missionary bishop, *in partibus infidelibus*, not a see holder) means that he was learned man, so this trait was something that was expected of him as an ecclesiastical leader. This description of him could also be used as an example to argue that in Ari’s time greater emphasis was laid on the role of bishops as state-builders in the earlier history of Iceland than on the role of chieftains, or, on the contrary, to prove Ari’s bias in favour of the role of Christianity and the Church in earlier times in Iceland.

\textsuperscript{35} Sigurðsson 2011, 73.
Wisdom as a character train stands out in Hákon saga Hákonarsonar where the king is presented not only as wise but also as well educated and having a culture that permitted him to read Latin as well as Old Norse, and as a patron of the letters who commissioned translations of riddarasögur into Old Norse\textsuperscript{36}. In his study of Konungs skuggsjá, Sverre Bagge found that “the king’s virtue above all was wisdom.... ‘Fyrir þui at... gud hefir gefit þier spekt ok manuit. Pa gættu rikisstiornar med uitrligu rettdæmi...’”\textsuperscript{37}. While


\textsuperscript{37} “Because I find that God has given you wisdom and understanding, I charge you to govern wisely and justly” Konungs skuggsjá part III, apud Bagge, 90.
Bishop Ísleifr in Íslendingabók is commended for his wisdom in a more practical manner (his intelligence having attracted high born students and having allowed him to consolidate the first bishopric of Iceland), the quality of wisdom described in Konungs skuggsjá is from the Old Testament and follows the model offered by the medieval philosophical model of the four virtues\textsuperscript{38}. In Konungs skuggsjá an allegory of Wisdom describes all that wisdom helps in, including practical matters such as agriculture, trade, economic development, art, schools and education but also judgement and law, therefore both pragmatic as well as idealistic matters\textsuperscript{39}. In Íslendingabók, Bishop Gizur’s wisdom and prestige is likewise praised when Ari points out that it was he who recommended the consecration of Þorlákr Þórhallsson as Bishop of Skálholt, despite being ill and not being able to attend the Althing: “…everyone acted in accordance with his instructions, and this was obtained because Gizurr himself had urged it so strongly; and Þorlákr went abroad that summer and returned out here the next, and had then been consecrated bishop”\textsuperscript{40}.

One very important point when discussing the ideology of power in Íslendingabók is the depiction of the Norwegian monarchy in this source. It is worthwhile to mention that there is little evidence, if any, of a contestation of any of the actions of the monarch. On the contrary, Ari seems to implicitly approve of the policy of the Norwegian monarch. A sign of reverence to Norwegian institution of kingship is the fact that dates are calculated according to the rule and lives of different Norwegian kings. There are many examples of this kind of devotion in Íslendingabók. For example, we are told from the beginning that “Ísland byggðist fyrst ór Norvegi á dögum Haralds ins hárfagra…”\textsuperscript{41}, that Ingólfr brought the law to Iceland “when Haraldr the Fine-Haired was sixteen years old”\textsuperscript{42} and that the colonisation of the island was completed in six decades, when Hœngr from Rangá became lawspeaker “one or two years before Haraldr Hárfagri died, according to the reckoning of wise men”\textsuperscript{43}. In the last example we

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\textsuperscript{38} István P. Bejczy, \textit{The Cardinal Virtues in the Middle Ages. A Study in Moral Thought from the Fourth to the Fourteenth Century} (Boston: Brill, 2011), 215.

\textsuperscript{39} Bagge, 91.

\textsuperscript{40} Íslendingabók, chapter X.

\textsuperscript{41} “Iceland was first settled from Norway in the days of Haraldr the Fine Haired…”, Íslendingabók, chapter I.

\textsuperscript{42} Íslendingabók, chapter I.

\textsuperscript{43} Íslendingabók, chapter III.
find out that the wise men of Iceland awarded great importance to the rule of King Haraldr, therefore positioning the Norwegian monarch as the main authority they looked to. In Íslendingabók we are also told that the Christianisation of Iceland took place the year “Óláfr Tryggvason fell... fighting the king of the Danes, Sveinn Haraldsson, and the Swedish Óláfr, son of Eiríkr at Uppsala, king of the Swedes, and Eiríkr Hákonarson, who was later earl in Norway”\(^{44}\). In this example we see not only a reference to the king of Norway, but also to the most important leaders of the time, which was probably aimed to emphasize the importance of the event of the adoption of the Cross in the country’s history. The insinuation remains that this crucial event is also linked to the figure of the Norwegian king, the author implying that the success of the Christianization of Iceland could be seen as the crowning of King Óláfr Tryggvason’s efforts at the end of his rule and life, completing the circle opened by Ari in the beginning of Íslendingabók’s chapter VII: “King Óláfr, son of Tryggvi, son of Óláfr, son of Haraldr the Fine-Haired, brought Christianity to Norway and to Iceland”\(^{45}\).

Figure 4. King Haraldr Hárfagr (c. 850 – c. 932) receiving Norway out of his father’s hands in an illumination from Flateyjarbók (GkS 1005 fol.).

\(^{44}\) Íslendingabók, chapter VII.

\(^{45}\) “Óláfr konungr Tryggvasonr, Óláfssonar, Haraldssonar ins hárfgara, kom kristni í Norveg ok á Ísland”, Íslendingabók, chapter VII.
Other examples of using the reign of Norwegian kings as reference points appear when we are told that the revered lawspeaker Skapti Þóroddsson, nephew of lawspeaker Grímr Sverthingsson, “died in the same year that Óláfr the Stout fell, son of Haraldr, son of Goðrøðr, son of Björn, son of Haraldr the Fine-Haired, thirty years after Óláfr Tryggvason fell”\textsuperscript{46}. Just like in the previous example, the reference does not simply allude to one Norwegian king, but to an entire lineage of rulers, eventually as far back as Haraldr Hárfagri’s time, when Iceland was colonised. In another example, it is told in Íslendingabók that Bishop Ísleifr was consecrated “in the days of King Haraldr of Norway, son of Sigurðr, son of Hálfdan, son of Sigurðr Bastard, son of Haraldr the Fine-Haired”\textsuperscript{47}. From reading the same source we are also informed that Kolbeinn Flosason became lawspeaker the year “King Haraldr fell in England”\textsuperscript{48}, i.e. 1066, and that Bishop Ísleifr passed away “eighty years after the fall of Óláfr Tryggvason”\textsuperscript{49}, that Bishop Gíuzzur “was consecrated bishop at the request of his countrymen in the days of King Óláfr Haraldsson”\textsuperscript{50}.

**Closing observations**

Such examples prove how important it was for Ari to establish a connection back to one of the most venerated Norwegian kings, the unifier of Norway, Haraldr Hárfagri, during the time of which the kingdom was formed simultaneously with the colonisation. Therefore, the author does not seem to share the idea that the colonists came to Iceland as a result of the Norwegian king’s tyranny, otherwise less reference would have been made to royal dynasty. It might seem obvious that a population of colonists should refer to the leaders of the country their ancestors were born in, but in the Middle Ages the reference to the ruling years of other monarchs were always done as part of a political recognition of their authority and never without carrying a political message. For example, the early Popes of

\textsuperscript{46} “En hann andaðist á inu sama ári ok Óláfr inn digri fell Haraldssonr, Goðrøðarsonar, Bjarnarsonar, Haraldssonar ins hárfragra, þremr þigum vetra síðar en Óláfr felli Tryggvasonr” Íslendingabók, chapter VIII.

\textsuperscript{47} “…á dögum Haralds Noregskonungs Sigurðarsonar, Hálfdanarsonar, Sigurðarsonar hrísa, Haraldssonar ins hárfragra.” Íslendingabók, chapter IX.

\textsuperscript{48} Íslendingabók, chapter IX.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., chapter X.
Rome that came from Greece (in the period roughly from 678 to 752) sometimes dated their letters using the regnal years of the Emperor in Constantinople, whose approval they required in order to be ordained, much like various Icelandic goði or bishops, who received the mandate to Christianize their country or the approval of their ordination from the Norwegian king, in a similar relation of dependence. Possible counter-arguments might include the fact that Ari refers not only to Norwegian kings but also to Popes and to English monarchs like King Edmund (the Martyr, ca. 855-869) as well as to the Emperors of Constantinople, Alexios I Komnenos (1056-1118) and Phocas (602-610), and to the first King of Jerusalem, Baldwin I (1100-1118) and Patriarch Arnulf of Jerusalem (1099, 1112-1118) too. For example, at the end of chapter VII it is stated that:

Bishop Gizurr died thirty nights later in Skálaholt on the third day of the week, the fifth [day] before the calends of June.

In the same year Pope Paschal II died before Bishop Gizurr, as did Baldwin king of Jerusalem and Arnulf patriarch in Jerusalem, and Philip king of the Swedes and, later the same summer, Alexius king of the Greeks; he had then sat on the throne in Miklagarðr for thirty-eight years. And two years later a new lunar cycle began.

Eysteinn and Sigurðr had then been kings in Norway for seventeen years after their father Magnús, son of Óláfr Haraldsson. That was 120 years after the fall of Óláfr Tryggvason, and 250 years after the killing of Edmund, king of the Angles, and 516 years after the death of Pope Gregory, who brought Christianity to England, according to what has been reckoned. And he died in the second year of the reign of the Emperor Phocas, 604 years after the birth of Christ by the common method of reckoning. That makes 1120 years altogether.

This probably stems from the ecclesiastical character of Íslendingabók or possibly from the desire of Ari to write a pompous ending to his book, an expression of his sagacity, as he would later be called fróði. Probably the

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52 Íslendingabók, chapter VII.
first reason is the one that bears the greater weight. Looking at this gallery of leaders mentioned in Íslendingabók, Historian Poul Skårup suspects that the writer’s inspiration came from a version of Fulcher of Chartres’s Historia Hierosolymitana, which contains references to Alexios I, Baldwin I and Patriarch Arnulf of Jerusalem (this chronicle is one of the most appreciated chronicles of the First Crusade, written by Fulcher of Chartres, who was a participant in the event, it is considered rather accurate and it is thought that it remains one of the most important sources for contemporaries as well). The reference to King Edmund the Martyr – who ruled East Anglia but little is known about his reign from the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle other than he fell victim to Viking raids, suggesting he might have been mentioned as an ecclesiastical figure who was greatly venerated in church tradition in the North, may be considered surprising, while, for instance, Emperor Alexios I Comnenos is well-known in Old Norse literature as Kirjalax (Gr. kyrios, κύριος = Lord), has a saga dedicated to him (Kirjalax saga) and is remembered for having received King Eiríkr the Good (of Denmark) and King Sigurðr Jórsalafari in Miklagarðr (Constantinople).

54 Poul Skårup, “Ari frodes dødsliste for året 1118” Opuscula, 6 (1979), 18-23 apud Grønlie, 30.
55 Also known as St. Edmund, he was King of East Anglia from circa 855 to his death on 20 November 869 (when the king was allegedly slain by Ivar the Boneless and his brother Ubba after refusing to give up his faith in Christ). The cult of St. Edmund was revived after the 10th century with hagiographies such as Passio Sancti Eadmundi by Abbo of Fleury or legends like De Infantia Sancti Edmondii by Geoffrey of Wells greatly contributing to St. Edmund being worshipped as a martyr and to the creation of his image as a sacral king through his example of faith, sacrifice and sense of duty at the early age of 29 when he was martyred. Mark Taylor, Edmund: the Untold Story of the Martyr-King and His Kingdom (Fordaro, 2013), 27-43.
The power of the Norwegian king is to a great extent never contested in Íslendingabók, which supports the argument that from the point of view of political ideology, the source does not fail to appear as a declaration of faith to the Norwegian throne. For instance, Ari explains that, in the beginning, King Haraldr Hárfagrí had the power to impose a tax of five ounces of silver on those who travelled to Iceland. The demeanour of the king is not commented or contested in any way, such as, for example, would be the case in other sources.

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57 Íslendingabók, chapter I.
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HE PEOPLE’ S EXPECTATIONS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN GERMAN-OCCUPIED ESTONIA, 1941-1944

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Abstract:
This paper aims to explain why certain elements were present in the expectations of the Estonian people and how, in the end, Estonians perceived the activities of German administration. On the basis of the analysis it is evident that a few central elements were distinguishable. The expectations consisted of several universal elements while others derived their roots from local and time-specific conditions and the history of Estonian-German relations. Similarly, there were remarkable divergences as to how different levels and parts of administration were perceived by the local population. For instance, the highest German representative in Estonia, Generalkommissar Karl-Sieg mund Litzmann was seen in a different light than the rest of the administration and different hopes were placed on him. The course of war also brought along changes in opinion and mood of the Estonians.

The source material of this study mainly consists of the surveillance reports of the German Security Police and other relevant documents of the German occupation administration, including those of the Estonian Self-Administration. Revealing examples of both good and bad governance exist in the original material.

Rezumat:
Lucrarea urmărește să explice de ce au existat anumite elemente în așteptările poporului estonian și cum au perceput estonienii, în cele din urmă, activitățile administrației germane. Pe baza analizei efectuate devine evident că s-au distins câteva trăsături centrale. Așteptările au integrat mai multe teme universale, în timp
ce altele și-au derivat rădăcinile din condițiile locale și specifice momentului dat și istoriei relațiilor estoniano-germane. În mod similar, au existat divergențe importante în ceea ce privește modul în care diferite niveluri și aspecte ale administrației au fost percepute de populația locală. De exemplu, cel mai înalt reprezentant german din Estonia, Generalkommissar Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, a fost văzut într-o lumină diferită de restul administrației și s-au pus speranțe diferite în el. Cursul războiului a adus, de asemenea, schimbări în opinia și starea de spirit a estonienilor.

Materialul sursă al acestui studiu constă, în principal, din rapoartele de supraveghere ale Poliției de Securitate germane și din alte documente relevante ale administrației de ocupație germane, inclusiv ale Autoguvernării Estoinene. Exemple elocvente de bună și rea guvernare coexistă în documentele de arhivă.

**Keywords:** Estonia, German occupation, World War II, governance, ethnic relations, images

**Introduction**

It can be argued that if any governance wants to succeed and be perceived as a “good governance” it must follow certain universal principles. Here the most essential concepts are “leadership” and “strategic communication”. As a starting point, during the Second World War the Estonians expected the same kind of behavior, exercise of power and governance from the Germans as people in general would. Recent studies on leadership have shown that in spite of their cultural background, people very much appreciate the same features in their leaders. “Exceptional leadership” and its components are usually referred to with the term deep leadership (or transformational leadership). The four cornerstones of deep leadership are building trust between the leader and subordinates, an inspirational way to motivate, intellectual stimulation and an individual approach to subordinates.¹

Since the 1990s, strategic communication has seen increased interest in the areas of research and practical use. Areas in which strategic communication have been applied include foreign and domestic affairs

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The people’s expectations of good governance in German-occupied Estonia, 1941–1944

(policy), military affairs, economics, communication and management. The term “strategic communication” has been in broad use through the last two decades particularly within the Anglo-American language area, and from there it has spread throughout the world. There has been some amount of debate among scholars as to what “strategic communication” means exactly. Based on this debate it is clear that no one, accepted definition of strategic communication exists. However, when the core content of strategic communication is examined, it is apparent that there is a fairly large consensus among different researchers regarding the basic elements of the concept. D. M. Murphy, for example, has summarized the thought in one sentence: “Strategic communication is, at its essence, the orchestration of actions, words, and images to create cognitive information effects”.

Consistent interpretations are given from several other researchers.

A more practical approach is to use the short program of the United States Department of Defence, prepared in 2008, as a point of reference to identify the occurrence of strategic communication in cases earlier than those in recent history. In this context, the program is not interpreted as the “sole legitimate” descriptor, but it is only one possible program of principles. However, it contains a wealth of issues raised by researchers and those defining strategic communication, and this is why it is well-suited as a descriptive point of comparison, or a theoretical starting point. In the


“Principles of Strategic Communication” compiled by the U.S. Department of Defence the concept and the principles of applying it are condensed into nine main categories:

(1) Leadership-Driven. Leaders must lead communication process;
(2) Credible. Perception of truthfulness and respect; (3) Understanding. Deep comprehension of others; (4) Dialogue. Multi-faceted exchange of ideas; (5) Pervasive. Every action sends a message; (6) Unity of Effort. Integrated and coordinated; (7) Results-Based. Tied to desired endstate; (8) Responsive. Right audience, message, time, and place; (9) Continuous. Analysis, planning, execution, assessment.

This article examines the governance of Germany during the occupation of Estonia in 1941–1944. At the same time it examines the “deep leadership” and “strategic communication” of German authorities. It is clear that during this time, the terms did not exist, but research questions are not anachronistic when one remembers that the same thing can be and has been expressed in different ways. In Germany and elsewhere during World War II, the term mainly in use was propaganda. The goals and means of propaganda closely resembled and resemble those of strategic communication, although there are differences that can be found, relating mostly to the difference of the historical situation and the more thorough knowledge of today in relation to the mechanisms and possibilities of human communication. Strategic communication is also understood as a more comprehensive function than how propaganda was understood. Nevertheless, this does not conflict with the fact that decades ago, agencies of propaganda operated quite similarly according to principles of strategic communication that were outlined later.

In addition to theoretical contemplation, this study also analyses the main points of what taking these principles into consideration meant in practice in Estonia during World War II. Estonia was occupied by Germany from the summer of 1941 to autumn of 1944, during which time surveillance of individual’s sentiments and propaganda work were coordinated by

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Germany’s Security Police. The fact that the German ruling power had to cooperate with the Estonian Self-Administration (Eesti Omavalitsus), created as a local ancillary organisation for the occupying administration, posed its own challenge. The viewpoints and goals of the Estonian functionaries did not always coincide seamlessly with those of the Germans. The same problem applied to ordinary Estonians’ opinions and hopes, which were often contradictory to the views of the Germans. Thus, getting the Estonians to support the war objectives of the Germans required carefully deliberated propaganda work and utilisation of the principles of strategic communication.

In the summer of 1942, Dr. Martin Sandberger, the head of the German Security Police in Estonia, compiled an extensive report on matters within his own field. The material was acquired during the first year of occupation, between July 1941 and June 1942, but the report also included a detailed evaluation of matters on which the German occupation administration should concentrate attention in the future in order to retain and strengthen the willingness of Estonians to cooperate. This report is a key document for the analysis of Security Police opinions concerning the condition of “strategic communication” and its developmental needs. In other surviving archival material from the Security Police, for the years 1941–1944, the same concerns often arise, though in a simpler form. The most essential part of the prevailing material (bi-monthly, monthly and annual reports) has been published as a source collection. A comprehensive report from the summer of 1944 is otherwise similar to that from the summer of 1942 but makes fewer recommendations for further action.

**Governance executed by the German administration**

The general gratitude of Estonians towards Germany, as Germany had liberated Estonia from Soviet occupation, explains the positive attitude

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9 EJA, pp. 87–288.
10 EJA, pp. 289–363.
of Estonians towards the German exercise of power and governance. The fact that Estonia lived with a military regime (Militärverwaltung) until 5 December 1941 further explains why this attitude remained quite positive for a relatively long time. As long as Estonia was a zone of the front, it was likely that Estonians would be prepared to accept exceptional circumstances and the related strict regulations and governance from the quarters of the German occupation administration. It was probably thought that temporary difficulties, for example having no share in the governance must just be withstood, as on the front and in rear areas, it could not be expected that things would be organized as they were under a peace-time model.\textsuperscript{11}

According to reports, financial and economic problems, especially food and goods shortages, undermined people’s attitudes already during the fall of 1941, but dissatisfaction was not directly oriented towards the German administration but in its quality there was a more common annoyance with the exceptional circumstances and the scarcity and breakdown of normal life which these brought with them.\textsuperscript{12} However, towards the end of the year the Estonians still awaited more eagerly a transition to civilian rule, which it was believed would bring significantly more possibility for Estonians to decide on the affairs of their own country.\textsuperscript{13} The transition from a military to civilian administration occurred on 5 December 1941, and by March 1942 Germany organized a detailed division of labor between the German occupation administration and the Estonian Self-Administration.\textsuperscript{14}

During the period from the summer of 1941 until the winter of 1941–1942, it appears that Estonians largely accepted the German governance, at least as a temporary organization, and tried to cooperate with the new rulers. According to reports, Estonians generally accommodated the demands of German military and civilian authorities and wanted to obey them.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{12} Weekly reports from the agents of the Political Police in the Narva region, October-December 1941, ERA R-59-1-84, l. 1, 6-9, 11-13, 48-49, 142, 156-157, 188-193.
\bibitem{13} Weekly reports from the agents of the Political Police in the Narva region, October-December 1941, ERA R-59-1-84, l. 183; Political Police report (All Estonia), December 1941, ERA R-64-1-821, l. 3-6.
\bibitem{15} Weekly reports from the agents of the Political Police in the Narva region, October-December 1941, ERA R-59-1-84, l. 26-27, 72-73, 142, 156-157, 188-192, 221-222, 240, 270, 289-
\end{thebibliography}
Estonians particularly accommodated German soldiers with positivity and showed them help, friendship and understanding in practical matters. On a general level the Estonians desired a German victory over the Soviet Union and saw that the future of Estonia after the war would be tied inevitably to Germany in one way or another. They were also quite convinced of a future German victory on the Eastern Front.

German propagandists had moderately favorable conditions in which to operate in Estonia in 1941. From the German point of view the war was going well and until December it seemed possible that Germany would indeed succeed in defeating the Soviet Union before the end of the year. The military prowess shown by Germany and the dominance it had achieved in Europe gave Germany an authority that improved the delivery of German strategic communication among its target audience. Propagandists had enough work explaining military operations during the autumn without that they would have had to make information much more propagandistic. In other words, the reality spoke for itself and Estonians seemed to be largely convinced of Germany’s military superiority as well as of Germany’s ability to win the major war underway. As one important factor, this undoubtedly built trust between the leaders and subordinates and thus met the first criterion of deep leadership.

In the press, the German invasion of Estonia was also easy to present as the liberation of Estonia from Soviet domination. From the very beginning the Estonians felt that they had been liberated, and all the propagandists had to do was keep this idea afloat. The primary method selected was a regular reminder of this through different media channels (especially radio and the press) and by instilling gratitude in the minds of Estonians. It appears that gratitude was particularly strong towards German soldiers, and
also had a lasting quality after the first few months of war. As one of the objectives of German propaganda was to create a positive image of Germans for Estonians on the part of the military and soldiers this goal succeeded well. It is also psychologically understandable that the gratitude of Estonians was focused precisely on soldiers, as in practice they had driven out the Soviet troops from Estonia, even at the danger of their own lives and health. Clear political and other social nuances and differences of opinion were also not related to military “liberation” as to other areas of life. Almost all Estonians agreed that the downfall of the Soviet regime was a positive thing, but there was no prevailing consensus on how things were to be organized afterwards.

Estonians perceived cooperation with Germany above all as soldierly comradeship, a struggle against a common enemy, instead of an actual ideological alliance. German propagandists did not have to teach Estonians the idea of soldierly comradeship, but rather they attempted to prevent the spread of the idea among Estonians. For Germany, it was more advantageous to emphasize the sovereign role of the German forces in liberating Estonia, as in this way it was easier to instill gratitude towards Germany in the minds of Estonians and rationalize why in return Estonians had to accept German dominance in Estonia. Estonians for their part regarded the matter as one in which they themselves had played a significant role in the expulsion of Soviet troops from the country since Estonian partisans had fought on the German side. On the basis of this, Estonians expected that they would be treated as equal allies and partners.

When analyzing the differences appearing among Estonians as to how German governance was seen in 1941, the most obvious divergence appears between the highly educated and the so-called public at large. Numerous reports on public opinion indicate that from the start, the educated class was the most critical towards Germany. Thoughts of restoring Estonian independence or at least of large-scale autonomy existed precisely

19 Weekly reports from the agents of the Political Police in the Narva region, October-December 1941, ERA R-59-1-84, l. 12, 22, 26-7, 72, 157, 176, 188-191, 202, 221, 225, 231, 266, 283, 286-287, 301.
21 Annual report of the head of Sipo and SD, July 1941 – June 1942, EJA, pp. 45-46. See also Nurmis 2011, pp. 30-31.
among the political and cultural elite. The same group was also more strongly in favor of an alliance with Finland and more generally sought to develop solutions by which Germany’s grip on Estonia would not become too binding.\textsuperscript{22} It is plausible that the right to national self-determination possessed the most importance to the elites of state and culture of the independent period. The idea of nationality itself was originally a movement of the educated that gained its strongest supporters from the educated classes, even during the interwar period. The educated classes were also more used to reflecting on social issues than the general public, and to seeking different solutions to them from a variety of theoretical perspectives.\textsuperscript{23}

The educated classes were also better qualified to identify propaganda and evaluate it more critically. This is why any propaganda efforts had poorer than average outcomes among the elite than among the general public. Germany’s strategic communication, for example that of the “united fate” of Germany and Estonia and of Germany’s future victory, was more successful among these recipients in the summer and early fall of 1941, when the successes of German forces on the Eastern Front were more influential and impressive. In this respect, it was estimated that the common people were almost unanimously in support of the aforementioned position.\textsuperscript{24} At that point, military setbacks and the abuses of the German governance had not yet significantly interfered with the efforts of German propagandists, but in these efforts it was easy to rely on the current strategic situation of the military.

The turning point towards a more clearly critical attitude towards the German governance can be considered the winter of 1941–1942. When the transition to a civilian administration did not bring any desired changes with it, disappointment began to take over from gratitude and a sincere desire to cooperate with the German occupation administration. By the fall of 1942,


\textsuperscript{23} Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 131-146.

\textsuperscript{24} Report of the public mood in the occupied areas of the USSR, 30 September 1941, document published in Krausnick and Wilhelm 1981, p. 375; weekly reports from the agents of the Political Police in the Narva region, October–December 1941, ERA R-59-1-84, l. 1, 20, 50-51, 115, 156, 217; annual report of the head of Sipo and SD, July 1941 – June 1942, EJA, pp. 21-27.
the Estonian view of the German governance had developed into a division with two sides. On one hand, the archival material shows that the basic attitude of Estonians remained positive. There was belief in a German victory in the world war and it was hoped for, particularly on the Eastern Front. A respectful and friendly attitude towards German soldiers remained steadfast. In addition, the Estonians remained respectful towards Germany and its highest administration.\footnote{Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), July 1942 – October 1942, EJA, 114–115, 119, 128, 135, 180, 193, 199, 206–207, 212–213.}

On the other hand, by the summer of 1942 the Estonian's had already witnessed how a portion of the German civil authorities seemed to be greedy, incompetent and disdainful towards Estonians.\footnote{Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), July 1942 – October 1942, EJA, 149, 157, 174, 184; Annual report of the head of Sipo and SD, July 1941 – June 1942, EJA, 21, 87.} It appears that in spite of this, roughly until the fall of 1942, Estonians still hoped that the situation would be corrected. A large number of Estonians believed or wanted to believe that the abuses of the German governance were temporary. It was perceived that as Germany's best had been recruited into the armed forces, in a sense, weaker individuals remained for the needs of the civil administration. The fact that trust was maintained in Germany and the highest governance reveals an attitude according to which the cause of the problems was not regarded as the German governance itself, as a structural or principle model of power. The problem was regarded more as a consequence of inferior individuals gaining access to administrative machinery, in which case the issue was about the exception, not the rule.

The fact that food and goods shortages continued raised growing discontent during 1942. This was related to growing dissatisfaction with production standards, in other words requirements that were set for all production plants from individual houses to factories and all of the persons working in them. These requirements were considered too much, especially when at the same time the basic material needs of the population could not be satisfactorily met. Defects were also seen in the allocation of scarce resources, in which complete fairness had not been guaranteed, according to the perception of the common people.\footnote{Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), July 1942 – October 1942, EJA, 95, 101–107, 110, 113, 117, 120–126, 147–158, 163–168, 175-176, 186, 201–205.}
The second transition point mentioned earlier in the article regarding Estonian attitudes towards the German governance is located a little later in the fall of 1942, more specifically, in October–November. The main explanatory factor was the reversal of Germany’s fortunes in the war. Until then, the mood of Estonians had remained good in spite of the sorrows of everyday life, wartime shortages and burdensome requirements, and the uncertainty of the future. As long as the war went well for Germany and its allies, there remained a belief among Estonians that after the temporary difficulties of wartime there would be a better time of peace. The relative prosperity of prewar times would be restored and Estonia would be given a place in “the new Europe”, a place in which the unusually large (for example, in comparison to Latvia and Lithuania) contribution of Estonia towards victory would be recognized.

Until now, Germany's victorious warfare and particularly the liberation of Estonia from Soviet occupation had, in the minds of Estonians, legitimized the German governance in a certain way. As a result, some of the perceived grievances in governance could be forgiven, or at least attempts could be made to understand them. This basic situation changed throughout the fall of 1942. Reports on the public mood provide a relatively uniform assertion that by December 1942 at the latest, Estonians had made a clear strategic re-evaluation. By the end of the year, the situation was such that the Estonians still hoped for a German victory over the Soviet Union, but the earlier certainty of a victory had changed to hope, accompanied by fear of a possible return to a Soviet regime. At the same time, the belief in a German victory in the world war had been seriously shaken: most were convinced that in the end, the Allies would win the war, in which case the status of Estonia would be difficult to predict. There was a belief that the Allies could not, and perhaps did not even wish to block the ambitions of the Soviet Union in the Baltic region, if Germany was not able to first completely defeat the Soviet Union.\(^{28}\)

Thus, the obvious change to all in the power relations of the world war quickly eroded the authority of the German governance. If Germany was not able to protect Estonia from Soviet terror, then what good was Germany to the Estonians? The previously observed abuses of power by the occupation administration, to which had been turned a partial blind eye, rose

into people's minds and became a topic of conversation with a whole new intensity.\textsuperscript{29} As early as the end of 1942, Estonians began to generally equate Germany’s governance with the Soviet Union; no significant differences were seen between them. These feelings deepened further during 1943.\textsuperscript{30} In spite of deep disappointment, the vast majority of Estonians still remained of the view that if they were to choose one of two evils, Germany or the Soviet Union, the scale would tip towards Germany. Although Estonia’s future under German subordination was seen as uncertain and overall, the German governance gave rise to continuing resentment, it was feared that a new Soviet occupation would lead to the destruction of the entire nation.\textsuperscript{31} Therefore, the decision to continue to fight alongside Germany was made, even though the relationship was no longer based on a feeling of alliance inspired by common goals.

On the basis of the reports it is apparent that during the summer of 1944, the interest of Estonians was focused first and foremost on the events of the war and on their direct consequences for Estonia. The German withdrawal on all fronts had caused deep disappointment and fear of the future. The main concern was the feared withdrawal of German troops from Estonia, and another comparable one was fear that the Soviet forces would reach the Gulf of Riga. As a consequence of this, Estonia would be encircled, and even possibilities for a small-scale evacuation of the population would disappear. It seems that in a small portion of the population, the situation brought about the will to go to battle, while the majority leaned in the direction of apathy or panic.\textsuperscript{32} In any case, in such circumstances, questions about the different forms that the German occupation administration’s governance took had become a minor side-issue. During the summer of 1944, the large majority of the population was indifferent to the theoretical problems relating to governance, which again can be considered psychologically credible. If one’s own as well as the existence of the whole

\textsuperscript{31} Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), February 1943 – December 1943, EJA, pp. 267-268, 277-279; report of the head of the Security Police (Estonian section), June 1944, EJA, p. 306.
\textsuperscript{32} Report of the head of the Security Police (Estonian section), June 1944, EJA, p. 306-309.
community is threatened, other issues are naturally pushed aside when all resources are concentrated in the struggle for survival.

As regards Estonian perceptions, the distinction between the Baltic Germans and Germans in general is a specific matter that can be shortly discussed. In reports on public opinion beginning especially from the fall of 1942 it was apparent that the Estonians feared that the Baltic Germans would come back to Estonia and take power into their hands again. The social leadership of Baltic Germans had been defeated immediately after Estonia became independent, and in the years 1939–1940 almost all Baltic Germans had emigrated to the Warthegau district in occupied Western Poland or other parts of Germany. Not very many returned to Estonia during the war in the service of the German occupation administration, but even individual cases attracted attention and worried Estonians. It is also apparent that the mode of operation of the German occupation administration brought to mind the governance and attitudes of the Baltic Germans for Estonians. Towards the end of the war the attitude that Germany’s Germans had been inept and arrogant like the Baltic Germans and had not taken into account the interests of Estonians became common among Estonians.33

This can be regarded as a remarkable failure of strategic communication from the German perspective, as in the situation of 1941 the Estonians clearly expected that officials coming from Germany would be different: they would relate to Estonians more as equals and in a more friendly way than the Baltic Germans had traditionally done. For reasons that were understandable, in German strategic communication, Germans of the Reich (Reichsdeutsche) could not be confronted with Baltic Germans, thus fishing for favor for the German occupation administration, which consisted almost entirely of Germans from the Reich. However, in practice, the apparent shortcomings of the German governance created sentiments that fought against the interests of Germany. The almost self-evident goal was to win the trust of Estonians and to present a positive image of Germany and Germans34 but the results were rather weak – the image of Germany and the German governance in Estonia was in 1944 more negative than it had been in the summer of 1941.

34 Annual report of the head of Sipo and SD, July 1941 – June 1942, EJA, pp. 29-30.
Governance executed by the Estonian Self-Administration

As mentioned above, the transition from a military to civilian administration occurred on 5 December 1941, and by March 1942 Germany organized a detailed division of labor between the German occupation administration and the Estonian Self-Administration (Eesti Omavalitsus). Ordinary people waited for the Self-Administration to become a real wielder of power, which would operate as a near equal in cooperation with Germany. In February 1942 (also in 1943), before Estonia’s Independence Day (February 24) there were even rumors of a return of Estonian independence or at least autonomy under a German protectorship, but here as in previous hopes, the Estonians were disappointed. Behind the scenes the Estonian Self-Administration only had the role of enforcing the regulations of the German occupation administration. However, Estonian larger public were not aware of these realities in the beginning.

Governance executed by the Estonian Self-Administration meant, in practice, that the Self-Administration seemed to have an independent role. As commonly experienced by ordinary Estonians it was exactly their “own” national administrative body that gave the orders and guidelines concerning everyday life. Consequently, Eesti Omavalitsus also bore the responsibility for successes and failures of governance in the eyes of Estonians. As Germany invaded the area the situation of all three Baltic countries was otherwise identical (the same Soviet occupation with the same defects), but reports on the public mood show that among Estonians, Germany and Germans were regarded in a more positive light after the invasion. The Estonians also more actively participated in various collection campaigns in support of the war effort, and in relation to the population, from the summer of 1941 onwards there were the largest numbers of Estonian volunteers serving in the German forces.

As such, even in reality, the portion of Estonians was greater than that of the Latvians and Lithuanians fighting on the German side. It may also

35 Nurmis 2011, pp. 18, 27; Paavle 2006, pp. 542-5.
for a significant part explain why the Estonians had a more positive attitude towards German power than the Latvians and Lithuanians. Namely, this phenomenon can be explained by the rules of social psychology, by which a joint effort to overcome common difficulties is the most powerful factor uniting people. It more than anything else is effective in removing prejudices between groups and increasing mutual sympathy.38

At least until the fall of 1942, Estonians had the notion that the Estonian Self-Administration had quite a lot of power and possibility to at least influence economic and other issues related to the maintenance of the population. According to the reports on the public mood, in the opinion of ordinary Estonians, Estonia’s Self-Administration had done its work poorly and indeed bore the main responsibility for the shortcomings observed in everyday life.39 The German occupation administration was seen to be partly responsible as it held the office of higher power, but this did not yet generally lead to the conclusion that there would have been fundamental flaws in the German governance and in the occupation administration.

In reports on the public mood throughout 1943, the same grievances as before remained apparent; only the degree of criticism increased. The German governance was now seen as bearing the main responsibility for the poor situation of Estonia. The role of the Estonian Self-Administration as a mere underling was already well publicized, which certainly did not reduce the disappointment felt by the people in it. The image of the Self-Administration as an apparent user of power was then just as poor as the image of the German occupation administration as the real user of power.40

As such, the perceived situation violated several principles of good governance based on successful strategic communication, above all those of credibility, conception of truthfulness and respect, comprehension of others, and real dialogue. For instance, multi-faceted exchange of ideas was clearly non-existing.

39 Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), July 1942 – October 1942, EJA, pp. 95, 105-109, 124, 149, 175-176, 190. See also Nurmis 2011, p. 27.
40 Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), February 1943 – December 1943, EJA, 266–288.
Governance executed by the leader of the administration: General Karl-Siegmund Litzmann

Estonians had a particularly good impression of Estonia’s Commissioner-General, SA-Obergruppenführer Karl-Siegmund Litzmann, who was regarded as being sympathetic towards Estonia and Estonians as a people.\(^{41}\) In the summer of 1942 Estonians thought that there were unspecified “centers” of the German administration, either at the level of Reichskommissariat Ostland or in Berlin, which did not sufficiently understand or care about the conditions in Estonia. It was believed that Litzmann or some other “rational” leaders would have handled Estonia’s affairs better if these ‘centers’ would not get involved in things.\(^ {42}\)

The reactions of Estonians described by the reports and the interpretations of the situation at the time are psychologically plausible. In crisis situations, people turn more than they normally would in their expectations to leaders who are visible, who are believed to be able to solve problems better than any faceless civil service would be able to. At the same time, mistrust is placed on the latter, and in people’s opinions, the responsibility for problems easily falls on the lower-level decision-makers and executive organization.\(^ {43}\) In the case of populations of the former Russian Empire, including the Estonians and Finns, this has often been referred to as the faith in the “good Tsar”.\(^ {44}\) Senior-level leaders, upon whom high expectations are placed, then have some time to show themselves worthy of these expectations. However, this time is not indefinite. In Estonia’s situation of 1942, the “good Tsar” was Generalkommissar Litzmann, and the faith of Estonians in him remained high even when the rest of the administration was already regarded as a failure. Criticism of Litzmann began to increase only near the end of 1943.

This was reflected, for example, in the fact that Estonians valued the habit of Litzmann and a few other higher German officials to go amongst the

\(^{41}\) Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), July 1942 – October 1942, EJA, pp. 114-115, 119, 128, 135, 180, 193, 199, 206-207, 212-213. See also Nurmis 2011, p. 33.

\(^{42}\) Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), July 1942 – October 1942, EJA, pp. 206-207, 221; annual report of the head of Sipo and SD, July 1941 – June 1942, EJA, p. 22.


people in different parts of Estonia. In such situations, they rubbed shoulders freely with ordinary people, listened to their opinions, and in a psychologically able manner, encouraged them further, whether their problems were related to working conditions, material well-being or broader societal issues. The fact that Litzmann generally did not promise anything that was impossible to fulfill also aroused respect, even if, in being denied, the matter was basically a disappointment. Relating things that would cause disappointment honestly was part of building trust in encounters. In the same way, Litzmann’s public appearances and speeches that were published in the Estonian press were evaluated positively among the people. Even in this respect, opinions did not begin to divide until late 1943.

It can also be surmised that in his task, Commissioner-General Litzmann was also Germany’s most effective strategic communication worker in Estonia. Hard-working footwork among the people, socializing with ordinary citizens across the country and declarations that took into account the national feelings of Estonians all created a picture in the minds of Estonians of what the German governance could be at its best. On different occasions Litzmann praised the Estonians, and considering the circumstances, showed a quite far-reaching understanding towards the aspirations of Estonians. Leadership by example is usually the best leadership, therefore Litzmann’s personal efforts cannot be underestimated in considering why the desire of Estonians to assist Germany in its war efforts remained higher throughout the entire war than, for example, that of the Latvians and Lithuanians. Litzmann also clearly did not gather sympathy only as an individual, but as Germany’s highest representative in Estonia, he created a positive image of Germany and of Germans as a whole.

Litzmann’s success as a “strategic communication worker” was also certainly influenced by the fact that his actions appear to have been based in his real opinions. In other words, he did not have to pretend to be sympathetic towards Estonians. If Litzmann’s expressed sympathy towards Estonia had only been mere tactic, it would have likely become known one way or another and weakened his credibility. In this context, it can be briefly noted that because of his views, Litzmann also ended up in difficulties with Hinrich Lohse, the Reichskommissar of Ostland, as well as Heinrich Himmler.

Reichsführer-SS, whose attitudes towards the Baltic nations were significantly cruder.\textsuperscript{46} The internal disputes of the German occupation administration as such are not the subject of this paper, but the situation is worth noting as it helps explain Litzmann’s success in his strategic communication. The rumors around Estonia of Litzmann ending up in difficulties because of his excessive sympathy towards Estonia appear to have increased his popularity among Estonians as well as the loyalty of Estonians towards Germany’s occupation administration operating in Estonia.\textsuperscript{47}

**Conclusions**

During the German occupation of Estonia (1941–1944) the German holders of power tried to overcome the opposition of the Estonians and make them loyal to German rule and willing to promote German war endeavors. To a great extent, the success or failure of this aim depended on how the German administration succeeded in fulfilling the local population’s expectations of good governance and meeting their current everyday needs.

The most important common denominator for all the criticism shown towards the German governance was the feeling of inequality experienced by Estonia’s residents. The Estonians hoped to be treated on an equal footing with the Germans, but in many ways, the Germans operating in Estonia were not only privileged through the exercise of power but also in material well-being, which aroused bitterness in Estonians. Secondly, the German administration was not able to guarantee the equal distribution of responsibilities and rights among Estonians, a grievance which in practice appeared as frequently as the before-mentioned fact in reports and also aroused widespread dissatisfaction.

The case again returns to the expectations that people universally impose on their leaders. The fair distribution of rights and responsibilities among subordinates is a key perspective, and the importance of the matter is emphasized in conditions in which there are few benefits to distribute and an abundance of responsibilities.\textsuperscript{48} A failure to do so undermined the right to a German exercise of power and governance in the eyes of Estonians.


\textsuperscript{47} Bi-monthly and monthly reports (from different regions of Estonia), July 1942 – December 1942, EJA, pp. 206-207, 234, 252-253.

other decisive factor was when, from the fall of 1942, Germany showed itself to be incapable of protecting Estonians from their greatest experienced threat – the Soviet Union and Soviet rule.

This analysis also confirms the conclusions of those researchers who have suggested that successful communication is inevitably based, consciously or unconsciously, on attention to strategic principles. Strategic communication is therefore not really a matter of new approaches, independent of the old, but rather of holistic and purpose-driven design. In addition, it may be considered that successful communication is based on universal structural principles that are essentially independent of time, place, and culture. Naturally, there may be considerable variance in the practical application of these principles according to operating environment, temporal context, and target audience.

At any case, good governance cannot exist without implementing deep leadership, i.e. building trust between the governmental bodies and common people, an inspirational way to motivate, intellectual stimulation and an individual approach to subordinates. Equally important from this viewpoint are the cornerstones of strategic communication: perception of truthfulness and respect, deep comprehension of others, exchange of ideas through dialogue, pervasiveness, integration and coordination of effort, commitment to a desired endstate, and in communication choosing the right audience, message, time, and place, also paying continuously sufficient attention to analysis, planning, execution, and assessment.

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50 Halloran 2007, pp. 4-14; Murphy 2010.
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The people’s expectations of good governance in German-occupied Estonia, 1941-1944


An overview of the Copenhagen School’s approach to security studies: Constructing (in)security through performative power

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Abstract:
Security has generally posed a challenge to those who have attempted to reach an ideal, comprehensive and encompassing definition of the concept. Orthodox perspectives have mainly focused on the state as a “harbinger” of security that defends its territory and citizens against external enemies through the acquisition of military grade weapons. Neorealist theorist, Stephen Walt defines security as “the study of threat, use, and control of military force” (1991, 212). Since security is a seemingly self-explanatory concept, it has also been rather underdeveloped to the point that International Relations theorist Barry Buzan argues that before the ‘80s, “conceptual literature on security” was rather neglected if not, a sorely absent field of inquiry (1983, 3-4). Buzan himself, along with Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, proposed a new research agenda for security as evidenced in the book: “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” (1997). These authors are regarded as the main representatives of what today we refer to as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The present article provides an analysis of the Copenhagen School’s “good practices” on security and securitization as speech acts (Mutimer 2016, 93) and intersubjective processes (de Graaf 2011, 11), in order to address the performative power behind the contemporaneous security architecture and the security practices of threat construction.
Rezumat:

Keywords: the Copenhagen School, critical security studies, securitization, performativity, threat assessment, asymmetric warfare

Introduction

With the outbreak of the reflectivist wave in International Relations (IR), traditional concepts – such as security and sovereignty, or war and peace – have been subjected to an interpretativist process which sought to critically reevaluate their standing in the discipline of IR as well as within the familii of IR’s subdisciplines. Analyzing the framework of security under the new methodological auspices of the “contested concepts” framework, led to the multiplication of security referents (from the state as a classical actor to the individual) and sectors. In turn, as Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung point out, due to this “conceptual widening”, the barriers between strategic studies and peace research started to break down: “To some extent, the two fields have merged to become security studies, which
covers a range from more traditional approaches (Walt 1991) to so-called ‘critical security studies’ (Krause and Williams 1997).”

In the midst of this theoretical cacophony during the first half of the 90s, the Copenhagen School brings its contribution to the security debate by providing a research framework that better encompasses the concepts of security and that of security threats. The name of this approach originates with its proponents – members of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (formerly the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research). At its core, the Copenhagen School considers that security is constructed as a result of human and not state agency.

This article reviews the overarching ethos of the Copenhagen School by addressing the School’s research framework on security and the theory of securitization. We follow this with a critique of the Copenhagen tenets proposed by fellow reflectivist / postpositivist researchers of Security Studies. Finally, we address the issue of threat construction by exemplifying what Matt McDonald refers to as the “performative role of security,” explored in the context of preemption, imminence and asymmetric threats.

**The Copenhagen School’s Theoretical Underpinnings**

In the field of Security Studies, security approaches such as those of the Copenhagen School as well as those of Critical Security Studies, were a by-product of the debate on security from the mid-80s onwards, between proponents of peace studies and those of strategic studies. The commonalities shared by the Copenhagen School with the Critical Security Studies, range from:

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“the stress on the political power and symbolism of the word ‘security’; the [...] implications of taking issues outside ‘ordinary politics’ and onto the security agenda’; the understanding of security as an intersubjective concept; a commitment to the desirability of trying to avoid the militarizing of issues by challenging the ‘mind-set of security’ that sees issues in zero-sum terms; the search to resolve security issues without violence”⁴.

In general terms, the Critical Security Studies approach aims to go one step further than the Copenhagen School, and to politicize security – that is to “bring the political back into security studies”⁵, as evidenced by the research published in the book Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (1997): “Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse” (Simon Dalby); “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies” (Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams; “The Subject of Security” (Robert B.J. Walker).

The Copenhagen School originated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute – founded in 1985⁶ – and the seminal work of this approach was Security: A New Framework for Analysis, co-authored by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (published in 1998). Other representative texts of the Copenhagen School are: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (Ole Wæver et al., 1993), or The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (Barry Buzan et al., 1990). While the School has undergone an evolutive process over the course of several decades, the research has maintained a level of continuity even when more recent analyses focused on a critical revision of the School’s

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⁵ The author paraphrases the title of a classical book on the poststructuralist theory in International Relations, authored by Jenny Edkins: Poststructuralism and International Relations. Bringing the Politics Back In (Boulder, CO.: Rienner Publisher, 1999).
⁷ Currently known as the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI).
research fundamentals. Meanwhile, the name itself originates with Bill McSweeney’s critical article of these works, published in 1996.

The Copenhagen School frames its theoretical enterprise in a juxtaposition of somewhat disjunctive research venues, interlocking – according to Ken Booth – neorealist, liberal and poststructuralist assumptions. Where neorealism is concerned, the School remains tributary to the traditional debate on security, in that as Michael C. Williams points out, the Copenhagen School rethinks security by reaffirming realist ideas regarding conflict, war, survival and zero-sum thinking. The poststructuralist influence is reflected in the preferred object of analysis, namely that of discourse and discursive structures. Moreover, the Copenhagen School shares a series of common views with social constructivism, since both emphasize “[t]he utility of the model of language as action or as a resource for action in the field of security.”

We can go so far as to say that the Copenhagen School proposes a radical view of social constructivism, subsumed to the notion that security belongs to actors, not to observers. In other words, threats are established in an intersubjective manner through the interplay of actors and audience, while the researcher sits on the outside, providing an input on the security dynamics. Consequently, one can identify whether a problem is non-politicized, politicized or securitized and furthermore one can trace the ways

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10 Booth, Theory of World Security, 161.
13 Here, we apply Holger Stritzel’s view of constructivism, representing approaches characterized by: “1) the social constructedness of reality, 2) the ideational embeddedness of agency and 3) the focus on constitutive research” (Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond”, European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (September 2007): 378).
in which a non-politicized issue warrants politicization and when the situation arises, goes so far as to require securitization - which involves the need for emergency measures (see Fig. 1)

Fig. 1: Securitization spectrum


Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams ascertain that the Copenhagen School represents the merger of two innovative research endeavors conducted by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. The former publishes in 1983, the book People, States and Fear, in which the author advances the concept of “sectors of security” through the prism of the system structure, while the latter develops the concept of “securitization”16. Buzan combines neorealism and constructivism, adopting the realist view on anarchy while at the same time, regarding the struggle for power as anachronic. What Buzan proposes is a ‘reconstructed’ neorealism, expanding on Kenneth Waltz’s three levels of analyzing state behavior (1. anarchy / self-help system, 2. functional differentiation of units and 3. the changing distribution of capabilities / issues of polarity) by adding two more: interaction capacity and process variables17. Wæver, on the other hand, adopts a more poststructural approach, regarding himself as a poststructuralist realist, by noting that: “[...] poststructuralists have emerged on the academic scene with
the political program of tearing down ‘givens’, of opening up, making possible, freeing”\(^{18}\). Lene Hansen argues that for Wæver, security is regarded as a speech act, framing the practice of security by connecting its discursive side to the political one:

“In this usage security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real, the utterance itself is an act. [...] By uttering “security”, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it”\(^{19}\).

Consequently, from this eclectic convergence of theoretical predispositions, three main themes emerge:

1. expanding security beyond the conventional understanding of the concept\(^ {20}\) (sectors of security);
2. the state-based process of identifying “security threats” tends to vary and be socially constructed (regional security complexes);
3. securitization – further investigated in the following section.

**Security and Securitization: Speech Acts, Intersubjective Negotiation and the Performative Effects of Speech**

In the IR sub-field of Security Studies, the theory of securitization refers to a diverse and comprehensive body of literature, representing in Jef Huymans’ view, “possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a widening security agenda for security studies”\(^ {21}\). This proliferation has led to the expansion of securitization theory beyond the first generation – represented by the Copenhagen School (Buzan, Wæver et al.) – and was reflected in the subsequent dissemination,


exploration and critical transformation of securitization (see the works of: Thierry Balzacq, Juha A. Vuori, Holger Stritzel, Rita Floyd (Taureck)). Furthermore, securitization has been applied and theorized from the perspective of: 1. idea / theory (the role of identity / identification); 2. bureaucratic routines; 3. ethics; 4. agency and discourse; 5. non-articulation / silence; 6. illocution versus perlocution; 7. audience; 8. securitizations in non-democratic environments; 9. images and visual language22, etc.

In the early stages of the Copenhagen School, researchers participated in the debate on security studies between the narrow and wide sense of security, and applied a broadened understanding of the concept of security. Unlike the traditional approach which is based in material considerations and utilized a positivist framework of research, by favoring explanatory models, the Copenhagen School added and operated with “non-military” security issues, alongside more traditional security issues, divided across five sectors: 1. military; 2. political; 3. economic; 4. societal; 5. environmental; based on their “specific types of interaction”:

1. “relationships of forceful coercion”;
2. “relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition;
3. “relationships of trade, production, and finance”;
4. “relationships of collective identity”;
5. “relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere”23.

Notable for this period, was the fact that both sides of the debate considered the security context to be pre-existent – a fact which would later be reconsidered by the very same researchers of the Copenhagen School24. For example, while in People, States and Fear, Buzan advances three levels of analysis (individual, state and international system), the focus remains exclusively on the state and national security, exposing his neorealist inclinations, as mentioned above. In this acceptation, security in its national character is dependent on the international environment of security.

Meanwhile, critics of the neorealist tradition of security, argue that the object of security should expand beyond the containment imposed by the superposition of the state as a referent subject. Instead, security should encompass social groups or individuals. By overcoming the “narrow-wide” analytical framework for understanding security, one no longer regards it purely as a pre-existing object waiting to be examined by external parties, instead when one refers to the concept by its name, one, in effect, assists at “the discursive formation of the object itself”.

As Munster explains, it is at this point that authors like Buzan – accustomed to a more neorealist view of security – transition “to study the processes through which specific issues become illocutionary constructed as security issues” – where illocutionary constitutes “an act in saying something”. Anne Hinz observes the “qualitative jump” in the Copenhagen School’s view on security. The transition from “security” as perception of an external referent object, to “security” as speech act, is seen in the conceptual revision – attributed in particular to Wæver’s influence – proposed in Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). Here, the adopted view departs from Buzan’s Identity, Migration and the New Agenda for Security (1993) – which covers the societal...
dimension of security, in the earlier context of the narrow (traditionalist, neorealistic) – broad debate on security. In order to showcase the hypothesis of security as a speech act and of security threats developed as discursive constructions, the Copenhagen School coins the concept of “securitization” (see Fig. 2). Wæver proposes that:

“there are no natural things out there that are security threats and others that aren’t. It’s more that we as communities, politically, choose sometimes to deal with things in a particular way. We named certain things “security problems” and when we do that something happens to that issue and to our interaction around it. [...] It is outside the normal bounds of political rules. [...] Securitization is a situation where a referent object depicts an existential threat and justifies to the relevant audience the use of extraordinary measures.”

In other words, “securitization” refers to, at the same time, a notion, an instrument for security analysis and a theory. For Wæver and Buzan, securitization constitutes a speech act: “through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.” In plain terms, securitization turns a noun into a verb, by moving from the struggle to find an ever elusive definition of security, to pursuing the means by which objects become securitized, so that they pose an “existential” threat. In this case, the threat can only be mitigated through a state of exception. The process of applying a security label on something, constitutes “a speech

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32 Andreas Behnke, NATO’s Security Discourse after the Cold War. Representing the West, (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 55.
An overview of the Copenhagen school’s approach to security studies

act”\(^{33}\). Furthermore, once something is labeled a “security” issue, this will have an effect on policy and policy-making\(^{34}\).

According to Nyman, the Copenhagen School advances the idea that: “security issues are not objective and external but ‘determined by actors’ and ‘intersubjective and socially constructed’”\(^{35}\). Consequently, security is imbued with a constructed meaning, as a result of intersubjective interaction, negotiation and contestation. In McDonald’s view, this framework regards security as “a site of competing visions about a group’s core values; threats to those values; and the means of protecting or advancing them”\(^{36}\).

Fig. 2: The Process of Securitization

As a notion, securitization introduces the concept of “security” as a consequence of performative power politics, underlining the ways in which objects are securitized. In other words, the ways in which they become issues of security after being subjected to “intersubjective socio-political processes”\(^{37}\). As a research tool, securitization enables one to follow the instances by which an object enters the domain of security threats and by extension, moves from “the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal

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33 Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, 55.
36 McDonald, Security, the Environment and Emancipation, 11,
(democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making”\textsuperscript{38}. In order to avoid a surplus of artificial security issues, three steps are required to conduct a securitization analysis:

1. “identification of existential rules;
2. emergency action;
3. effects of inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules”\textsuperscript{39}.

In terms of performativity, the Copenhagen School proposes a view of security that becomes performative through the act of securitization in the sense that an issue becomes securitized only when “a suitably powerful securitizing actor” identifies it and declares it a security threat\textsuperscript{40}. Since securitization theory is rooted in the speech act theory\textsuperscript{41}, the act of securitization is dependent on the capacity of the securitizing actor to establish what Williams characterizes as “socially effective claims about threats, by the form in which these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience”\textsuperscript{42}. Regarding the security speech act, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue that:

“[...] the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience”\textsuperscript{43}.

\textsuperscript{38} Rita Taureck (Floyd), “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies”, \textit{Journal of International Relations and Development} 9, no. 1 (March 2006): 54-5.

\textsuperscript{39} Taureck, “Securitization Theory”, 55.


\textsuperscript{41} According to Vuori: “The basic idea presented by John Langham Austin (1975) was that people indeed do things with language beyond asserting statements with truth-values in regard to an external reality; people can make bets, name ships, and adjourn meetings through the use of speech acts. Such acts have three types or aspects: locutionary (an act of saying something), illocutionary (an act \textit{in} saying something), and perlocutionary (an act \textit{by} saying something)” (Vuori, \textit{Critical Security}, 29).

\textsuperscript{42} Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies”, 514.

The Copenhagen School and Its Critics

Many criticisms directed at the Copenhagen School’s view on security and securitization, stem from the fact that a central idea of the School, is rooted in a neorealist mindset, which states that “the social production of security is sufficiently stable to be treated objectively”\(^{44}\). This view is disputed by Huysmans who argues that “speaking and writing about security is never innocent”\(^{45}\).

At a conceptual level, Matt McDonald argues that the securitization approach is narrow on three levels: form (focus on the dominant actors), context (focus on the moment of the securitizing intervention) and nature (focus on the designation of threats)\(^{46}\). Though generally the Copenhagen Schools tends to be grouped alongside other critical approaches to the study of security, due to its heterogeneous theoretical make-up – that meshes together a neorealist weltaschaung, with a social constructivist raison d’être, and tops it with a poststructuralist tension – the School has been criticized by proponents of the Critical Security Studies approach. In Ken Booth’s view – for example – “the Copenhagen School does not move far enough in the direction of ‘real people in real places’, that it mistakenly ties together security and survival, and that it is state-centric, elite-centric, discourse-dominated, conservative, politically passive, and neither progressive nor radical”\(^{47}\). Meanwhile, Lene Hansen in the article “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School”, reflects on the “silent security dilemma”, highlighting how entire segments of silenced voices (subaltern or marginalized) “are precluded from participating in the production of security”\(^{48}\). Hansen’s critique is aimed at two main issues: 1. “security as silence”; and 2. “subsuming security’ problems”:

\(^{44}\) Mutimer, “Critical Security Studies”, 94.


‘Security as silence’ occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being faced. ‘Subsuming security’ arises because gendered security problems often involve an intimate inter-linkage between the subject’s gendered identity and other aspects of the subject’s identity, for example national and religious”.

Another strand of criticism has been associated with the ethical aspects pertaining to the researcher’s very own responsibility when analyzing security. Rita Floyd identifies two main directions of the ethical critique: 1. one which explores the inherent lack of an emancipatory project or normative concept of the Copenhagen School; 2. and one that focuses on the School’s externalized role in the research of security: “the alleged disregard for the political consequences of the School ‘writing’ and ‘speaking’ security themselves” especially when it concerns societal security and its referent object, namely identity.

Securitization and Threat Construction: The Curious Case of the Khorasan Terror Group

On Tuesday, September 23, 2014, the United States launched a three-pronged attack on Syrian territory, against the positions of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and against the Khorasan Group. What interests us in the present analysis, is the case against the latter terror group and how it came to be securitized over the course of September 2014, prior and immediately after the American intervention.

As we have established earlier, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde consider securitization to be a where:

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50 Floyd, Security and the Environment, 44.
“a securitizing actor [...] uses a particular discourse, referred to as a ‘speech act’, to represent a particular issue to an audience as an existential threat to the security of a referent object”, such as the state or its citizens. The acceptance of this speech act by the audience allows the securitizing actor to break the bounds of normal politics and take exceptional action to counter the security threat”.

Prior to the publication of an article in the Associated Press (AP) on September 13, 2014, the only available information related to Khorasan, referenced either a historical region, covering most of the territory of Turkmenistan, Iran and Afghanistan, or a province in Iran. The news report titled: “AP Enterprise: al-Qaida’s Syrian Cell Alarms US” – warned that the group – “a cadre of veteran al-Qaida fighters from Afghanistan and Pakistan” – “poses a more direct and imminent threat to the United States, working with Yemeni bomb-makers to target U.S. aviation”.

Moreover, the group allegedly had ties and collaborated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – the al-Qaeda offshoot in Yemen, regarded as “the most dangerous terrorist threat to the U.S.”

The article further cites sources in the U.S. government who warn that the Khorasan fighters did not arrive in Syria with the purpose of fighting the government forces of President Bashar al-Assad, “[i]nstead they were sent by al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to recruit Europeans and Americans whose passports allow them to board a U.S.-bound airliner with less scrutiny for security officials”. The group is framed as posing an existential threat to U.S. and European targets. Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, declared on September 18, 2014, that “in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as

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55 Filimon, “Is it Possible to Prevent”, 36. See also: Dilanian and Sullivan, “AP Enterprise”.

56 Filimon, “Is it Possible to Prevent”, 36. See also: Dilanian and Sullivan, “AP Enterprise”.


the Islamic State”\textsuperscript{57}. In the days preceding the intervention, a series of articles crop in the press, warning of a more direct and bigger threat that ISIL:

- ***, “Al Qaeda’s quiet plan to outdo ISIS and hit U.S.”, CBS News, September, 18, 2014;

Table 1: The Securitization of the Khorasan Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech act</th>
<th>Public officials’ statements:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- U.S. President address/ letter to the Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- CENTCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pentagon</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Attorney Genera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- F.B.I.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>- “Homeland”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- “European countries”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Existential threat | - “execution stage of a plot” (A.G. Holder) |
|                    | - “nearing the final stages of an attack” (Lt. Gen. Mayville); |
|                    | - potentially an even bigger threat to the U.S. than ISIS |
|                    | - involving a bomb to pass undetected through airport security |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extraordinary measure</th>
<th>Military intervention:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- targets west of Aleppo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- training camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- explosives and munitions production facility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At a Pentagon press conference from September 23, 2014, the Press Secretary, Rear Adm. John Kirby, describes the military strikes against the Khorasan Group, as having disrupted the “imminent attack plotting against the United States and western targets”\textsuperscript{58}. Meanwhile, the Director of Operations, Lt. Gen. William Mayville cites intelligence reports that pointed towards the Khorasan Group as being “in the final stages of plans to execute major attacks against Western targets and potentially the U.S. homeland”\textsuperscript{59}. After the September 23 intervention, press articles refer to the group as having been in the final stages of planning an attack or as having posed an imminent threat\textsuperscript{60}:

- “Khorasan Planned Imminent Attacks Against U.S. or Europe: White House” (\textit{Reuters}, September 23, 2014);
- “Shadowy al Qaeda Cell, Hit by U.S. in Syria, Seen as ‘Imminent’ Threat” (\textit{Reuters}, September 23, 2014);
- “In Airstrikes, U.S. Targets Militant Cell Said to Plot an Attack Against the West” (\textit{The New York Times}, September 23, 2014);

In order to apply a securitization framework, we require the presence of four elements: 1. speech acts; 2. a referent objects; 3. an existential threat; and 4. the application of an extraordinary measure (see Table 1). In their


\textsuperscript{59} As quoted in: Filimon, “Is it Possible to Prevent”, 37.

\textsuperscript{60} The Pentagon spokesperson stated that: “We had very good information that this group, this dangerous group, an offshoot of al Qaeda, was in the final stages of planning an attack on Western targets” (Zachary Roth and Jane C. Timm, “Admin: Strikes on Khorasan Group Aimed to Avert Imminent Threat”, \textit{MSNBC}, September 23, 2014, accessed on October 21, 2016, http://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/us-arab-partners-airstrikes-syria-isis#54298.

application of speech act theory, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde distinguish between three actors involved in the securitization process: 1. referent objects; 2. securitizing actors; and 3. functional actors. In our case, the referent object (“things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”\textsuperscript{62}) is the U.S. homeland or other European countries. The securitizing actors (“who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened”\textsuperscript{63}) that engage in speech acts are represented by the U.S. officials (the U.S. President, Pentagon spokespersons, F.B.I. director, Attorney General, etc.). Meanwhile, the role of the functional actors in our case (in other words, “actors who affect the dynamics of a sector”\textsuperscript{64}) is played by the media – which by disseminating the information on the Khorasan Group – assists the securitizing actor, in gaining the approval on the part of the audience. As Vladimir Dolinec explains:

“they influence the dynamics of the security sectors like functional actors do, and they promote the speech acts of the securitization actors and sometimes shift them to a higher level”\textsuperscript{65}.

The existential threat is represented by the alleged threat of imminent attacks posed by members of a group that have adopted a media blackout, instead of promoting their messages through various propaganda channels, in the vein of ISIL or al-Qaeda. Finally the extraordinary measure consists in the military intervention conducted strictly by U.S. forces, on the backdrop of a bigger military intervention by coalition forces, against ISIL in Northern and Eastern Syria, on the same day (see Fig. 3).

\textsuperscript{64} The functional actors do not constitute “a referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, \textit{Security: A New Framework}, 36).
The measure can be considered extraordinary since it involves attacks on the territory of a country with which the U.S. is not officially at war. Moreover, the intervention is justified on the legal ground provided by the broadly and vaguely formulated Authorizations for Use of Military Force from 2001 (against al Qaeda forces) and from 2002 (against Iraq), thus bypassing both the U.S. Congress and the U.N. Security Council.

Furthermore, in the securitization process, the securitizing actor described the Khorasan Group as posing an imminent threat, thus putting it under the incidence of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (which states “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member”)\(^66\). Another notable aspect is that soon after the public is informed about the intervention and the alleged imminent threat posed by the group, the same officials who advanced the “imminent attack” as an existential threat, start to provide more nuanced observations, stating that:

- “It's hard to say whether that's tomorrow, three weeks from now or three months from now. But it's the kind of threat you have to operate under the assumption that it is tomorrow”. (F.B.I Director Jack Comey)\(^67\);

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“I don't know that we can pin that down to a day or month or week or six months. It doesn't matter. Far better to be 'left of a boom' than to the right of it” (Rear Adm. John Kirby).

The Khorasan case provides a blueprint for intervention against threats located in states with which the U.S. is not at war with, and which have not asked for military assistance (like in the case of Iraq faced with the territorial gains of ISIL on Iraqi soil from the June - August 2014), by relying on pre-existent national Authorizations for Use of Military Force. Consequently, in this operational framework, the President was not required to seek a Congressional authorization for war on a case by case basis – especially as it relates to countries with which the U.S. is not presently at war with (Somalia, Yemen, Syria). On the other hand, at the international level, the U.N. Security Council which supposedly has the authority to authorize the use of force, was ignored altogether.

**Conclusions**

By applying the Copenhagen School’s methodology, we can trace how in the act of securitization, the securitizing actor has transformed a potentially latent threat (as seen in the subsequent declarations) into an imminent threat, thus requiring an immediate reaction. This has been made possible by the contemporaneous codification of imminence especially in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks – an event that has created a context for the occurrence securitization *in perpetuum*. For example, in the case of the Obama Administration, a White Paper from the Department of Justice states that:

“The condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.”

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68 Here the Pentagon spokesperson uses “a military expression referring to a left-to-right timeline associated with efforts to stop roadside bombs before they explode” (Dilanian, “U.S. Offers More Nuanced Take”).

69 Dilanian, “U.S. Offers More Nuanced Take”.

In conclusion, the application of the Copenhagen’s School’s securitization theory to the Khorasan Group has shown who can securitize, what can be securitized and the way in which security threats are referred to. The Khorasan Group has undergone a process of securitization – which signifies the fact that the state was successful in designating them as posing an existential threat to the security of a state and the wellbeing of its citizens. Consequently, as a result of this intersubjunctive interplay, the state was now warranted to take extraordinary measures and even go so far as to naturalize and permanentize a state of exception.

This context allows for latent threats to become imminent since as Beatrice de Graaf observes, “securitization” as an intersubjective process, “does not concern an objective threat, but a subjective threat perception accepted by the majority of the population”71. Given the contemporary, extraordinary circumstances which require that “[w]e must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed”72, the framework of the Copenhagen School – in spite of its flaws – shows how a particular security issue that has undergone a prior stage of securitization, arrives to be regarded in the particular way advanced by the securitizing actor and in doing so, becomes a national security problem.

71 de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism, 11.
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Newspapers


**Web Postings**


NORDIC STATES CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND SECURITY

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Abstract:
Over the past years, the Nordic countries have gained a powerful voice on the stage of international affairs; in this context, this article will explore their contribution to peace and security in the sphere of the European Union.
In the past 20 years, the Nordic States (in this case I refer only to Sweden, Denmark and Finland) have gradually aligned to the collective EU foreign policy while at the same time investing in reinforcing their influence in international affairs. One of their core beliefs was that peace building involves a broad range of instruments (besides military) that encompasses crises prevention and civilian capabilities. In a world characterized by complex security issues that involve multiple aspects ranging from migration and poverty to climate change, development has started to go hand in hand with security.
The Nordic countries have proved several times that they have a powerful voice and can bring an added value on issues related to security and development. The paper will refer to their recent contributions and attempt to measure their influence and the consequences of their actions at international and EU level. Furthermore, the paper will also analyze contributions of the Nordic states to EU crisis management capabilities including the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations, emphasizing how these contributions align with their foreign policies as well as assess whether they had an impact.
Rezumat:
În ultimele decenii, statele nordice și-au consolidat prezența în sistemul internațional, articolul de față propunându-și să analizeze contribuția acestora la menținerea păcii și stabilității în contextul Uniunii Europene. În același interval de timp, statele nordice (în cazul acesta mă voi referi doar la Suedia, Danemarca și Finlanda) s-au aliniat politicii externe a Uniunii Europene, investind în același timp în creșterea influenței proprii în relațiile internaționale. Una dintre principalele viziuni a fost aceea conform căreia „peace building” implică o varietate de instrumente (pe lângă cele militare), exemple în acest sens fiind prevenirea crizelor și dezvoltarea capacităților civile. Într-o lume dominată de probleme de securitate complexe cum ar fi migrația, sărăcia și schimbările climatice, conceptul de dezvoltare este strâns legat de cel de securitate. Statele nordice au demonstrat de nenumărate ori că au o voce puternică pe scena internațională și pot aduce o valoare adăugată în domeniul securității și al dezvoltării. Acest articol va analiza contribuțiile recente, încercând să măsoare influența și consecințele acțiunilor lor la nivelul Uniunii Europene și la nivel internațional. De asemenea, lucrarea va analiza contribuțiile statelor nordice în cadrul capabilităților UE de gestionare a crizelor, subliniind modul în care aceste contribuții se aliniază cu politica lor externă și impactul avut la nivel international.

Keywords: international security, Nordic countries, regional cooperation, crisis management, foreign policy, comprehensive approach

Introduction

On the world stage of today, dominated by a multitude of challenges ranging from post conflict reconstruction, famine, development issues, unemployment, poverty, environmental disasters to civil wars and military clashes, states have tried to develop together new tools and instruments to address them. In this context, the Nordic countries stand out not only for showing a commitment to address the contemporaneous issues by pursuing active contributions but also for the fact that they employ a combination of tools known as the comprehensive approach. This paper aims to assess the role of the Nordic States, which are members of the European Union (i.e. Sweden, Finland, Denmark) and their contribution to maintaining peace and stability in order to prove that they have a powerful voice both on the level of discussion but also on the practical level of addressing the issues on the ground. The structure of the paper will be as follows: first section will deal with the case of Sweden highlighting its strategic view of international affairs and pointing out a few directions of
involvement, the second part will address the Finnish case which has many similarities with the Swedish one, both cases depicting the two Nordic countries as powerful voices on the international stage. It is important to mention that due to several factors, Finish and Swedish cases overlap in some instances (strategic interests and guidelines, reason for cooperation in the Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP area, etc.) and therefore some arguments are presented together without repeating them in each part of the article. The last part will present the case of Denmark that is particularly interesting and different because of the defence opt-out that basically prevents the Danish government from getting involved on the military side of operations under the EU flag. Conclusions will stress upon a few main differences between the case studies while outlining once again the assumption that the Nordic countries are strong contributors to peace and security worldwide.

**Sweden**

The main reason behind Sweden’s involvement in peace and crisis management operations is to promote peace and security and ultimately to support development in areas that require it urgently in order to avoid the so called “state failure”. Of course this stance based on values is also in line with the advancement of Sweden’s interests and foreign policy aims. Sweden’s development policy – that maps out the actions taken in military, civilian and other areas and which is viewed as part of one combined approach – represents the backbone of Swedish operations. In a security environment where threats transcend borders and regions, issues from other parts of the globe have the potential to also impact directly the Swedish state. Besides threats such as terrorism, weapons trafficking or civil wars, poverty and unemployment also have long lasting effects on the European and international security environments.¹

Membership of the EU and UN represent the two main pillars in the Swedish foreign policy. These are complemented by the enhanced cooperation with NATO on defence and security matters. The Swedish government views the EU as a platform to be influential in a greater area as

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well as to protect its interests. Through its commitment, contributions and solid views, Sweden has built a good reputation and promoted itself as an important player in the EU foreign policy. Its understanding is that crisis management and development go hand in hand and should aim to promote democratic principles, human rights, rule of law, and stability.2

The underlining principle on which all actions are based is the international law (including international humanitarian law), which must supersede everything in all peace keeping operations. Sweden furthermore manages to enhance its own capabilities and experience through its contributions to operations. According to the National Strategy for participation in peace missions, Sweden pledged and started to implement in accordance to the UN Resolution 1325, the decision to increase the number of women taking part in international peace support and peace keeping operations. In order for Sweden to take part in any operations and/or make use of force, there should be in place a mandate from the UNSC.

The current Swedish security policy characterized by a reduction of the defence budget and by eliminating the military conscription (which currently seems that it will be reinstated) has focused mainly on building capabilities for foreign missions. This was in line with the absence of conventional threats in Europe and has hindered the defence capabilities. This approach has put more emphasis on a closer cooperation with NATO, on a possible deepened cooperation with the other Nordic countries and on further efforts to develop capabilities at the EU level3.

The National Strategy reinforces the aim to develop the cooperation with NATO under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) which has heavily contributed to the development Swedish armed forces as well to the creation of the necessary capabilities for action in international operations. Being in line with NATO standards enables Sweden to participate in any operation no matter if it is under the UN, the EU or NATO jurisdiction.4

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It is increasingly agreed that in countries going through the post conflict phase, security sector reform (SSR) is essential in the stabilization and development process. In order to implement SSR there is the need for a combined approach. Swedish SSR approach will encompass all the security threats faced by states and people and will be implemented in cooperation with local actors and international organizations. The local ownership of the process will be essential and all the solutions will be tailored to the local requirements, being adapted to the country/region in question. This falls into the bigger category of the comprehensive approach. As for concrete contributions, Sweden is very active in logistics and IT infrastructure as well as in the business sector and strongly supports increasing the number of women in civil operations.

**New strategic outlook**

In the post-Cold War international environment, Swedish national interests are centered on two main directions. On one hand, peace and stability in its neighborhood is very important in ensuring security of the state, therefore the regions comprising the Baltic States, Eastern Europe and Arctic are of utmost importance. On the other hand, global economy based on free trade and free access to markets is strongly supported by Sweden, since it is part of this system on which it heavily relies on. One concrete example of this support is the Swedish engagement in EU/NATO counter piracy operations.

We can notice that Swedish main approach to the international system has changed over the past three decades. During the Cold War, Sweden asserted itself as neutral in the conflict, its aim being to distance itself from both parties. This position changed into nonalignment, for instance cooperating with NATO but with no intention to apply for joining the alliance and be part of the collective defence framework. What does nonalignment mean for Sweden? Basically, when Swedish interests converge with the NATO ones, the Swedish government opts to cooperate

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and stand with the Alliance, while when it does not, Sweden can withdraw. This is definitely a change from neutrality in which states would refrain from engaging with other actors in such a capacity.7

A main part of the new strategic outlook regards the openness to international cooperation on a broad range of issues, in particular the collaboration with the other Nordic countries that established itself in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) and has been mainly marked by the Stoltenberg Report (2009).8

Secondly, another instance of cooperation is the participation in the PfP that translated into active participation in the NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Libya and also in the NATO exercises as well as raising the Swedish capabilities to the NATO standards. Concrete examples: participation in the Kosovo Force (KFOR), Stabilization Force in BiH (SFOR), Operation Unified Protector and Resolute Support Mission.9

Sweden’s participation in the PfP as one of the first partners was designed to take the cooperation to another level and to stay close to NATO. Membership was not seen as a goal in itself, Sweden opting for a deepened partnership even nowadays.

Sweden involvement in NATO operations started with participation in the SFOR, also in KFOR and joined the International Security Assistance Force ISAF in 2002 – participation in ISAF is motivated by reinforcing the transatlantic bond, support to the UN mandate and less focus on the NATO role. Swedish involvement in ISAF has been beneficial from the point of view that it helped modernize equipment, skills for operations, interoperability with NATO Forces, strengthening cooperation with NATO, etc.10

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The Swedish strategic posture has been influenced by the historical neutrality position adopted in the 20th century. In spite of this, the powerful voice on the international stage, the assistance offered, the support for human rights and the democratic process have all shaped the Swedish approach and participation in the CSDP, participation that amounted to contributions to all CSDP missions up to 2012, outlining an active and comprehensive approach to the EU crisis management.\textsuperscript{11}

Thirdly, a particular aspect of the Swedish foreign approach consists in the assistance provided for development and humanitarian crisis. According to the Government of Sweden, in 2016 Sweden has been the 7th largest humanitarian donor in the world, with approximately € 500 mil. During 2017, the amount will be more than € 600 mil. It is important to note that in the past 12 years, the amount destined has almost doubled making Sweden an important international player in this area.\textsuperscript{12} Aid recipients are usually the most affected countries or regions such as Afghanistan, Syria, Sahel, Iraq, South Sudan, etc. Humanitarian aid reinforces the stance taken towards maintaining peace and security in the world. At a theoretical level, it is also worth noticing the funding offered by the government towards the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI in support of research in the field.

On the other hand, as some experts have pointed out, Sweden has a strong impact on the defence market by being an important producer of equipment and aircrafts. The advancement of the defence industry has created high level products which make Sweden the world’s 12th largest arms exporter.\textsuperscript{13} However, at some point this might come in direct contradiction with Sweden’s principles of exporting democracy and maintaining peace and security.

\textsuperscript{12} For more, please see: http://www.government.se/articles/2017/02/new-strategy-for-humanitarian-aid/.
Common Security and Defence Policy

Sweden joined the EU in 1995 but has been very active in the development of CSDP, both at political level and operational level by participating in the missions implemented. Sweden has long advocated and sustained developing the crisis management capabilities of the EU in the framework of the former European Security and Defence Policy ESDP.

At the level of the EU and development of CSDP, both Sweden and Finland strongly voiced their support for the crisis management area instead of the EU territorial defence due to: i) the earlier mentioned strategic approach of nonalignment which implies that Sweden will not be part of any collective defence agreement; ii) public opinion stance against a military buildup of the EU, and iii) the view according to the new international system (after the Cold War) is no longer dominated only by conventional threats and it needs a combination of instruments in order to approach the new threats – the so called comprehensive approach, which Sweden strongly supports.

Therefore, the main contributions to CSDP came in the area of crisis management operations: the idea of Civilian Response Team, promoting human rights, gender issues, committing troops to CSDP missions.

The rationale was also supported by the view that CSDP could make a change on the ground, portray Sweden in the eyes of the other member states/partners as a strong partner, ready to commit resources and thus exert influence. Specific reasons for contributing in some cases are as follows:

- CSDP missions in the Balkans = threats close to the EU;
- CSDP monitoring mission in Georgia = secure the neighborhood of the European Union;
- European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan – show solidarity for the partnership with the US/transatlantic bond;
- Operation Atalanta – free flow of goods, one of the two Swedish strategic priorities mentioned above;

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• European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali – military trainers and contribution to strengthening Malian forces in order to be able to keep peace in the country.

**Finland**

Non alignment has been a strong direction in both Sweden and Finland, but nevertheless the two Nordic actors sought to take part in international missions aimed at maintaining peace and stability under both the EU and NATO.

Due to their geostrategic location, Sweden and Finland, but especially Finland, need to take extra measures to ensure the security of the countries. In this sense, there is a trend implying that Sweden and Finland will reduce their contributions to international missions and grow their capabilities on home ground, including here a raise in military spending.¹⁶

Finland – unlike its neighbor and close ally Sweden - has had a different path in framing its strategic interests given the fact that peace was not always maintained as in the case of Sweden.

International and regional cooperation is integral to Finnish foreign policy approach. NORDEFCO¹⁷ is a very good example of framing cooperation at regional level, encompassing a broad range of areas such as developing strategies, capabilities, trainings and exercises. Its main downside is that it is not viewed as a possible mutual defence against an external threat both by Finland and Sweden. As Michel states, a good example of cooperation is the air force joint exercises between Norway, Sweden and Finland.¹⁸ Sweden – Finland cooperation includes the 2014 Action plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation which produced in 2015 a report that pointed out cooperation areas and possible implementation – reason for enhancing cooperation being non NATO members.¹⁹

As it is the case of Sweden, Finland is committed to NORDEFCO. Its main goal is to build cooperation between members with the scope of

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¹⁷ http://www.nordefco.org/
finding solutions to the security related problems the region faces; there are no over-reaching targets, the focus being rather on the current needs of the members. However, as the Finnish government also noticed, the resources at their disposal alone are not enough to offer solutions neither on short nor medium term.

Participation in peace operations has long been embedded in Finnish foreign policy so contributions to the UN, NATO and CSDP come as a natural consequence of this direction. The main reasons are: maintaining peace and stability worldwide, developing comprehensive defence capabilities, and enhancing its position and influence on the international stage.

In spite of not being a member of the Alliance, Finland has had a very active cooperation process with NATO that involved sending force to theaters of operation that has aligned the Finish army to the NATO norms, a highlight being the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that welcomes further reinforced cooperation with the Alliance.\(^{20}\)

Finland has had an important role in the cooperation with NATO, proving itself to be a significative partner:\(^{21}\)
- NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia – 1996 to 2003;
- NATO KFOR since 1999;
- ISAF in Afghanistan.

On the involvement in CSDP area, Finland follows the same principles as Sweden (mentioned above). The following graph showcases Finnish current contributions in crisis management operations. On CSDP, main contributions are to: maritime missions (EU Naval Force Operation (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta, EU NAVFOR MED Sophia), comprehensive approach - EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Nestor, EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, Atalanta -, EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUPOL Afghanistan, EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo, etc.

Finland is also contributing by investing in centers that deliver trainings both at theoretical and practical levels to both to civilian and military personnel and that produce solid analysis of international affairs that contribute to the discussion on world issues and finding solutions. Examples in this sense are the Crisis Management Center (CMC), the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and the National Defence University.

**Denmark**

The Danish Foreign policy has been framed after 1945 on four pillars – Nordic, UN, European and Atlantic; starting after the end of the
Cold War, the Atlantic pillar has started to gain momentum over the others becoming the most important direction, due to the United States becoming the sole superpower in the international system and the best vehicle to promote interests, which aligned in most part with the US ones.²²

Alliances and international cooperation represent the two core features of Danish foreign policy. By becoming part of alliances and by cooperating with different actors, Denmark has managed to project power and influence in international affairs, at the same time portraying itself as a contributor to peace and stability in the world. Also, Denmark has rallied under the UN leadership and decisions to use military force.

Alliances and international cooperation translated for instance in the Danish involvement in the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the intervention in Libya where Denmark not only managed to strengthen the relation with its allies and deepened cooperation but also enabled military forces to gain experience and become integrated in the coalition. As concrete example, the Danish air force relied upon the US air refueling capacities to conduct missions during the intervention in Libya.²³

By always playing a forefront role in international issues, Denmark is now considered to be a producer/exporter of security (and not a consumer as is the case of other states which benefit from advantages of being part of an alliance but do not contribute significantly). Committing troops under the UN and NATO flag in the Balkans, aircrafts and troops in Afghanistan, and Iraq under the US leadership and in support of NATO are just a few examples that reinforce the previously mentioned idea.²⁴

When linking security to development, the development assistance offered by countries is of outmost importance. Denmark is one of the few countries which spend more than 0.7% from their Gross National Income (GNI) on this issue alone. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the

amount reached was $ 2.68 billion and it was focused on stabilization and protection, promotion of democracy and human rights, social progress and green development\(^{25}\). The commitment is also illustrated by keeping its development contribution over the 0.7% landmark for over 30 years. The development assistance is based on core values for Danish foreign policy and society such as human rights, gender equality, democracy, rule of law, freedom, sustainable development and commitment to make a positive change where it intervenes through aid and other civilian instruments. In addition, coordination with other donors is essential in choosing and concentrating on key actors/partners.

The know-how in areas mentioned above represents the added value brought by the Danish approach as well as the experience coming from the processes in its own society which rest upon the aforementioned values. The development area is closely connected with the humanitarian one where the main objectives are protection of people from areas affected by armed conflict, climate change, and environmental hazards.

**Danish Security and Diplomacy Strategy**

Denmark rests upon NATO for the security of the European Continent as well as for involvement in crisis management and operations for maintaining peace and stability. NATO is the main instrument through which Denmark is involved militarily in international missions. Another strong point of the development approach will be, according to the Danish Diplomacy and Security Strategy, the focus on green development and sustainable urbanization thus enabling the combination between economic diplomacy and development.\(^{26}\) The strategy also mentions three areas of focus for Danish action in regard to development: “sustainable growth through partnerships, strengthened efforts in fragile states and prevention of refugee and migration flows”.

The comprehensive approach is becoming more and more relevant in today’s context and encompasses a multitude of instruments such as stabilization of affected areas, humanitarian and development aid,

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cooperation between actors on the ground, commitment to sustainable development.

Regarding the issue of threats to the Danish state, on the military side there is a slim chance of a possible conventional attack being directed. However, once distant threats, some issues have become more and more concerning over the past years such as migration, terrorism, Russia’s provocative stance, etc. New threats have also emerged such as cyber-attacks, as well as threats from the other sectors of security such as environmental (climate change), political (possible weakening of the transatlantic bond), social, economic, etc.

**Consequences of opt-outs**

Denmark has been skeptical about the defence and security cooperation in the EU even before it was formally established through the Maastricht treaty. The rationale behind this was the fear that if the EU develops common military capabilities (that was a possibility at the time) that will come in contradiction with the role of NATO as a security guarantee therefore hurting the transatlantic bond. This attitude culminated with the Danish opt-outs from the treaty. Over time, the project for an EU army failed to come to fruition, while the defence and security cooperation was enhanced combining a large variety of instruments and being a possible good fit for Danish foreign policy. Unfortunately, the opt-outs limit Danish participation and its influence at European and global level.

Another consequence of the opt-outs is that Denmark focused on NATO (the UN and the US as well) on military issues, constructing a policy echoed by considerable contributions to peace and security worldwide. If Denmark was present at all level in CSDP, it would probably have the chance to make an even more lasting contribution and fulfill its interests better. In spite of this, the Danish government is able to take part in the civilian aspects of CSDP, more specifically in the EU civilian missions and has active contributions to most of them up to date.\(^{27}\) To illustrate better, a few examples of the defence opt-out are the following: EUTM Somalia, Christine Nissen, *European defence cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty* (Copenhagen : Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015), 27-28, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191724/diis_report_06_european_defence_cooperation_after_the_lisbon_treaty_web.pdf, accessed at 20.01.2017.
Athena mechanism, European Defence Agency (EDA), EUTM Mali and EU Force (EUFOR) RCA.

The Report from the Danish Institute for International Studies argues that after the Lisbon Treaty, on the medium to long term, the Danish opt-outs will have negative impact mainly in three areas: EU’s comprehensive approach, developing defence capabilities and further development of the EDA.28

The comprehensive approach comprises of a combination of instruments from both the civil and military areas that together aim at making a long lasting impact on the ground. The advancements in this strategy might push Denmark away from the development of CSDP, having a say in less and less aspects. This is somehow contradictory with Danish foreign policy goals that put emphasis on a comprehensive approach strategy and promote this exact approach in the sphere of the EU, and CSDP in particular. A straightforward example is mentioned in the Report: the strategy for countering piracy in the Horn of Africa where multiple tools are embodied in the comprehensive approach (EU NAVFOR Atalanta, EUCAP Nestor and EUTM Somalia) and where Denmark participates only in EUCAP, the civilian mission and not in the counter-piracy operations per se. This is in total discrepancy with the Danish state strategic interest of countering piracy which should be fast-tracked Denmark in any international mission of such kind. This can be confusing at international level, between other EU member states and can have negative impacts such as loss of Danish credibility for not being able to sustain its own strategy.

The EDA has become a main forum in the EU for designing and developing military equipment and capabilities and it is on an ascending trend, gaining more importance and at the same time having more negative impact on Denmark as it cannot take part in its work or enjoy the benefits of these projects.

Furthermore not being part of EDA also impacts Danish participation in the European Defence industry which again is in contradiction with Danish strategic interests. Therefore, the examples illustrate the negative impact of the defence opt-out and its far reaching consequences that seem to deepen over the years.

Following the logic of the defence opt-out one can argue why all the other EU member states that also belonged to NATO were fully involved in the development of CSDP. We have seen before how the opt-out prevents following some basic strategic interests that lead to a reduction of Danish capacities to influence at international level and a reduced capability of making a difference with its own comprehensive approach.

Conclusions

This article intended to give a glimpse on the issue of the Nordic countries which are also EU members and on their international contributions to maintaining peace and stability. The case studies presented highlighted and strengthened the idea that Sweden, Finland and Denmark are strong contributors in the international arena, having solid reputations, and being involved in crisis management, development and post-conflict reconstruction. This is embedded in their strategic thinking and without a doubt in a way that increases visibility and influence in the EU, NATO, and the UN.

There are multiple similar aspects in all of the cases – assistance for development and humanitarian aid, strong contributions to NATO (even as partners as in the case of Sweden and Finland), active participation in EU civilian missions.

The study has also highlighted the main differences between the Danish case and the others. Given its defence opt-out, Denmark cannot participate in EU operations that involve a military component, its commitment on this side going mainly to NATO. This aspect has nevertheless reduced the Danish capabilities to influence and be fully involved in EU CSDP as well as in aspects related to European defence. In a complex international environment, where intervention requires a combination of instruments from both civilian and military sectors (the so called comprehensive approach), it would have been essential for Denmark to be able to fully participate (taking part in civilian operation is certainly a plus as pointed out, however does not count much when the comprehensive approach is applied) and furthermore to be fully able to pursue its strategic objectives.

All in all, the Nordic countries will continue to be a pillar and have a powerful voice on the international stage in all aspects related to development, conflicts and humanitarian aspects.
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DEMOCRATIC ORDER AND ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS: THE WEAKNESSES OF THE FINNISH AND TURKISH DEMOCRACIES

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Abstract:
This paper raises important questions about the nature of governance in Finland with a view to the difficulties of the Sámi minority, and in the same time in this study we present our comparative approach to investigate how Finland and Turkey are able to solve internal ethnic conflicts related to their national minorities. The article provides a comparative analysis of the democratic order in a consolidated democracy (Finland) and in a weak democracy (Turkey). The democratic experience of these countries is of reasonable importance, as a considerable number of countries worldwide are at various stages during the democratic experiment. This study outlines the role of democratic order in conflict prevention in these two states.

Rezumat:
Această lucrare ridică întrebări importante cu privire la natura guvernării din Finlanda raportată la problemele cu care se confruntă minoritatea Sámi. În același timp, acest studiu prezintă o analiză comparativă cu scopul de a investiga modul în care Finlanda și Turcia sunt în măsură să rezolve conflictele etnice interne legate de minoritățile naționale. Articolul descrie procesele prin care Finlanda și Turcia, la fel ca mai multe state din Europa de Est, iau măsuri în vederea consolidării unei ordini democrațice care să funcționeze adecvat. În contextul în care într-un număr considerabil de țări din întreaga lume se desfășoară un experiment democratic, experiența democratică a acestor țări prezintă o complexitate apreciabilă. Acest
The paper argues that although Finland and Turkey are countries with an extensive and effective civil society, functioning democratic institutions and free press, the failure is that these democratic institutions have not been fully extended to the Sámi population and have not yet been spread to the Kurds. We show that not fully developed democratic governance may not be adequate to manage intricate aspects of internal security problems.

This paper shows that both the Finnish and the Turkish democracies have their own weaknesses which derive from the fact that the current minority populations (Sámi and Kurdish) have not trusted this democracy. Accordingly, democracy seems to be a difficult matter for these minorities, though it represents the basis of a Western-style society. Democracy is an important concern for the Kurds and Sámi, but in both countries included in the study actions are needed so that the values of these two populations are appreciated. Moreover, justice should be sought through the democratic process.

The Sámediggi and the transition to democracy

Jouni Kitti, a former Sámi politician notes that issues related to democracy can be addressed to the Sámediggi (Sámi Parliament), where some of the members’ hostile attitudes towards the world around are derived from their predecessors’ language use and way of doing politics. Members of the Sámediggi often act inefficiently with regard to the ideals of democracy and freedom and do not seem to try to build a common understanding on the basis of generally accepted objectives. Although the founding of the Sámediggi had been considered a success, the direct transition to democracy seemed only a dream as long as the new institutions did not prove to be effective. Sámi politicians became the

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Democratic order and ethnic minority rights: the weaknesses of the Finnish and Turkish democracies

misrepresentations of democracy by losing the understanding of the balance among various groups of populations. Sámi politicians had ambitious and long-term objectives but divergent for the Sámi population. Building democracy on non-existent funds proved to be ineffective. Practice soon showed that the land ownership issues of the Northern Sámi people were considered a priority while for other groups of Sámi they were inessential. As long as the objectives of the Sámediggi are not achieved, the confidence of the rest of the population will not be restored.

The current form of democracy in Finland has only taken into consideration the interests of the majority population, not considering also the will of the Sámi. The proper approach should take into account their realities as well. Practice shows that the issues related to the Sámi are not prioritized among the Sámi politicians. The Sámi politician Kitti J. stresses that the Sámi people should find the ground themselves for prioritization or otherwise this will be done according to the Sámi politicians’ principles. On the other hand, Sámi politicians are expected to show more engagement in matters related to the Sámi.

Sirpa Pietikäinen, a member of the European Parliament, argues that the European Union does not give enough thought to the Sámi issues and that their affairs should be monitored. Finland had received admonitions related to the Sámi human rights issues several times but according to the researcher Leena Heinämäki, Finland did not make any progress. Although the Constitution of Finland respects the international law and efforts are made at times, the problem is that many politicians think the current achievements are enough and that there are also certain difficulties in interpreting the legislation. Sámi politicians consider that they do not have the adequate conditions for work and that the Sámi are overlooked when it comes to jurisdiction, therefore the agenda is full of matters to be negotiated and handled.

The authorities have the obligation to promote services in the Sámi language but there are several language problems especially in the health services. Doctors in Sápmi encounter language problems almost on a daily basis as the speakers of the Sámi language are not enough at the moment. In Finland, for example, mental health services should be better assisted,
while in the other Scandinavian countries other services lack attention. Problems caused by language issues also exist at the town halls in Sápmi where it is difficult to find qualified employees. The state would be expected to offer enough separate funding to these institutions, otherwise the health care and social care reforms may not clarify the situation.

Concerning language learning among young people who want to learn the Sámi language, the state should create the best possible conditions. Researching the Sámi communities’ past and the acknowledgement of their history are also important steps.

Some Sámi intellectuals think that the Finnish government has a dismissive attitude towards the Sámi people and their rights. Young people in these communities also feel discouraged and resentful. It seems that the existing means of democracy have not helped the Sámi expand their rights. Moreover, Finland has raised the question whether the Sámi are indigenous people or a nation at all. The Sámi artists and intellectuals present their attitudes of criticism towards Finland’s Sámi policy. They even accuse the state of colonialism. They emphasize that the Sámi population should be able to pursue their goals, practice their basic rights and follow their traditional way of life without the Finnish state interfering with laws and regulations. Lehtola (1997) is of the opinion that the young Sámi generation’s feedback is reasonable considering the developments of the last decade and the change of mentality in the country. The Sámi people experience disdain and social stigma from the majority culture, just as immigrants face racism.

Poelzer and Wilson (2014) highlight that although the authority from the national government in Finland has been transferred to the local government, the latter struggles with restricted administrative potentiality and constant social challenges, and additionally the local government does not share common objectives and concerns with the national government. The regional government in Sápmi exercises a more restricted autonomy

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because its policy proposals are not legally binding. Strengthening balance, promoting dialogue and actual cooperation should be aimed at in the relation of these two institutions and among municipalities.

Josefsen (2010) also underlines that in practice the Finnish authorities do not consult with the Sámediggi regarding the conclusions that may influence the Sámi population’s position.6 Political action is not ensured at all because of the fact that most of the politicians and the central government have restricted knowledge about the legal framework that regulates the rights of these indigenous people.

**Unstable democracy declining in Turkey**

With a view to the nation building and governance, it seems that the ‘one country, one nation, one language’ motto continues to affect Turkey in present times. At the time of the attempted coup on the 15th of July 2016 a discussion evolved in Turkey about concepts of democratic rights, pacifist methods of governance, civil society and dialogue.

As Asgharzadeh (2007) emphasizes, only the Kurds’ right to self-expression, self-governance and self-rule would assure the possibility of fairly and clearly interpreting the notion of democracy.7 The exertion of the Kurds’ voice and language is a prerequisite in confronting dictatorship. The Kurdish language would allow its speakers to reveal and depict their own past and actuality. The Kurdish people cannot achieve worthwhile advancement and prosperity assuming that their language, culture, traditions and values are not in a harmonic connection with their surroundings.

The Turkish government promotes its own program in the middle of the disturbance instead of trying to diminish ethnic and social demarcation. In fact it sustains more separation and animosity by not getting through to the representatives of the Kurdish minority of the country. Rather than aiding them to renew from the traumas of the past year, the government allows ethnic hostility to rise. While Turkey is struggling against the possible hazards to the country, its unstable democracy, the social and human rights are constantly declining.

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The Kurdish people will endure more because the government does not seem to understand that not the Kurdish nation is the great threat to the country but the growing separation and alienation among the various social groups. The Turkish government should admit that a united nation is more able to confront diverse threats than a divided country and should act correspondingly.

In conclusion, for the sake of truth it should be noted that almost 100 years have passed since the introduction of Atatürk’s reforms, but a significant part of the Turkish society is still untouched by the spirit of these reforms, and among the population still prevails the intolerant perception of Islam which was almost unknown in the Ottoman Empire.

After the failed coup attempt on the 15th of July 2016 the President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, repeatedly confirmed that Turkey was working on preserving the democratic order, protecting human rights and the unity of the state. Albeit the Kurdish problem has been discussed in Europe, the Turkish Prime Minister denied any possibility of finding a solution saying that there was no solution regarding the Kurdish problem. The journalists supporting the Kurdish policy have been arrested.

Turkey needs encouragement and pressure has to be applied on the government to adopt reforms that lead the country towards a more democratic direction but the inner will is absent. The attempted coup could have been a chance for a new beginning, but it seems the Kurdish population of Turkey cannot witness any positive changes. The Kurdish people’s hope for a real democracy disappeared and they soon experienced the harsh reality that the government had done nothing to make progress towards a true democracy. In fact, Turkey is moving towards a fascist dictatorship, a presidential dictatorship that is characterized by extreme authoritarianism and political views that prioritize national values.

Turkey needs the immediate restoration of stability and peace, but this process should take place within the boundaries of rule of law and democratic norms. At the present moment, it seems to be impossible to have a proper democracy in that country. Therefore, after the coup attempt the perception and the public image about Turkey have significantly

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changed in Europe. Moreover, the operations against the Kurdish press suggest that the fight against terrorism is not presently effective.

As Hassanpour (1992) argues, changes in the Kurdish society cannot occur if the political rule is not democratized in Turkey and the state power is not decentralized, which would mean an important linguistic impact as well. In the case of Kurds, the political unification does not seem possible at the moment, so they are not given the chance for a linguistic unification either and they are likely to experience further limitations in exercising their language and dissemination rights. Definitely, parallel democratization processes in the surrounding countries seem very improbable, as currently Turkey is conducting a war in Syria and prevents the Syrian Kurdish ambitions from creating an independent state along the Turkish borders. According to the current situation the USA and Russia oppose the Kurdish autonomy in Syria as they want Syria to remain united. Although Russia has emphasized that the Kurds should be fully involved in the political process, in Syria the situation has turned again out to be greatly to the Kurds’ detriment. Turkey’s cross-border interference to clear the border area has changed the world’s assessment about the region. According to the Turkish President no procedure can be implemented in Syria without Turkey’s approval, as the country protects its borders.

As Gunter (2008) also emphasized, the Turkish President, Erdoğan, admitted that the state had made many errors in the past and the clarification of the Kurdish problem needed a more democratic policy. Regrettably, these former authoritative governmental affirmations have recently been denied by Erdoğan.

At the present moment, Turkey does not serve as an example of democratic reform in the Middle East and conflict resolution activities are not the priority of the state. Earlier endeavors of building democracy and activities of building rule of law proved to be failures. Blanchard et al. (2008) point out that because of the current level of disturbance in Turkey

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there is no hope for political reconciliation or reinforcing stability. Democracy promotion and work seem unlikely in the prevailing turbulent situation.

**Conclusions**

The governments of the states included in this research should focus on the principles of democracy, justice, equality, respect for human rights and non-discrimination if they want to meet the most important preconditions of a democratic society. Finland and Turkey should admit that respect of the right to self-determination of the Sámi and Kurdish people is not an impediment but a progress in the democratic governance of the respective states (Åhrén 2016). Without a governance reform in Turkey which helps to protect the minorities’ human rights, the state cannot bridge the gap between human rights principles and their exertion. Governance in Finland and Turkey would assume more liable and transparent political processes according to the Sámi and Kurdish minority representatives. The Sámi Parliament and the Finnish government are expected to rely on more dialogue in making decisions about their indigenous people, so that the Sámediggi would be considered more effective in protecting the Sámi language and culture along with education and health policies.

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THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET/ RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE END OF THE OCCUPATION (ESSAY OF THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS) \(^1\)

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**Abstract:**
This speech discusses the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Republic of Lithuania mostly based on some personal recollections and the integration of research conclusions reached so far in the scholarly literature. The paper outlines the international environment which made the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania possible, the goals of the Lithuanian side and the peaceful means to achieve them as well as the responsibility of foreign occupations resting upon the shoulders of Russian state then and now, as the legal heir of the Soviet Union. This speech is to be perceived as an exercise of historical memory.

Rezumat:
Acest discurs discută retragerea trupelor rusești din Republica Lituania în mare parte pe baza unor amintiri personale și prin integrarea concluziilor cercetărilor realizate până în prezent în literatura de specialitate. Lucrarea descrie mediul internațional care a făcut posibilă retragerea trupelor rusești din Lituania, obiectivele lituaniene și mijloacele pașnice utilizate pentru a le atinge, precum și responsabilitatea ocupației străine care cade în sarcina statului rus, atunci și acum, ca moștenitor legal al Uniunii Sovietice. Acest discurs trebuie percepțat ca un exercițiu de memorie istorică.

Keywords: Lithuania; foreign occupation; Russian troops; Soviet Union; Neostalinism, historical memory

Ladies, Gentlemen - Preparing myself for this Conference, I understood that it was necessary to offer the basic facts about what happened to Lithuania, why it had “to be born twice” in the bloody 20th century.

Historical data reminds us of the current legal and political status of Lithuania. First of all, this year we celebrated the 25th anniversary of the restoration of Lithuania’s independence. On March 11th, 1990 the Supreme Council (Parliament) of Lithuania declared the reestablishment of the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania. Lithuania embarked itself, on the road of peaceful parliamentary struggle, on a negotiated solution. Without real withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of independent and sovereign Lithuania the newly reborn State would have never been free. The restored state of Lithuania at that time needed to pursue three urgent priorities: the removal of Soviet/Russian troops, the joining to NATO, and membership of the EU.

Secondly, nowadays Russia’s policy and Russian politicians express doubts whether Russia should take upon itself the “sins from the past”. I think that allows me make a few observations concerning this issue.

What is more interesting, Russia, as the legal entity continuing the rights and obligations of the former USSR, tries to ignore the position expressed on December 24th, 1989 by the Congress of the People’s Deputies of the USSR, following its decision on the political and legal evaluation of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact. Thereafter, the USSR recognized that the secret Soviet-German protocols (the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact) and their accompanying acts had violated the sovereignty and independence of some third countries. The USSR itself therefore declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact null and void from the very date of its signing. The Federal Republic of Germany declared the same on the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II.

Consequently, the leadership of the USSR, until the end of the existence of the USSR, resisted officially recognizing the re-established independence of Lithuania and avoided beginning genuine negotiations with it on the issue of the withdrawal of occupation troops.

Next day, on March 12th, 1990, the Parliament adopted a decree invalidating the military conscription law of the USSR for the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania. Appeal to the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Gorbachev, on March 13th, 1990, the Parliament appraised as illegal the stationing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil, and proposed negotiations regarding their withdrawal. By the decree of March 14th, 1990, the Parliament ceased the operation of the USSR military commissariat offices.

On August 7th, 1990, the Parliament approved the goals and provisions for negotiations with the USSR.

Among them a goal was set to reach "an agreement on the terms and stages of the withdrawal of the USSR Armed Forces from the Republic of Lithuania". It was followed by same rounds of “talking” between officials, but on the USSR’s side there was no real desire for negotiations.

In parallel, the state level negotiations continued with the Russian Federation, considering that on June 12th, 1990, there was a Declaration on the sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

On August 24th, 1990, in Vilnius a consultation between State delegations of the Republic of Lithuania and of the Russian Federation was held. The Head of the Lithuanian delegation was Ceslovas Stankevicius. This difficult process of bilateral consultations and meetings was successfully concluded after 10 mouths.

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On July 29th, 1991, an official meeting of the state delegations of both countries under the leadership of the heads of the Republic of Lithuania and of the Russian Federation, Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin, took place in Moscow for the signing of the Treaty. In Lithuania, the Treaty was ratified on August 19, 1991, before the day when the anti-democratic forces of the USSR attempted a coup d'état in Moscow.

On December 24th, 1991, the USSR formally ceased existing, and the Russian Federation declared itself the successor and assumed all rights, responsibilities and duties of the former Soviet Union.

Russian officials who declare that the occupation and annexation of Lithuania was legitimate are determined to forget that Russia supported an opposite position in the preamble of its July 29th, 1991 Treaty. In this document Russia declared that the USSR had to eliminate the consequences of the 1940 annexation which violated Lithuania’s sovereignty. Thus, the opposite statements may be viewed as attempts to violate the fundamentals of the friendly relations between Russia and Lithuania.

On January 17th, 1992 a Lithuanian-Russian Summit took place in Moscow. In a bilateral communiqué signed by Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin, the former USSR troops present on the territory of Lithuania were officially defined as "withdrawing forces under the jurisdiction of Russian Federation". It was agreed that these troops would be completely withdrawn and that this would be done in accordance with a special agreement. It was also agreed that, pending the completion of the withdrawal, these troops would not undertake any actions which might violate the sovereignty and laws of the Republic of Lithuania.

On January 31st, 1992, the first session of the State delegations for negotiations between the Republic of Lithuania (Head of the delegation Ceslovas Stankevicius) and of the Russian Federation (Head of the delegation Sergey Shakhray) took place in Vilnius. The bilateral communiqué fixed the agreed-upon date of February 1992 for the beginning of

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3 Treaty Between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on the Basis for Relations between States (signed in Moscow, on July 29, 1991).
4 The Russian Federation ratified this treaty half a year later – on January 17, 1992.
5 On the same day, as the Russian Supreme Soviet ratified the Lithuanian-Russian Treaty.
of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian territory. It also stated that negotiations on the procedure for the withdrawal and the termination of the withdrawal would be held and that agreements would be made promptly.

On **April 27th, 1992**, the Parliament passed a bill to hold a referendum, which took place on **June 14, 1992**. Over 76 percent of Lithuania's citizens entitled to vote participated. 90 percent of those participating in the referendum expressed the demand that "the withdrawal of the former USSR troops from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania be commenced immediately and completed in 1992, and that the damage inflicted to the people of Lithuania and the state be compensated".

10 **July 1992** – the CSCE Helsinki Summit final document called for the rapid withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic States in a simple manner: “withdrawal … as soon, as possible”. This formula was used in discussion on **19 July 1992** in the Petersberg Declaration (Bonn) on the meeting of WEU Council of Ministers. The Declaration stated that: “… 6. Ministers recalled that the presence of foreign forces on the territory of a sovereign state requires the explicit consent of that state. They stressed the importance of rapidly establishing, in the negotiations under way, timetables for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the Baltic States”.

On **August 6th, 1992**, Russia's Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev invited the Foreign Ministers of Baltic States to Moscow and raised the demand for the protection of the so-called Russian-speakers as a precondition for the withdrawal of the troops, saying that Russia would withdraw troops by 1994, if the following conditions were fulfilled:

1) laws concerning the rights of the Russian-speakers would be changed;
2) claims to border zone territories would be discarded;
3) the armed forces were given a legal status for their presence until their withdrawal;
4) strategic military possessions were preserved;
5) the demands for compensating the damage inflicted by the USSR during 1940-1991 were rescinded;
6) the Baltic States would undertake the construction of houses for the military of the units being withdrawn, in accord with the terms of the time-table for the withdrawal;
7) Russia would be given guarantee of free military transit to Kaliningrad;
8) the real estate and other possessions left by the departing troops would be compensated to Russia;
9) social protection of the military and their families would be guaranteed;
10) the Baltic states would abstain from one-sided actions during the withdrawal period;
11) discrimination of the Russian legal and natural persons in the sphere of ownership and property relations would be abolished.

Lithuania assessed these demands as an ultimatum, as unjust, and without foundation, and therefore, unacceptable.

The negotiations which took place in an intense and harsh manner in Moscow ended early in the morning of September 8th, 1992. Foreign Affairs Minister Vitaliy Churkin also participated in them.

Seven agreements were prepared for signing. However, in the evening of September 8th, 1992, at the final meeting of the Heads of States and the delegations held in the Kremlin, Russia decided to sign only three of the agreements.

The following agreements were signed:
- on the time table for the withdrawal of the troops; \(^6\)
- on issues regarding the organizational and technical aspects for the withdrawal process; \(^7\)
- regarding the procedure for functioning of the troops, pending their withdrawal. \(^8\) (During the 9 months process of the preparation of negotiations the main goals were reached).

**On 25 November 1992** – the United Nations General Assembly resolution called for the rapid withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic States.

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\(^6\) Timetable for the Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the Territory of the Republic of Lithuania (signed in Moscow on September 8, 1992).

\(^7\) Agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation on the Rules of Behavior and Functioning of Units and Military Officers of the Withdrawing Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (signed in Moscow on September 8, 1992).

\(^8\) Protocol on the Procedure of Settlement of Technical and Organizational Questions on the Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the Territory of the Republic of Lithuania (signed in Moscow on September 8, 1992).
In 1993 the process of the real withdrawal was totally stopped. The Lithuanian position, especially the claim that Russian troops had been stationed in Lithuania illegally, and that Russia had to pay compensation for the damages inflicted by the troops since 1940, had drawn harsh criticism from Russia. On several occasions Russia accused Lithuania of purposefully delaying the signing of the agreement until the last troops were completely withdrawn from Lithuania on August 31st, 1993.

According to Professor Romain Yakemtchouk, it was “a fine victory for international law, which successfully passed a long 50-year political and moral test”.

When on June 15th, 1940, the USSR invaded the Republic of Lithuania, the Soviet troops allocated for possible military actions against the Baltic States numbered 435,000 soldiers, around 8,000 guns and mortars, over 3,000 tanks, and over 500 armored cars.

The figures for the beginning of 1990 were as follows: Estonia – 200 000, Latvia – 30 000, Lithuania – 100 000 troops. For the beginning of 1992: Estonia – 26 000, Latvia – 45-50 000, Lithuania – 45-50 000 troops. According the Russian official announcement at the UN General Assembly on 19 December 1994, “more than 100 000 troops, 30 000 families which comprise about 105 000 people, 41.5 thousand pieces of equipment, about 700 000 tons of military stockpiles were removed with 230 warships which left Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia”, but in the document of the Assembly of WEU, “A European Defense policy”, issued on 17 November, 1994, it was

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9 See: http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/94-96/stankevi/home.htm “In November, 1992, a general election to the Seimas took place in Lithuania and in February, 1993, a Presidential election was held. Both elections were won by former communists and Soviet nomenclature. Algirdas Brazauskas was elected as the President. Russia had a great interest in the results of these elections. While the new governance of Lithuania was being formed and the State delegation for negotiations was being changed (April 27, 1993), Russia waited. She did not make any secret of her hope that the new governance in Lithuania would make one-sided concessions to Russian demands.”

10 On 31 August 1994 – Complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia, which coincided with the withdrawal of troops from other Central and Eastern European countries and from Eastern Germany.

indicated that “at the peak of its power, the Soviet Union had about 350 000 troops stationed at over 1 000 military bases in the three Baltic States”\textsuperscript{12}.

Some points regarding the issue of the so-called Russian speakers and the retired Russian military officers:

Upon the withdrawal of its occupation forces from the Baltic States, Russia left behind not only a contaminated environment, but also a considerable number of retired military officers and other “colonizers”. It is clear that there are Russian Lithuanians (they are citizens), but no Russians in Lithuania. In the Baltic States, the Russians and “colonizers” of other nationalities transferred here from "Great Russia" who stayed behind after the de-occupation are referred to by Russia as "Russian speakers". They are a political factor which Russia uses at an international level. To exert pressure on the Baltic States in order to isolate them, since 1992, Moscow has actively used the so-called problem of the rights of the Russian speakers (see: Andrei Kozyrev’s points mentioned before).

It is clear that the presence of large Russian minorities (as population of the country) represents a cultural and political threat in that they might be used by Russia to justify future intervention in the domestic affairs of the Baltic States by Russia.

The main political paradigm of Russia now is very clear "... the defense of the ethnic Russian is not an aim, but a means"\textsuperscript{13}. Russia presents the "... defense of the rights and interests of the Russian speakers" as a universal national interest in different countries in order to present them as an integral region ("immediate foreign space") where Russia bestows upon itself special rights\textsuperscript{14}. There are opinions that the terminology “immediate foreign space” means not only territories of the former Russian empire, latter the former USSR, but also as the space for/of propaganda (or informational) war with useful instruments in Russian language (newspapers and magazines, TV and radio programs, and so on).

\textsuperscript{12} See document No. 1445, item 97, p. 13 of the Fortieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU.
\textsuperscript{14} J.B.K. Lough, "Defining Russia's Role in the Near Abroad" (Soviet Studies Research Centre, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, April 1993).
The processes in Russia today has a simple definition – “re-establishing of Neostalinism in Russia”. Nothing has changed during the last 15 years in Europe, but something was changed dramatically in Putin’s Russia.

The security environment in Europe is changing drastically. The ideas of revenge and military pressure on neighboring countries has totally been implanted in the “brains” of the Russian powerful elite and among the “population” of the state.

The results of this Russian policy can be seen to day in Moldova (from 1992), Georgia (from 1992 and the war of 2008), Crimea (from occupation of 2014) or in the Donbas region (from 2014).

Regarding the clarification of the terminology, it is necessary to clarify the slogans: “crisis and Russia” and/or “crisis with Russia”.

Historically, the result of the vengeful and vindictive Russian policy will be the same: later or sooner – the collapse followed by the process of the withdrawal of Russian military troops from Ukraine and possible from others places in Europe.

The essential question of our modern times is - QUO VADIS, RUSSIA?

As an answer, let me quote: – “Narod bezmolvstvuet, the people are speechless” – which has become a Russian proverb. This is a final scene of “Boris Godunov” 15, by Alexander Pushkin:

“... We have seen their dead bodies.  
(The People are silent with horror).  
Why are you silent? Cry, Long live the tsar Dimitry Ivanovich!  
(The people are speechless).  

THE END “

This entire story is only an example of HISTORICAL MEMORY.

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Revista Română pentru Studii Baltice și Nordice – The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies is a biannual peer-reviewed journal dedicated to publishing the results of research in all fields which are intertwined with the aims of The Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies such as:

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Next deadlines: March 1, 2017 (vol. 9, issue 1) and August 31, 2017 (Vol. 9, issue 2).